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Ibis is a study of one South Asian state —  Ceylon. It is an 
analysis of the aspirations and frustrations, the trials and errors of 
a developing nation*state working toward finding its place in the world's 
state system. It is a dis^llate of contributory elements toward attain­
ing that condition referred to as This work emphasizes a
socio-political revolution in Ceylon between 195^ and 1964, a period of 
a people's determination to revive its cultural identity. It is placed 
against the broader background of political independence, and a history 
of 2500 years, lAich served as the stimulant for that determination.
Ibis study focuses on those instruments which can aid the social­
ization of diverse communities into a common whole or, conversely, can 
inhibit the process resulting in a continuum of divided, fragmented com­
munities. It attempts to illustrate how the inept use of these instru­
ments sacrifice logical processes in exchange for questionable rewards 
which accompany the desire for parochial identity.
Chapter I sketches the background from Ceylon's earliest point 
in historical time through four centuries of colonial bondage. It was 
an evolution of both pride and humiliation lAich today frames the con* 
tenporary structure which the C^lonese are preoccupied with a rebirth 
of cultural identity. Associated with the history is the revival of 
Buddhism and its current political implications. Ibis account forms
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Chapter C. Chapter H I  is devoted to the animosities current between 
the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils, the fears and frustra­
tions of both communities, and exas^les of racialism in Ceylonese socie­
ty, Chapter IV undertakes to summarize those problems connected with the 
utilization of material resources, and the shortcomings in the develop­
mental programs due to the socio-political factors. Chapter V places 
Ceylon within the scope of external relations; and how and why of being 
a «ftwaliomeri country, and its functions as a nonaligned state. Chapter 
VI deals with the political structure and the problems associated there­
with, the political parties and philosophies. The last chapter offers 
in summation a general approach to the problem areas through a more judi­
cious use of the instruments and institutions as a means toward the de­
sired goal —  nationalism.
Perhaps it would be appropriate to define the terms politics 
and nationalizing. The usage here of "politics" is taken to mean an 
instrument enqployed in undertaking a task; techniques to produce a de­
sired end; an approach-factor oriented toward a given goal which, in this 
case, is the unification of social groupŝ  It is also used, of course, 
in another sense, that of interactions between the actors in government 
and opposition forces.
"Nationalizing” means that process of bringing together diverse 
communities of human groups such as racial, caste, religion, labor, lin­
guistic, leadership, and ecetra, and through politics (as defined above) 
produce a society imbued with nationalism. The use of the word national­
izing seemed preferable to nationalization or nationalism on two counts. 
First, "nationalization" has taken on a rather narrow and specific
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connotation, i.e., the expropriation hy a government of foreign or domes­
tic economic enterprises, or the ownership and operation by a central 
government of enterprises previously private or of local government under­
taking. "Nationalism” was someidiat too broad both in definition and 
application. It is used by some authors in the behavioral sense, by 
others as an emotion, and by others as a process. Nationalizing here 
attempts to limit the definition to that process lAich proceeds the con­
dition of nationalism.
À word must be said also concerning dates, especially those pre­
dating European contact. For these, I have relied upon three principal 
sources: the Geiger translation of the Maharamaa,. Nicholas and Paranavitana, 
A^Jkmeise Jistorv of Ceslon: From the Earliest Times to the ArrivaLof 
■the Portuguese in 1505. and Ariyapala, Society in Medieval Cevlon. The 
dates I have used find common accord in these sources. The same authors 
are in close agreement as to the spelling of the names of people and 
places. For other Sinhala terms, I have used Geiger's in Etymological 
Glossary of the Sinhalese Language.
I have sincerely tried to avoid subjecüveness in this work. 
Frequently, literature dealing with a foreign country enqphasizes the 
values and observations which best reflect the author's society. His 
qmqpathies are very often oriented tow^ad his own kind, his own way-of- 
life. This I have tried to avoid. In the attempt to stay within the 
grey range of the black and tdiite scale, I hope I have succeeded, in 
effort has been made to construct this work neither as a pure vehicle of 
opinion, nor just an almanac of factual data. It contains some of each. 
Whatever value the factual data might have, perhaps it rests in summar­
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izing the political, rssoorce, and social facets of a very small inde­
pendent entity among the states of the world.
This work was undertaken in partial fulfillment of the require­
ments for the Degree of Doctor of Philosopk^ at the University of Okla­
homa. The question of acknowledgments is always a very difficult one, 
since it is virtually impossible to include names of all those who 
have ̂ vea me stimulation and guidance over the years. But especially,
I owe a debt of gratitude to the several who have had direct contact with 
this dissertation. First and foremost, to my doctoral committee at the 
University of Oklahoma: Dr. Rufus G. Hall, the committee chairman, i&o 
guided me in this woit from the idea stage through to this, the finished 
product. And to Or. Oliver E. Benson, Dr. John Paul Duncan, Dr. W. Nelson 
Peach, and Dr. John W. Wood, all took the time to discuss relevant points, 
make suggestions, and lend encouragement. I am grateful too for the in­
terest shown in this study by Dr. Walter F. Scheffer, the Chairman of the 
Department of Government. A number of agencies in Cqylon have been of 
great help in responding to inquiries for data and other materials. % e  
typing of the final draft is the handiwork of Mrs. Joe Blackburn of 
Norman, Oklahoma. This woi^ would by no means be finished today if it 
had not been for my wife, Bettie Lou, who in addition to her encourage­
ment and patience, spent long hours at the typewriter with preliminary 
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IMTBODOCIÏQN
South-^utheast Asia lies in a long, sweeping are aronnd the 
southern and eastern peripheries of the Asian continent. Its lard zone 
begins at the point where Pakistan's border intersects the Makran coast; 
it runs along China's southern boundary to the northeastern tip of Viet­
nam, southeast to the Philippines, then southward to include Indonesia. 
The region is one of startling diversity in cultures, religions, tradi­
tions, economies, and political developments» The history is written in 
tezms of tens of centuries, its population is counted in the hundreds of 
millions, the geographic area is measured by millions of square miles.
The term "South Asia" is cooqparatively new having replaced the outmoded 
"subcontinent" reference to India, Pakistan, C^lon, and the ELmalaya 
kingdoms of Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim. "Southeast Asia" is chosen in 
relation to the area it designates encoaçassing the states of Burma, 
Cambodia, Korea, Laos, the Malaysian states, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Vietnam.
Ten countries in South-Southeast Asia became self-governing 
states between July h, 1946 fAion the Philippines gained its independence 
from the United States, and December 28, 1949 when Indonesia emerged from 
under the guardianship of the Netherlands. Interspersed between these 
two dates, India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia
gained some measure of independence.^ The cumulative geographic terri­
tory involved roughly 2.8 million square miles, and a population of 
approximately 7^5 million people.
White man's flight from this part of the world is usually dated 
by the mid-twentieth century. However it may have had its beginning a 
hundred years earlier, or at any one of the subsequent points along the 
route of history. It may have begun in China in 1842 when the Treaty of 
Nanking, with all advantages accruing to the foreigner, set guidelines 
for accords defined by the Chinese as "unequal treaties". The Boxer 
Rebellion (1899-1900), anti-Western and anti-Christian in nature, may 
have marked the event. Or perhaps it was Japan's defeat of Russia in 
1904-1905 lAich awakened the revolutionary impetus among all Asian nations 
suffering, in various degrees, from non-Asian iî aet. Perhaps it was the 
voices of Gandhi, Jinnah, and Nehru in India. There are any number of 
events idiich might well have been the beginning of the flight, but the 
real exodus began on a gray September morning in 1945 in Tokyo Bay, Ihe 
signature of Maaoru Sbigemitsu, Minister of Foreign Affairs to His Imperial 
Japanese Majesty, affixed to the instrument of capitulation dlearly spelled 
out both military defeat and propaganda victory for the Asian peoples.
There was no question as to the embarrassment of the military defeat, but 
in terms of propaganda Japan's sporadic victories and the contributions 
the Asian people had made on both sides in the war effort gave a good in­
dication as to lAat could be attained through cooperative arrangements in
^India and Pakistan were granted independence on August 15, 1947. 
In 1948, Burma, Cpylon, and Korea became self-governing on January 4, 
February 4, and August I5 respectively; and in 1949 Vietnam on March 8,
Laos on July 19, Cambodia on November 8.
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peacetime. The slogan "Asia for Asians", bom of cynieism and of undated 
origin, no longer had the hollow ring; Asian would join Asian to make 
e:q)lioit that the lAite man need no longer burden himself.
The demands for self-governing status brought the emergent states 
out from under the protective umbrellas of the motherlands to bask in 
idiat Asians assumed to be the sunshine of autonomy. The people took a 
starried-eyed approach toward the newly won freedom, believing that inde­
pendence of and by itself would produce satisfaction of their economic 
needs and wants, ethnic and racial equality, and brighter tomorrows.
There was a harvest to be reaped: dignity and respect among the world 
community, equitable économie returns for products and labor, and self- 
determination in charting a course of conÿlete self-rule.
Crucial to the democratic political process was the common de­
nominator of natianaHam wherein parochial interests would be melded and 
separatist groups would voluntarily accept changes in social structures 
lAich had been part of the ethnical consciousness for centuries. The 
architects of the independence movements were wÆL aware that national­
ism could be brought about only through effort and tolerance respecting 
the provincial diversildes. Working plans contained rather broad prin­
ciples lAich dictated dramatic changes in the value system —  changes 
affecting all groupings from peasant to elite. It was admitted that per­
haps some inequities did e:d.st in the format, but these were thought to 
be of minor consequences.
In the history of social organization, acquiescence to dramatic 
changes in life styles have a rather sorry record of success. Political 
and economic orders have been plagued by the cosgplex of mores, customs.
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and ideologies which have created deep chasms among social groups. In 
the traditional societies the art of living —  and in maxgr areas of the 
world it is still an "art" —  had centered itself upon allegiance and 
responsibilities to family, village, and caste. This relatively narrow 
interest had negated the acquiring of a sense of common good for the 
larger society. Communal separatism was based upon castes and sub-castes, 
classes and sub-classes, a system which for centuries had been the accept­
ed social structure. The doctrine of superiority verses inferiority was 
grounded firmly in ritual texts and philosophical treatises. Customs 
and beliefs were nutured in religious soil.
Challenge of these dogmas had always existed covertly in some 
quarters but customary law and, later, the politico-economic fabric of 
colonialism were successful in holding tight reins against violent erup­
tions within the internal structure. The vanishing of the protective 
force of Western paternalism coupled with the idea of equality under 
constitutional law produced a new environment, one in lAich the long-held 
premises were overtly contested. Challenge by the lesser status groups 
were met with responses by the elite; groups struggled to raise their 
rank i&ile others fought to retain theirs. The lines of separate iden­
tities hardened.
Among the states of South-Southeast Asia, with the possible ex­
ception of the Philippines, the new status of political independence 
proved to be the harbinger of a time of new troubles. All too soon it 
became obvious that the scales of aspirations and efforts were out of 
balance; people expected too much, too soon, and with too little effort 
on their part. They clamored for material increments lAile refusing to
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make any aaerifloes vblch meant changing traditional living patterns.
There was much that was "sacred" about the "old ways". But, the people 
themselves were not entirely at fault. The elite xdio had led them down 
the path of independence had made promises which predicted something of 
a Utopia. It was iiq>lied at least that there was something for everyone; 
that even the depressed, poverty-ridden villagers would soon be Inxur- 
iating in abundance. The tins^ of a self-sustaining economic system 
lost its sparkle as self-governing status failed to provide automatically 
the solution to all problems. Aside from the fact that development plans 
had been conceived in an agglomerate environment of inesçezience, naivete, 
and idealism, there were other factors militating against the instant 
realization of the dreams.
The power to govern was a coveted prize sought by the elite tdien 
the colonial powers relinquished administration. Political matters were 
far more inqportant in terms of personal power and, concomitantly, personal 
reward. Concern for économie matters confined itself largely to self- 
interest profit motives. To be sure there was national planning which 
included schemes for "modernizing" the countries, but here efforts were 
directed generally to projects of the prestige t̂ pos, and these came 
quickly under the control of the elite groups. Among a very large per­
centage of the people, these economic excesses created grave doubts as to 
the virtue of the free enterprise doctrine of minimal government control 
in business and industry. Elitist philosophy preached of relieving de­
privations among the less fortunate fellowmen, but theory and practice 
were widely separated. There was little attention given to the condition­
ing process by lAich inter-community relations could be bettered insofar
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as removing prevailing fears and suspicions* The negligence of the lead­
ership and ineffectual administration left the ground barren for the 
growth of political stability.
If, in the past, particularisms had made difficult associations 
between multiple status communities, the present has yet to find a solu­
tion to the nationalizing of these groups* Thus, there are some iag>er- 
atives lAioh face all emergent states regardless of the geographical 
location* These are*
1) the discovery and ia^lementation of political and economic 
principles broad enough to pervade all cultures and commun­
ities within a respective state in order that nationalism 
can become a reality;
2) freedom from the coercions of poverty and oppressions,
3} the protection of the characteristics of the individual group 
so that their identity —  heritage and tradition —  will not 
be lost*
The island of Ceylon offers fertile ground for an inquiry into 
the problems which surround the nationalizing process* Long contact with 
European powers have bequeathed to Ceylon a Westernized flavor, and with 
it a stature of perhaps the most sophisticated member of the Eastern 
state system* It has a thoroughly coiq>etent, articulate, and proud 
middlaeifl.as in its socio-economlc strata, a rather lengthy acquaintance­
ship with an elective form of government, and although there is much 
factionalism among its political parties, still the Parliamentary struc­
ture of its government has never been challenged in the past* There is 
another side of the coin however* The realities of economic life have
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slowed the dreams and aspirations of the Ceylonese people. There are 
fears and suspicions iddeh divide the island's pidneipal racial-linguistic 
eommonities, the Sinhalese and Tamils, and the struggle for power in the 
political area threatens to invite radicalism.
The problems facing Ceylon are those lAich occur in that a#cward 
gap of transition from the adolescence stage of colonial protectionism to 
national state autonomy. For any emergent nation, the road between these 
two is long, filled with unê qpected detours. It is one of indecisiveness 
and, most frequently, of painful experimentation, violent rejection of 
the colonialism past, and the determination to justify the fnture with 
the present. In Ceylon the formidable barriers toward nationalism fall 
under four general headings; the people's sense of inadequacy, national 
disunity, indecision as to the political process, and the pace of modern­
ization.
The sense of inadequacy is an inheritance of colonial rule.
There is an intellectual climate in lAich memories of shame and inequal­
ity are still quite vivid, and although subjection to the European may 
have been something less than that normally meant by the term "bondage”, 
it nevertheless was submission to alien masters who preached by their 
words and manners their own racial and cultural superiority. Foreign 
domination created an iron tyranny of servitude, the consciousness of 
inferiority, the depressing condition of being fettered to living pro­
cesses oUier than those of the indigenous culture.
With independence, the majority people —  the Sinhalese —  began 
a cultural retreat to pro-colonial days to capture the inspiration for a 
future society based upon parochial roots. This parochialism is now an
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obstacle to national nnity. Implicit in the independence process was a 
like degree of autonomy for the majority and minority alike. Sinhalese 
fervor gives the appearance of pursuing a course of puzposeful destruction 
of those safeguards ̂ iich assure the preservation of the language, cus­
toms, and mores of minority groups. In Ceylon, as elsewhere, nationalism 
demands some deemphasis of cultural traits among all communities of a 
pluralistic society, and a conciliatory approach to others, for the re­
moval of the witchery of hatred and fears.
The political process is thoroughly imbued with elective forms 
and r^resantative government and, fortunately to the present time at 
least, has had no significant record of violent opposition. Yet, the 
future is in doubt. Current difficulties among the plural society, the 
preoccupation with status, and the restricted opportunities for educated 
individuals do not augur well for future public policy without creating 
even further disunity among the people.
Another area of conflict among the people of Cqylon is the mat­
ter of tempo for modernization of the country. Divergent opinions as to 
the pace of innovation and industrialization have split groups into sub­
groups, each intent upon making gains for itself without thought as 
to the disadvantage to the other. The result has been dislocation and 
confusion among the people.
If the separate communities, and the groups and sub-groups with­
in the communities, continue to insist upon attaining separate identities, 
to the virtual exclusion of any sacrifice for benefiting the whole society, 
the future forbodes ill. The history, religions, communities, power pol­
ities, resources, and internationalism form the matrix of the problem of
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nationalizing. Each part contrlbates its share in retarding the hoped 
for national identity —  that somewhat indefinite agglomerate of common 
ideas, common feelings, and common memories* li&thout some sort of a 
solution, the future holds little else other than an accelerated drift 
toward chaos through increasing hostilities among political parties, re­
ligious commnnities, and social groups*
CHAPTER I
THE POLITICS OF HISTORY
The national flag of modem C^lon flattered proudly over the 
island for the first time on the morning of February 4, 194S. lûth a 
figure of a yellow lion against a maroon field, this sjnabol of sovereignty
THE MTXOHAL FLAG
Fig. 1.— Ihe maroon field is occupied by the symbol of the yel­
low Hon lAieh is distinctive of the island, the Sinhaladipa of history. 
The two vertical strips are green and saffron, and have been added to 
the flag to r^resent the minority groups.
pembodied the ancient Hon Flag lAose historical association with tiie 
Sinhalese people dates to the pre-Christian times and the legendary 
founding of the "lion-race" in 543 B.C. On that morning it meant the
2A historical sketch of the Flag will be found in Appendix I.
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M UQNAL CQ4T OF ARUS
Fig* 2.— !Qie National Coat of Arms derives its charaoter from 
the separate coaponeat parts* Flowers ocoapied a promiaent part in 
C^lon heraldry. The badge of the Royal Boase was the sunflower, the 
lotus was that of the nation* Note the lotus petals about the dark field 
(maroon) whieh bears the lion (yellow)* The Crown was added at the time 
of independence signifying Ceylon as a member-state of the British Common­
wealth.
return of autonomous rule to SM Tjmka.3 after 443 years of colonial sta­
tus* It otmnoted a proud new position, one full of bright promise, among 
the world* s state system. Self-governing status brought to an end the 
long record written by those who, over the centuries, had come for spices, 
gems, and elephants, and had remained to rule*
Strangers from all lands had used Lanka as a stepping stone
3s h  lAtiifA is Sanskrit for "The Island", and as such is used in 
legislative enactments and official business* It is possible that in 
the near future will replace "Ceylon* on area maps* Therefore the
Sanskrit term will be used interchangeably with the Bi^sh designate 
throughout the text*
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across the Indian Ocean* The Egyptian cartographer Ptolemy, and in tom 
the Greeks and Romans, called the land Tanrobane. derived from the Pali 
laabaeiflBl» its Sanskrit name, (lion dselling-place) is
connected mith the settling hy the Sinhalese people* And through the 
process of time it became £LdB to the Tamils of South India, ss-ian to 
(Mnese traders, Seymiitb in Arabic, Cetlao to the Portuguese, to
the Dutch, and Cevlon to the English speaking world* But by idiatsoever 
name it was called, Lanka has always had a magnetic attraction* Eamhsien, 
the Chinese scholar, recorded that from foreign merchants fdio traded with 
the island, "people of their various countries heard how pleasant the 
land was, and flocked to it in numbers till it became a great nation,"
The Venetian Harco Polo, after pausing there in the year 1293 on his 
homeward voyage, wrote that "the ialand produces more beautiful and val­
uable rubies than are found in any other part of the world, and likewise 
sapphires, topazes, garnets, and many other precious and costly stones*"^ 
Lanka has been described as a land "set like a delicate piece of jade in 
a turquoise sea*"*
Ihere is some miseonc^tion that C^lon is an island possession 
of India, This error comes about because of the close geographical prox­
imity of the two* In the Bay of Bengal and shaped something like a pearl 
pendant, or perhaps a mango fruit, Ceylon is s^arated from India's
^Quoted by Elsie K* Cook, Cevlon: Its Geography. Its Resources 
and Its People (2nd ed*, rev*, Madras: Macmillan & Co*, 1951)» p. 5*
5fhe Travels of Marco Polo, trans* and ed* VdUiam Marsden 
(Garden (M.ty, New York: International Collectors Library, 1946), p* 2̂ 4*
^Slr Ivor Jennings, of Cevlon (London: Stevens &
Co*, 1952), p. 3.
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southernmost tip by the twenty^three miles of Falk Strait. %th this 
exertion) it is a long way to any other land. Southward lie the wastes 
of the Aataretica some 70OO miles distance, 2500 miles westward is the 
East AfZdcan shoreline, and to the east is Singapore roughly 1800 miles 
with only the tip of &uaatra breaking the monotony of watery distance.
Perhaps sometime in the prehistoric past there may have been 
lAat amounted to a land bridge linking Ceylon with its northern neighbor. 
There is a series of sandbars, some above and some slightly below the 
surface, extending across the Strait. And lion teeth fossils found in 
the mid-summer of I963 give some weight to the theory that it was once 
part of India's land mass. These archeological findings have, in add­
ition to their geographical consequence, some social significance since 
the King of Beasts finds a special place in the hearts of the Sinhalese 
community and roams, as it does, through Sinhala myth, l%end, and folk­
lore. There is no archival material to indicate that the animal ever 
existed in the island's lush jungles, however, the fossils pose the ques­
tion as to idiether or not ancient Lanka may not have been a "lion dwelling- 
place" in fact as weU as in legend and tradition.
The cultural link is an entirely different story. Here it is 
difficult to determine lAere Indian influence has not penetrated. The
ancient legends of both India and Ceylon And common ground in the
7 8Ramavana' and the MahAvamga^” Buddhism was brought to Ceylon from India.
^One of the great Indian epics of the Vedic Period written by 
the renowned Indian sage Valmiki. The original version contained 24,000 
couplets. Historians differ on the time of the Vedic Period but 1200- 
700 B.C. seems acceptable.
Û
The second of three great Pali Chronicles in verse which tell
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For losg p@zd.ods of time Tamil power from southern India held the island 
in its grip, and from the sixteenth century onward much of the European 
administration was India based. No iiq>ortant change in Indian civiliza­
tion has failed to leave its iBg>ress. This profound innpact on the polit­
ical, social, and religious areas is quite unmistakable, as are the 
commonalities of problems and maladjustments of both contenqporary Indian 
and Ceylonese societies.
There is no way to separate legend from fact in the history of 
Ceylon, they merge with one another in a hazy fashion. The earliest 
mention of the country's existence comes by way of the RamA-gana. the 
story of woman's loyalty, passions, and tragedy. One can point out the 
similarity here with the Odvssev. but the resemblance is only slight, 
since the has more of the sombre Shakespearian approach rather
than the adventures of Ulysses. Since the story is not too widely known 
outside the relatively narrow area of Indian literature, a sketch of the 
tale follows.
A young Indian Prince, Rama, went into voluntary exile in the 
Dandak wilderness of southern India, accompanied by his Princess Sita, 
and his brother Laksmana. One day lAile Rama and Laksmana were away on 
a hiiHtdng eagpeditioD, Ravana, the Demon King of Lanka, came to the herm­
itage in the guise of am escetic. He wooed Sita. Rebuffed, he carried
the history of Buddhism but also contain valuable political and social 
history. The Dloavamsa (Island Chronicle) and %ie (Lesser
Chronicle) together with the Mah&vamaa (Great Chronicle) make up the 
literary work.
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her off by force over the boundless ocean to i&ere ̂ Lanka rose with 
tonreriog pride*. The two brothers, with the ^ d  of Sogriva, the king of 
the monk^, and his trusted general Hanumant, searched far and wide for 
Sita. (Qie latter found the abducted woman in Ravana*s palace and, with 
the aid of an army of monkeys and bears, helped Rama to build a causeway 
of stones across the water from Southern India to Lanka. ̂ Rama warred 
with the abductor and was victorious. But Sita had dwelt under the roof 
of another man and though she had not yielded to his desires, according 
to Sacred Law, Rama was forced to radiate her. To prove her innocence 
she offered herself to an ordeal of fire and though she ranained unscathed, 
still the people were suspicious of her piety. & e  implored Mother Earth 
to open up and swallow her; the wish was granted.
The author VaLniki perhaps was a contemporary of the hero, Rama, 
lAo may actually have existed as a "chief idw lived in the eighth or sev­
enth century It may have been that Valnriki aceozqaanied an aagy
as a chronicler from the kingdom of Eosala, (its present counterpart would 
be roughly the present state of Madhya Pradesh) as his prince invaded the 
island. This is peculation, of course.
"Sinhalese" (Idon-race) is derived from the story of the
^The earlier mentioned sandbars across the Strait, according to 
legend, are part of this causeway.
lOppobably one of the best condensed translations is that of 
Romesch C. £kitt. The Ramavana and the Mahabharata (London: J. N. Bent & 
Sons, 1929). The condensed translation runs approximately 2200 couplets. 
Mr. Butt is one of the most distinguished literary sons of modem India. 
The story can also be found in prose. See Maurice Collis, (hiest for Sita 
(New York; The John Bay Co., 194?)•
L. Basham, The Wonder Tndia (Inndon; Sidgwiek and
Jackson, 195 )̂» p. 303.
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12Mahavamsa lAioh relates to the settling of Lanka hy %jaya, the son of 
the slayer of a lion (sinhala). According to the Great Chronicle, a male 
child was bom from a union between a human princess and a lion. %e 
hands and feet of the child ̂ ere fomed like a lion's and therefore she 
(his mother) named him Sihabahn.*’̂  ̂ Eventually, Sihabahu slew his lion- 
father and, because of parentage, was the founder of the lion-race. As 
a king, he ruled over the kingdom of Lala, and he and his consort had 
many sons (thirty-two in all). One among these was Vijaya idio was con­
secrated as prinee-regent. But Vijaya
Was of evil conduct and his followers were even (like himself), and 
mazy intolerable deeds of violence were done by then. Angered by 
this the people told the matter to the king; the king, speakizig 
persuasively to them, severely blamed M.s son. But all fell out 
again as before, the second and yet the third time; and the az^ered 
people said to the kings 'Kill thy son.'
Then did the kizig cause Vijaya azid his followers, seven hundred men, 
to be shaven over half their head azid put on a ship and sent them 
forth upon the sea, azid their wives and children also.*^
The prince named Vijaya, the valiant, landed in Lanka, in the region 
called Tambapaoni.15
^^UUheLm Geiger, trans., Tha Mahavamsa (Colombes Ceylon Gov­
ernment Information Department, I96O). This is the chief authority of 
the history of the island up to 35^ A.D. The Geiger translation first 
appeared in 1912, and was reprinted in 1934, 1930, azid i960.
%̂bid.. p. 31. Sihabahu (in Pali texts Sihabhuja) means "Lion-
arm"
PP* 33-34. The head shaving was a ritual lAich desig­
nated the loss of freedom.
^^Ibid.. p. 5k, Tambapazmi literally means "red earth". The 
soil of Ceylon is composed of laterit lAich crumbles into red dust. The 
exact site has never been detezmined with accuracy but there is common 
agreement that it was on the west coast, a short distance below the pres­
ent Wazmar at the source vmere the old Kadambanadi flowed past Anuradhapura. 
!Qie Kadambanadi has been renamed the Walwatu Oya. See map p. 22.
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Thus was the royal house of Sinhala established on Lanka, lannehing a 
nonarehial chronology lAich was to last for 2100 years and cover the 
rolership of 180 monarchs until the sixteenth century.
It would indeed require a broad canvass to paint the historical 
evolution in detail. There is room only for those highlights idiich are 
suggestive of forces that left an indelible iŝ rint. Even with this se­
lectivity, the history becomes a little burdensome. But it should be 
kept in mind that a time-span of more than two millennia is being dealt 
with, and that while the names of people and places, occurences and dates, 
may make wearisome reading, it is the melding of these within the frame- 
work of the past which gives a clearer perception of the present and 
perhaps iUmishes some insight into the future.
A characteristic of C^lon* s history are the few periods during 
lAich the idiole island was united under a single ruler. Most frequently 
the countzy was divided into several power spheres, and occasionally, in 
addition, small scattered enclaves existed for short periods. These were 
harmless as a threat to an established domain, but were in^ortant as an 
early prototype of the balance-of-power (aquation. Periods of decline be­
came more frequent and of longer duration as time moved on toward the 
sixteenth century. Court and army intrigues were restponsible for the c
obituaries of a long list of monarchs. The era witnessed invasions from 
Southern India, since invasions were in style as the sport of kings. Ri­
val claimants to power and sovereigns alike were not adverse to enq>loying 
mercenaries whose loyalties depended on the fortune of battle. The mil­
itary hired hands were often carried away, as the saying goes, with their 
own exuberance* There were some short lived heroic episodes but these
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were overshadowed 1^ internal pressures of dynastic rivalries and civil 
strife, and were as much responsible for the tangled history as were the 
external forces* The latter were to play a far more significant role in 
the future*
% e  event lAich was to have immortal isqpact was the coming of 
Buddhism in the third century B.C. This will be discussed fully in a 
later chapter, but here it will suffice to note that the religion, dur­
ing the periods of stability, can be credited as the rallying force for 
creativeness in the arts as evidenced Iqr the teoqsles, statues, and fres­
coes, and for progress in social and technological attainments* The 
monarchs lAo were successful in establishing single sovereignty are among 
the heroes of Sinhalese history and literature*
First among these was Duttha Gamani who ruled between 161-137
B.C. Lanka had been successfully invaded by the Tamil king SLara result­
ing in a long occupation of the idiole northern half of the island* Al­
though Hara was a Hindu-Tamil reigning over a Buddhist-Sinhalese people, 
his justice commanded the respect of the people* Duttha Gamani, an im­
petuous youth moved the fire of adventure and freedom for his country, 
fought ELara at the city of Anuradhapura*
Near the south gate of the city the two kings fought; ELara hurled 
his dart, Gamani evaded it; he made his own elephant pierce (ELara's) 
elqahant with his tusks and he hurled his dart at ELara; and this 
(latter) fell there, with his elephant.lo
Of and by itself, the event is of questionable interest* But 
it is significant insofar as this pattern of strife was to be the scourge 
of the country for the next 1800 years, and the nationalistic fervor of
•» P« 175»
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Duttha Gamani in the century before the Christian Era was to find many 
corollaries down to the mid*twentieth century A.D*
The time q»an from kjf B.C. to 846 A.D. is the period of the 
Anuradhapura kings, so designated the site of the royal residence.
This continuity was interrupted for twenty years when King Kassapa I 
held court at Sigiriya. One among the several despotic characters in 
Sinhalese history, his is a story of cowardice, cruelty, sensuality —  
and the bequeathing to posterity a monument of which a Pharaoh would have 
been proud. Some six hundred feet atop Sigiriya (Lion Rock), Kassapa 
used Idle four acre plateau to build his iapr^nable fortress of palace, 
storage tanks, baths, living quarters for bis court, and formal gardens. 
The ruins still attract tourists and along a spiral stairway are to be 
found the world famous Sigiriya frescoes.
With the death of Kassapa I, his successor Moggallana I moved 
back to Anuradhapura (Royal City) in 497 A.D., and here the capital re­
mained until Polonnaruwa was selected in 10^6 as the seat of government
by the powerful Vijaya Bahu I. These capital sites are of historic
18interost as they are the major "Lost Cities" of preswt day C^lm.
^^These are the only ancient painti%s in Ceylon that do not 
have religious significance. They are definitely sensuous in appeal.
The women, mostly in pairs, are Aryan in features, large-breasted, small- 
waisted, with soft smiles on their Ups. At first sight, th^ appear 
to be nude; however, close inspection reveals diaphanous garments. No 
archival material has been found lAich identify the artist or idiat the 
paintings depict. Some idea of the art woric can be found in Plates Nos. 
40 and ̂ 1 of the photographic collection by Pietro Francesco Mele,
Cevlon. (Rome: Bdizioni Mediterranee, N.D.).
IS^e "Lost Cdties" find their place more appropriately in the 
story of Buddhism, thus, for purposes here the discussion will be found 
in Chp. II.
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The record of the thousand years since Duttha Gamani is the 
history of a land and people racked hy political and religious disputes. 
IDivasions such as those of the Pandyans and the Cholas came on a grand 
scale. üSiis maxked the rise of the great Chola Bqxire iddch at first 
overshadowed and finally engulfed the Sinhalese Island Kingdom sometime 
between 1001 and IOO5 A.D. The conquest was completed two years later 
and the king, Mahinda V, was deported to India.
The country was reunited by Parakrama Bahu I (The Great) HmMng 
his reign from 1153 to 1186, decades idiich were the zenith of Sinhalese 
greatness. Parakrama* s interest lay in the construction of numerous 
palaces, buildings, and gardens; he restored Buddhist shrines, and rec­
onciled the divisions among Buddhist priests thereby purifying the re­
ligion. The irrigation works to which he gave much attention were spec­
imens of engineering art. But taxation had fallen heavy upon the people;
his wars and construction costs "iapoverished the country, which never 
19recovered." ' Nevertheless, deepite its cost, Parakrama Bahu had united 
the country, and had given the Sinhalese people a brilliant page in their 
history. Eds name is still reverenced in modem Ceylon.
Following Parakrama* s death, civil strife again tore at the
vitals of Lanka. By the b%inning of the thirteenth century there were
20three well established divisions: Pihiti, Naya-rata, and Suhunu. The
W. Codrington, A Short History of Cevlon (rev. ed., London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1939)» p. 65.
20See map, p. 22. According to available records, there was in 
existence during the twelfth century much the same boundary divisions
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tides of war shifted the Sinhalese royal residence from Dambadeniya to 
Yapahuva, to Kurunegala, then to Gao ôla* Finally, in 1̂ 15, Parakrama 
Baha IV established total power over the island settling his kingdom at 
Kotte, The îms of this Parakrama rests upon his uniting the island un­
der a royal sovereign for the last time in the history of Lanka. Event­
ually, the country was again divided into three kingdoms: Kotte, Jaffha, 
and Kandy. Parakrama* s successor maintained control only over Kotte. 
Jaffna appeared at some uncertain date in the thirteenth century, prob­
ably the latter part, reaching its zenith by the last half of the four­
teenth century. An adopted son of Parakrama Bahu II, Sapomal Kumaraya, 
by virtue of conquest created a power structure within the Jaffha kingdom 
by which his descendants were to gain control of a considerable part of 
the island. Kandy, under an independent monarch, seems to have been es­
tablished about 1460.
On the morning of November 15, 1505, & Sinhalese noting strange
ships in the harbor at Colombo, made straightway for an audience with his
king. He said to the monarch
There is in our harbour of Colombo a race of people fair of skin and 
comely withal. They don jackets of iron and hats of iron: they rest 
not a minute in one place; they walk here and there; they eat hunks 
of stone and drink blood; they give two or three pieces of gold or 
silver for one fish or one lime; the report of their cannon is louder 
than thunder. . . , Their cannon balls fly many a gawwa.21
but named Raya-rata, Dakkhina-desa, and Ruhunu-rata respectively. These 
changed shortly after Parakrama Bahu's death. As Ariyapala notes: 
"Tentatively it can be suggested that the change seems to have taken 
place between the time of Parakrama Bahu and Lilavati (A.D. 1197-1200)." 
M. B. Ariyapala, Society in Medieval, Cevlon (Colombo: K.V.G. De Silva, 
1956).















Fig, 3«— Boundaries of Pihiti, Maya-rata and Ruhunu
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Tims did a Portuguese squadron of nine baxels cosœ&anded by Dorn Loreneo
de Almeida make their appearance on Lanka's coast* History records it a
chance visit, the ships having been bloun off course. The Sinhalese king.
Vira Parakrama Bahu VIU was
Naturally incredulous that such a strange people could exist, and 
he therefore sent his son in disguise to Colombo in order to dis­
cover the truth* The Prince on his return said to his fathers 
'To fight these men is useless; it will be well to give themaudience I*22
The "hunks of stone" and the "blood" —  the eating of bread and drinking 
of wine —  were to become familiar sights in Colombo, as were the cannon 
balls which would "fly many a gawwa"*^^ But the Portuguese story of isM 
perialism actually had begun a decade earlier*
On June 9» 1494, the Vest declared unremitting economic war 
against the Bast with the Treaty of Trodesilhas hy lAich Spain and Portu­
gal divided the world into spheres of influence* Trodesilhas fixed a 
north-south line running through the Atlantic Ocean, 370 miles west of 
Cape Verde, demarcating respective zonal frontiers for economic and re­
ligious conquest* The treaty was given a Papal sanction through the 
is8uii% of a BuU 1;̂  Pope Alexander VZ Borgia.
For Portugal, the Trodesilhas Treaty was the conclusion of the 
e:q>erimental phase of exploration begun under Henry, the Navigator, idiose 
inspiration and patronage of scientists, astronomers, and cartographers 
was to make Portugal a mighty sea power* It was at the Mediterranean 
port city of Ceuta, over iddeh Henry reigned, that he heard of supposedly
^^Lord Holden Holden, ggaLoa, (London* George Allen and Unwin, 
1939), pp. 90-91*
^^One gawwa equals one-half mile, approximately*
24
Christian kingdoms on India's northern coast, on the western desert of 
China, and in Ethiopia. Here too he had learned the myth of "Prester 
John”, the Christian monarch idio, it was said, was so powerfol that some 
seventy kings paid him tribute. Sach an ally, Henry thought, would be 
of inestimable value in the religious war against the Muslims, but there 
would be material benefits as well. Into Portugal's hands would fall 
the rich commerce in spices and gems, and Europe would come to Portu­
gal for the lumry items of % e  Bast. The Church gave wholehearted en­
couragement to ejqploratiom since it too could envision great rewards. 
There were converts to be gained among "heathen peoples" living in dis­
tant lands. Thus did the State and Church collaborate; the slogan was 
"Trade and the Cross". 1502, the Portuguese had gained part of their 
objective as wholesalers in trade between India and Europe.
The presence of the "strange people" at Colombo in I505 perhaps 
had awed and frightened Vira Parakrama. At any rate, he invited the 
squadron commander to a r^ral audience during which he pressed for Portu­
guese protection against the triple threat of Tamils, Arab traders, and 
warring Sinhalese princes. In return, the foreigner would receive a 
large portion of the cinnamon trade. A bargain was struck. Dom Loreneo 
and the fleet sailed leaving behind a few officials to oversee Portugal's 
new interest. For the following twelve years there were only occasional
contacts. Portugal's ships made periodic calls at Colombo for cinnamon
24cargoes bound for the marketplaces of Europe. But little materialized
^^hhe cinnamon trade, from the earliest times, had been in the 
hands of foreigners, the South Indians, Greeks, Arabs, Persians, and 
Muslims. The Portugese gradually took over this trade carrying Ceylon 
cinnamon to the Continent.
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in the v&y of defensive measures for the Kotte kingdom, ««H the Portu­
guese stationed in Colombo held themselves aloof from Sinhalese sooiety.
Vira Parakrama died at some uncertain date between 1513 and 1518, 
leaving two sons as co-regents to the throne. In a court intrigue, the 
younger of the two, Vijaya Bahu VU, overpowered his brother, ind it was 
Vijaya who received the word that a large squadron of Portuguese vessels 
had anchored off Golombo.^^ The year was 1513. The event was much the 
same as the earlier arrival but this time circumstances were different. 
Colombo had been a chance port-of-call twelve years earlier; now it was 
part of a wÆL planned casqtaign.
Lopo Soares de Albergaria, the armada commander, was taken to 
the palace lAere he told his host of the hatred of the Portuguese for the 
Muslims, and suggested constructing a fort at Colombo from which to carry 
on the fight to rid the East of this "scourge". Vijaya Bahu hesitated, 
requesting time for consultation with his court. While the king's coun­
cilors were deliberating, the Portuguese troops provoked a riot in Colombo; 
the town was set afire. The monarch was informed that "unless he wished 
to see his lands destroyed . . .  he must become tributary to the King of 
Portugal".26 Faced with this black or white situation, the Kingdom of 
Kotte submitted. In 1505, de Almeida had had the Arms of Portugal carved
25xhe derivation of the name Colombo is somewhat obscure. Pos­
sibly it may be derived from "colomba" meaning dove, but it has no con­
nection with the name of the discoverer of America. Colombo was ident­
ified as such long before 1492. It may be a combination of "cola" 
meaning leaf, and "ambc" meaning "mango fruit". It is interesting to 
note, however, that later, the Dutch gave the city a coat-of-aims lAich 
combined the dove, and the mango-tree.
26̂ jrdney Dawson Bailey, Cevlon (London* Hutchinson's University 
library, 19^), p* 40.
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upon a rock at Colombo; at the time, little did the people of Lanka real­
ize this ominous ^gn*
The Portuguese were to control portions of the country until 
1656» In the sense of political and ecssomic inperialism, theirs was a 
sordid history of suppression and brutalities. Their sy^atbies and 
collaboration efforts shifted among the rulers of the kingdoms of Kotte, 
Jaffna, and Kandy, dependent upon the advantage to Portugal. But they 
were aided too by the internal situation. Generally the period to 1656 
was another chapter of dvil strife among warring princes, a continuation 
of the story of the three kingdoms. Perpetrators of court intrigues used 
poison rather promiseuously, bringing about a number of rapid changes in 
the chronology of rulers. Had it not been for the quarrels among the 
sovereigns themselves and rival claimants to the thrones, the Portuguese 
might not have ruled over any part of the island.
Portuguese imperialism came in three intervals of roughly fifty 
years each. The first was when they were allies of the Kotte
king and during which time (15^) the Kingdom of Jaffna became a vassal 
of Portugal. In 1 2̂1, just prior to the death of Vijaya Bahu, the mon­
arch divided his kingdom into two principalities in order to placate his 
two sons. Bhuvanaika Bahu V U  received Kotte, while to the other, 
Hayadunne, he gave the principality of Sitawaka. Kayaduane had visions 
of overlordship of the entire kingdom, and to eventually rule the whole 
of Lanka. To further his plans, he entered a pact with the monarch of 
Calicut for a joint attack against Bhuvanaika, thus forcing his brother 
into a defense arrangeait with the Portuguese. Only the latter benefited 
through this internecine warfare. Hayadunne and his Indian allies were
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defeated aft@z» a straggle of some twenty years.
The second stage begins in 1551 and ends in 1597» highpointed 
by Kotte becoming a protectorate of Portogal. Bbnvanaika, had only one 
child; a daughter. Thus; in spite of the animosity eadsting betweon the 
brothers, Bhuvanaika intimated that he would nominate Hayadunne as his 
successor. The possibility of the principalities joined under a single 
ruler was against the best interests of the Portuguese, 1A0 urged the 
king to reconsider his choice. Under pressure, Bhuvanaika assented to 
Portugal's desires and chose a grandson, Dhazmapala, instead. In 1551* 
Bhuvanaika was shot idtile he stood at a palace window. "There are good 
grounds for suspecting it was done at Hayadunne* s instigation though the 
crime commonly is attributed to the Viceroy."^
Dharmapala ascended the throne and in 1557 w s  baptized into the 
Church taking the name of Don Juan. It was a triuag)h for the Portuguese, 
but it forecast trouble. According to a contengporary Sinhalese historian, 
the kingdom could never be governed by "a king who is not of the religion 
of Buddha.»^®
Hayadunne now appeared in the role of saviour for the Sinhalese 
people. Sis power increased as Dharmapala* s declined rapidly. There was 
constant harassment of the Portuguese, continued by Rajasinha I, Hayadunne* s 
son, who succeeded to the throne of Sitawaka in 1578, and later became 
master of the whole island with the exertion of Colombo, its environs, 
and the Jaffna area.
7̂codrington, A Short History of Cevlon. p. 97#
^Quoted ly Bail^, Cevlon. p. 44.
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Rajasinha is still renowned in C^lon for his lengthy campaign 
to rid the island of the Portuguese. He mustered sixty thousand troops, 
and for two years blocked the port of Colombo. The Portuguese, having 
command of the sea and with reenforcements from Didia, managed at long 
last to turn the tide, but only after an orgy of plunder and wanton de­
struction.
The cruelty of the Portuguese on this occasion almost beggars 
description. One Portuguese official describes how a Sinhalese 
soldier lAo had killed twenty-nine Portuguese levies vsm captured 
and taken to Colombo. Here a Portuguese soldier killed in . 
cold blood, cut open his heart, and drank the dead man's blood. °
Rajasinha died in 1592 leaving his hatred for the European as part of the
legacy to his son, hSmala Dharma Surya I. Jaffna meaxndiile had become a
protectorate in 1591* Its ruler had made the unwise choice of attacking
the Portuguese possession of Mannar, and by this action not only lost
his kingdom but his head as well.
The third stage of the Portuguese period began in 1597. Dharma­
pala died without an heir to his throne. He bequeathed his dominions and 
the overlordship of C^rlon to Philip 1, King of Portugal, thus effecting 
a legal sovereignty which was to end some sixty years later.
In retrospect, Portuguese political rule had extended from a 
rather humble beginning of a fort at Colombo, to control of a small 
section —  but by far the best part —  of the island. The idiole of the 
western coast from Matara to Mannar and the Jaffna Province^^ had been 
brought under the flag of Portugal. What the position would have been
map showing Portuguese area is on p. 30.
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had not the country suffered from the sins of the dynasties is open to 
conjecture. Be that as it may, it was a policy of divide et iwnaya. And 
henceforth, Ceilao —  or Zeilan or C^lon —  was destined to receive an 
ever greater impress of foreign influence. Portugal gave new enqphasis 
to the spice trade, still the overall economic results were rather insig- 
nifleant. There were no major contributions in the i^rovements of agri­
culture nor in the administrative sphere. Some social changes were 
brought about through the introduction of Boman Catholicism. Perhaps as 
Uendis puts it, "they did not bring about sufficient changes within the 
island as to make one consider their rule as a turning point in the iuf 
tema]. history of Ceylon. They taught the Sinhalese and the Tamils 
new methods of warfare as wÆL as the use of the gun and cannon. The 
Portuguese soldiers
Fought with the despiration of men who realized that vhat thsy had 
taken by force could only be retained by greater force. The long 
state of war with the Kandyan kingdom, the inhumanities of generals 
like Âzavedo, startling even in an age inured to brutality, are to 
read in the confession of their failure to mobilize anything in 
Ceylon in their support. Their accusations of perfidiousness, so 
often levelled against the Sinhalese, sort ill with their own record 
of dishonourable dealing with the people of the country. 3̂
In 1602, a Joris Spilbergen of the Dutch East Indies Company 
sailed along the east coast of Ceylon and dropped anchor at Batticaloa.
He paid a call on the King of Kandy, Vimala Dharma Surya, who asked the
C. Mendis, Cevlon. Today andJIesterdav (Colombo:
Associated Newspapers of Ceylon, 195?)» P* 56.
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Hollander for help against the Portuguese. Spilbergen made no commitment. 
His visit was the forerunner to that of Admiral Sebald de Weert the fol­
lowing June. Vimala was invited aboard the flagship for talks about 
military aid in exchange for the cinnamon monopoly. Just at the time the 
ki]% was to go aboard
The Dutch admiral was drunk and apparently insulted the king; there 
was some sort of a brawl in lAioh the admiral was killed. The king 
idio was not present when this happened, became panic stricken anH 
decided that his safest course was to massacre those of the Dutch 
who were on shore. 33
The Dutch demanded an explanation from Surya to which the latter is sup­
posed to have replied that if peace was desired, peace it would be; if 
war was wanted, war the Dutch would have. The fleet sailed away.
The Dutch returned in March, l6l2. Two months later one Marcellos 
de Bosehottwer concluded a treaty with the second King of Kandy, Senarat, 
who had succeeded to the throne upon Vimala* s death in l604. Senarat was 
**a priest who threw off his robes and married his predecessor's widow.
Dona Catharina.”3^ The treaty provided for Dutch assistance in protect­
ing the Kandyan kingdom from the onslaught of the Portuguese, in return 
for which permission was granted for the building of a fort at Kottiyar 
and a trade monopoly in cinnamon, gems, and pearls. But the Netherlands 
East India Company headquartered at Batavia would have none of these 
arrangements. De Boschouwer left Kandy in I615 taking his case to the 
Coipany's directorship in Holland. His arguments got noimore. He went 
next to Denmark where an East India Cospany had been formed. Ki»g
33sailey, QsSÛmt P. 7̂.
3^odrington, A Short History of Cevlon. p. 109.
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Christian» realizing the potentialities of an aid-trade agreement sent a 
squadron to Ceilao* During the negotiations de Bosehonwer had presented 
to the Danish monarch papers idiich purportedly gave the Dutchman the 
right to negotiate on behalf of the Kandyan king* The Danes arriving at 
Senarat* s court found the papers to be forgery and the Kandy monarch in 
no mood to confirm the original treaty, !Qie Danes did manage to obtain 
permission to build a fort at Trincomalee, but long before it was conn 
pleted they were forced by the Portuguese to evacuate*
Ueamdiile, Dutch operations elsewhere in the East Indies had been 
richly rewarding* Aided by the intense animosity of the native people 
for the Portuguese, generally it required little negotiation to reach an 
agreement with the rulers of those islands visited by the Dutch. In add­
ition, th^ had an advantage of wide experience in commercial ventures, 
sufficient capital for financial risks, and superb seamanship* The first 
Dutch eaqaedition had been undortaken by the Comoaiene van Verre under 
Cornelius de amtman viho, with four ships, landed at Bantam in 1596, then 
sailed to Bali* Returning home the following year, the cargo was smaller 
than expected but Dutch merchants were delighted, as the voyage had dem» 
onstrated that with better organization a successful trade route with 
the Indies was possible. There was new activity in the preparation of 
fleets, and subsequent Dutch voyages put in at ports in Siam, China,
Japan, and Manila*
Intense competition among the merchants and indiscriminate voy­
aging brought demands from Dutch entrepeneurs for some order in trading 
operations* The end result was the creation of the United East India 
Co#any, or Vereeniede Oostindisehe Comoaiene (V*0*C*)* The V*0*C* was
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established through a ecnstitution drawn up by the States General of 
Holland in March, 1602. It granted a trade monopoly in the area between 
the Cape of Good Hope and the Magellan Straits for a period of twenty-we 
years, privileges for erecting factories, making treaties, and maintain- 
ing the necessary units for protective purposes. Management of the Com­
pany was under a group of 17 men, the Heeren XVH. the directorship 
resting with a group of 76 persons representing amalgamating companies.
%.th the advent of the V.O.C., Portuguese power in the East
Indies was challenged and declined rapidly. The Dutch appeared off the
coast of Ceylon in 1635* and by I636 were in firm control of Batticaloa.
Trincomalee fell to them the following year, Negombo and Galle in 1640.
in interim of peace followed during which both protagonists occupied
spheres of power, fighting was resumed in l6j2. On October 14, 1655»
Kalutara surrendered.
The Dutch at once closed on Colombo, and after a desperate resist­
ance, in iMch the garrison was reduced to famine, intonion de Sousa 
Coutinho was obliged to capitulate on May 12, 1656, after a siege 
lasting six months and twenty-seven days.33
The Portuguese ccaaander withdrew to Goa, leaving his country's posses­
sions in Ceilao^^ to be absorbed by the Dutch.
The third Kandyan King, Rajasinha II, proceeded to wage war 
against the V.O.C. The Dutch, with continuous reinforcements, managed 
to maintain control of key ports and most of the coastline, yet the total 
area over lAich they ruled directly was even less than that which had 
been Portuguese territory. Holland was interested first in trade, and
3%bid., p. 124.
^Bailey, Cevlon. p. 64.
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secondarily in political power» The latter was seized to prevent the 
ultimate annihilation hy the Kansan king.
The beginning of the decline of Dutch power in Zeilan is some- 
lAat hazy, but the Sinhalese rebellion in 1?60 was at least partially 
responsible. Root cause of the uprising was an order by the Dutch Gover­
nor Jan Schrender idiich expropriated peasant lands in order to further 
cinnamon production.
The land which it was supposed the cinnamon tree would thrive 
best was the property of the people, and possessed and inhabited 
by them. %thout regarding the want and misery that must of nec­
essity have overwhelmed those wretched beings if robbed of their 
lands, upon the produce of idiieh th^ existed, the governor ordered 
them to give up their land and remove to a barren waste district 
which was appointed for them and idiere they might settle if they 
chose.37
The aggrieved peasants took their petition to Kirti Sri, now the Eaniyan 
monarch, vbo dispatched an emissary to Schreuder. The emissary was 
treated with contempt by the Dutch governor i^ereupon Kirti Sri insti­
gated and openly supported the rebellion. From India, came reinforce­
ments for the Dutch. And from India in 1762 came John Pybus, an emissary 
from the Madras Council, the local governing agent for British interests 
in India. The Pybus mission mariced the first serious attention given to 
Ceylon by the British, and was undertaken partly for strategic, and part­
ly for economic, reasons. Bombay was at that time the nearest shipyard 
for the repair of British ships damaged while at sea. England desperately 
needed a port in the Bay of Bengal; the most suitable was Trincomalee.
From the economic viewpoint, no commodity was isore li^ortmt than cinna­
mon. Kandy was the heart of the cinnamon growing country.
37
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Pÿbus proposed to the Kandyan monarch a treaty of alliance and 
friendship. Kirti Sri welcomed the opportunity of aid from the British, 
in return for lAich permission would be granted for ereetiî  forts on 
Kandyan coastal territory and trading privileges. But negotiations col­
lapsed however when the emissary, pressed for definite assurances of 
military assistance, could offer nothing more than professions of friend­
ship. Pybus was a meodber of the Madras Council but was not a pleni­
potentiary, and therefore had not been empowered by the Council to con­
clude any treaty; whatever proposals were agreed upon at the Kandyan 
court were subject to confirmation at Madras. Apparently tbe latter 
thought the price too high and no further contact was made with the monr 
arch in Kandy.
Hostilities between Kandy and the Dutch continued until 1?66.
By the treaty of February 14, Kirti Sri was forced to restore to the 
Netherlands all territories which had been taken from the Dutch during 
the course of the conflict and, in addition, hand over to them the re­
maining area of the eastern seaboard. Kandy became a land-locked kingdom, 
CQ#letely isolated from the oT&tside world. ̂  The Dutch agreed to defend 
Kandy against attack; the Kandyan monarch pledged not to enter any pact 
with another foreign power. For the following thirty years, there was 
precarious peace. Given the war with England over the right to search 
ships at sea, and the internal conflict between VdUiam and the States 
General due to the emergence of the pro-French Patriot Party, the Dutch 
had little time for colonial affairs.
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Despite the 156 years (1640-1796) of predatory oceupation, there
is not too nnich on the island today hy way of physical evidence of the
Dutch period. Interested essentially in commerce, the Dutch were diligent
in trade matters lAich directly benefited Holland. There were extensive
advancements in agriculture through the development of paddy cultivation,
and repair and new construction of irrigation works. The historian Mendis
notes that the Dutch
Encouraged the people to cultivate in their gardens commercial crops 
such as coffee, cardamons, arecanuts, and coconuts. They themselves 
opened cinnamon plantations instead of d^ending entirely on what 
grow wild.
Roads, canals, and bridges were inproved or new ones built for the trans­
portation of the products. A major contribution was the introduction of 
codified local customary law and Roman*Dutch law where local law was found 
wanting. And notable also was a domination l?y force, unduly harsh and 
restrictive laws, corruption and administration inefficiency, and relig­
ious intolerance.
ÆbgAAMigfeJBcft
For about twenty years following the abortive Pybus mission to 
Kandy, the British had less than perfhnetory contact with Ceylon. England 
had been preoccupied with other matters. By the Treaty of Paris in 
February, I763» it had gained French and Spanish possessions in North 
America, and had become safely entrenched in the Indian Ocean through the 
acquisition of French territory in India. Than had followed the War of 
American Independence, widened through the entry of France and Spain in
%endis, Cevlon: Today and Yesterday, p. 59.
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1778 and 1779, Holland joined the coalition in 1781. Ibis move by the 
Dutch had proa^ted the British to attack Trincomalee which surrendered 
to Admiral Sir Edward Bighes in 1782.
Aboard one of the vessels in the fleet lAich struck at Trincomalee 
was Bigh Boyd} the second secretary to Lord McCortney, the Governor of 
Madras. Boyd, in his capacity as emissary, proceeded to Kandy, there to 
propose to the monarch an alliance against the Dutch. In the meantime, 
Kirti Sri had died in January, 1782. He had bequeathed his throne to his 
brother Rajadhirajasinha who, aware of the treatment accorded his prede­
cessor by the British, made it clear that he would negotiate only with a 
personal representative of George III. Again British overtures in Ceylon 
came to naught. Shortly thereafter, a series of Erench-British naval en,» 
gagements resulted in the fort at Trincomalee capitulating and the return 
to French control on August 25. It was restored to the Dutch at the Peace 
of Paris in 1784.
For the next decade, C^lon lay outside the sphere of British
interest. England and Rrance were again warring with each other and.
In that year [17953 Holland was overrun by the armies of the Bepublie, 
and she was natursdly unable to support her forces in Ceylon. RrngTaM 
instantly took advantage of this welcome enf eeablement of her old 
rival, and by force and intrigue she had secured all the Dutch pos­
sessions in the island by 1796. Few Brit^h conquests have been made 
at the cost of so little blood and money.^
The "advantage of the welcome enf eeablement" was England's granting of asy­
lum to %Uiam V, Prince of Orange, and his issuance of the Kew Letters.^^
^Holden, Cevlon. p. 102.
^^VBUiam was resident in Kew (Ehgland) at the time. Hence, the 
"Kew Letters”.
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In these, %Ui@m had gî.ven instraetions to his colonial governors to 
place the colonies in British hands in order to prevent the possessions 
from falling to the French* To the Governor of Ceylon, J*P* Van ̂ gelbeek, 
the Prince of Orange addressed the following:
Noble and Ifost Honoured Confidante, Our Trusty and Veil Beloved,
Ve have deemed it necessary to address you this communication 
and to require you to admit into Trincomalee and elseiAere in the 
Colony under your rule the troops of His Majesty the ging of Great 
Britain tdiich will proceed there, and also to admit into the harbours 
or such other places where ships might safely anchor the warships, 
frigates and armed vessels which will be despatched on behalf of His 
Majesty of Great Britain; and you are also to consider them as troops 
and ships belonging to a power that is in friendship and alliance 
with their HLgh Mightinesses, and lAo come to prevent the Colony from 
being invaded by the French.
Wherefore, Noble, etc, . • * we commit you to God's holy pro­
tection, and remain
Your well-wishing friend,
Kew, 7th February, 1795» W. Pr. V. Orange.42
The British had made some vague promises that lAatever Dutch colonial 
territory was given up to English protection would be returned to the 
Netherlands East Indies Co#any at the conclusion of hostilities. But 
despite the instructions lAich %.Uiam had issued to his local governor 
in C^lon, the latter, upon his own initiative, chose instead to resist 
the British. There was no question as to the outcome. TMncomalee was 
again occupied by the British in the latter part of August, 1795» Batti- 
caloa and Jaffna the following month, and Colombo by February, 1796.
Thus, a new ing)erial power came to Coylon.
^^Colvin a. de Silva, Gevlon Under British Occupation. 179 S- 
1833. Vol. I, (Colombo: ühe Colombo Apothecaries Co., 1953)* P* 18.
% e  instructions issued to the Governor and the Commanding Officer at 
Sea of the Cape of Good Hope appear in Appendix II.
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^iglish interest in the non-European world had begun some two 
hundred years earlier. The 158? voyage of Sir Francis Drake had produced 
some stimulation for trade with the East Indies, as had the later sailing 
of Thomas Gavenish through the Magellan Straits to the Philippines and 
Java, A petition for further exploration submitted to the Grown in 1589 
was left unanswered by Elizabeth I, A second petition fared better. In 
1591 three ships set sail from Plymouth, The voyage came to grief due to 
an appallii^ mortality rate among crews, still it produced a great degree 
of enthusiasm since British ships had sailed into the Indian Ocean, But 
a number of obstacles stood in the way of further ventures, England was 
again at war and in deep financial troubles, merchants were hesitant to 
raise the necessary subscriptions, British seafarers lacked knowledge of 
trade and navigation routes in the Indian Ocean, and British vessels of 
that time were quite unsuited to long voyages. And too, few goods pro­
duced in Ehgland could be traded in the tropical areas, finally, however, 
the Crown assented to new e:2q»lorations through the issuance of the Charter 
of 1600, The East India Company began operations.
Under its royal charter the Company, which consisted of a governor 
and twenty-four 'committees' aj^ointed to organize a trading ex­
pedition to the East Indies, was granted a monopoly of trade in 
the region between the Cape of Good Hope and the Magellan Straits 
for a period of fifteen years. For its first voyage it raised a 
capital of 568,000, Four ships were especially purchased at a cost 
of £41,000, £6,860 was spent on goods for trading, and specially 
coined 'rials of eight' to the value of £21,742 were put on board 
for the purchase of return cargoes,^3
43s,g,E, Hall, &  ELstorv of South-East Asia (London t Macmillan 
and Co,, 1955)» PP* 227-228, It should be noted that the Charter was 
granted in the very same year, I600, as that of the Netherlands organ­
ization, and for trade monopoly in the same region i,e,, between the Cape 
of Good Hope and the Magellan Straits, Given the competitive nature of 
trading, this predestined Dutch-English conflict.
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With the end of warfare in 1796, the "question of the future of 
Ceylon immediately arose. Was it to be restored to the Dutch • • • or 
should it become a British colony?"^ England decided the matter in its 
cwn interest, in office of Governor was established in 1798 with dual 
control of the Crown and the East India Company. Ceylon became a Crown 
colony on January 1, 1802. But Kandy still remained a landrlocked island 
within an island until 1615 ̂ en it was forced to submit to European 
control.
In the Kandyan War lAioh preceded the capitulation, the British
were aided by Kandyan nobles and common people alike vbo b%ged the Crown
for aid gainst the cruelties of Sri Vikrama Rajasinha, the last King of
Kandy. Bailey gives the following account of the British decision to
wage war against Vikrama.^^ Sir Robert Brownigg, who had succeeded Sir
Thomas Maitland, as Governor of Ceylon
Could not hear with indifference the prayers of the inhabitants of 
five extensive provinces, consisting more than one-half of the 
Kandyan Kingdom, lAo with one unanimous voice raised against the 
tyranny and oppression of their ruler . . .  inq>lored the protection 
of the British Government. . . .Neither could BLs Excellency contenir 
plate without the livliest emotions of indignation and resentment, 
the atrocious barbarity perpetrated in Kandy upon ten innocent sub­
jects of the British Government, seven of idiom died instantly of 
their sufferings, and three miserable victims were sent, in defiance, 
with their mutilated limbs across their limits, to relate the dis­
tressing tale, and exhibit the horrid spectale to tlie eyes of an 
insulted government, and an indignant people. ŒLs Excellency had 
become convinced of the unavoidable necessity of resolving to carry
*̂4Bailey, Cevlon. p. 68.
^%esides Bailey, see also* Colvin R. de Silva, Cevlon Under 
British Occupation (Colombo* jkpothecaries Co#any, 1953); 8.1. Indoi#, 
ed., Robert Knox in the Kandvan Kjagdom (London* Oxford Univ. Press, 
1948); Lennox A. Mills, Cevlon Under British Rule (London* longsman. 
Green and Company, 1945)» 8. G. Ferera, ffl.sterv of Cevlen. 1%9 to the 
Present Dav (Colo^* Associated Newspapers of Ceylon, 1949)*
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HLs Majesty's anas into the Kandyan country. . . .But it is not 
%ainst the Kandyan nation that the anas of His Majesty are directed. 
His Excellency proelaiias hostility against the tyrannical power alone 
lAich has provoked by aggravated outrages and indignities the just 
resentment of the British nation. . . .His Excellency hereby proffers 
to every individual of the Kandyan nation the benign protection of 
the British Government.^
The Convention of March 2, I8I5 brought an end to the Kandyan 
War. In summary, the main points of the Convention were: that Sri Vikrama 
Rajasinha was deposed as the King of Kandy, his family and rdaüves ex­
cluded from succession to the throne, that Buddhism was to be maintained 
as the religion, and that rights and privileges of a U  people were guar­
anteed under the administration of the British. For the first time in 
four centuries, Ceylon was united under one effective rule.
The 133 years of British administration lAich followed was some­
thing more than imperialism per se —  although surely it was that. But 
it was also political and economic experimentation lAich had been lacking 
in the administrative programs of the two European predecessors. The 
differences in approach to administration was based upon the comparative 
value of Ceylon to Portugal, the Netherlands, and England respectively.
X higher estimate was made by the British, weighted by the strategic lo­
cation of Trincomalee in the Indian Ocean. The harbor, developed in the 
early nineteenth century, was a vital link in the chain of British domi­
nation of the seas. The value of C^lon to England was best summed up 
lAen in 1802, Pitt described it in Parliament as "the most valuable 
colonial possession on the globe . . .  giving to our Indian engdre a 
security it had not enjoyed from its first establishments"^^ The spice
^Bailey, Cevlon. pp. 81-82.
4?Colvin R. de Silva, Cevlon Under, British Occupation. Vol. I,
p. 26.
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trade shared, of coarse, in this role of inportance* Bat primary engihasis 
rested upon the political value. The Madras and Calcutta conquests under 
Clive had established power centers in the Indian Ocean, the scene of 
naval engagements between Ehgland and her rivals. Paramount in British 
plans for her control of the Indian Ocean was a naval base in the Bay of 
Bengal, and Trincomalee fit nicely into the grand scheme. It is little 
wonder that Pitt described Ceylon as he did in Parliament.
AgLApprfis&L
The politics of history —  the four centuries of foreign ing)aet —  
held immense difficulties for the people of Ceylon, ind, in retro^ect, 
it is indeed "a wonder that any of the essential characteristics of Sin­
halese culture have ever emerged."^ There is no question that the stream 
of invaders from southern India, the warring princes, and internal strife 
left their impress upon the island throughout its long history. Yet the 
culture itself was left largely untouched. Prior to I505 there was seldom 
the haeking-up and casting aside of the indigenous characteristics such 
as became the pattern from the sixteenth century onward. And this legacy 
of colonialism will linger long in the future.
The theory of colonialism can be argued from widely divergent 
points of view. It produced political and economic unification lAioh 
supplied something of a fabric, knitting together the various communities 
in such a way that transition to self-governing status was without civil 
strife such as the horrors of the India-Pakistan partition. The Portu­
guese and the Dutch, for exaag)le, can be credited as being the instrument
p. 30*
^Cook, Cevlon: Its CLeoeraphv. Its Resources, and Its People.
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-Hfaieh bridged the gap from the nedieral period to adapting the island for 
the eontemg»orary period, abetted by the British 160 were heirs to these 
foundations. And it was the British period which saw the transition from 
a colonial stmetore into a nation-state.
% e  other side of the coin is the rather sordid story of the man­
ner and means by iddeh the colonial powers saw as their dn^ the need to, 
in their words, civilize and christianize the native people. Here both 
Idle Portuguese and Dutch destroyed some parts of indigenous religious and 
social structures. Colonialiaa was to make a mockery of the dignity of 
labor, and the West a m  bases of law and order came in direct conflict 
wiidi the people's historically established customs. Engiloying the engines 
of government for territories and spheres of influence for the pure eoie* 
mercial value, the theory of competition was introduced, market crop 
values became the scales of survival. The force of coi^etition did much 
to undermine the fabric of society.
The politics of history then bequeathed a legacy of suspicion 
and resentment not only against the former colonial masters, but gener­
ally toward that part of the world which is called "the West". Farther, 
this past is the heritage of attitudes and emotions wish continue to 
shape the outlook and dictate the policies of present-day Ceylon.
CHAPTER n  
THE POLETXCS OF RELIGION
Ceylon Is the world center of Iheravsda Baddhlsm. This connec­
tion with one of the world's great philosophies has contributed much to 
the island's fame, especially in the Eastern world. Buddhism has been a 
living force in Ceylon for two thousand years. It survived the intact of 
Islam and Christianity, and this survival, together with its disappearance 
in India at the close of the twelfth century, ranks among absorbing his­
torical mysteries.
Buddhism was bom in India sometime before the close of the sixth 
century B.C. It was the result of an evolution in religious outlook dur­
ing the era of transition by the Indo-Aryan race from a pastoral to an 
agricultural people. It came during an age of social and intellectual 
ferment. The supremacy of the priestly Brahmans and the fanatical ascet­
icism they preached had become controversial issues in Hindu society. 
Buddhism offered a middle ground between the supernatural and the worldly 
life.
Among those seeking this a oath was SLddhartha Gautama. He 
was an offspring of noble birth, the son of the chief of a hill-tribe, 
the Shakyas, Gautama's birthplace was the town of Kapilavashu in that 
part of northern India idiich is present day Nepal. At the age of twenty-
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nine years, leaving behind a wife and son, he donned a saffron-colored 
robe (still the apparel of the Büddhist monk) and gathering together a 
group of followers set out in quest of the secrets of wisdom and sorrow. 
Eventually these were revealed to him as he meditated beneath a batihl tvaa 
in the town of Gaya. Gautama died in 483 B.C.^9 at the age of eighty 
years having bequeathed to the world the foundation of an immortal phil­
osophy. He is the Buddha, the "Enlighted One" or "The Awakened", a re­
ligious title which has as its corollary in Christianity the appellation 
"Christ" or "The Savior".
For a thousand years, Btddhism was deeply entrenched in India.
It started to decline in popular favor for some unknown reason and at a 
date lAich can in no way be determined. It may well be that covert for­
ces were active as early as the fourth century A.D., which saw the rise 
of the great Gupta Hindu empire. In any case, there followed after this 
time a constant diminishing of Buddhism's influence upon the people. 
Gradually, the religion was looked upon as a branch of Hinduism. By the 
time of the lAislim invasion of India in 1192, the absorption of Buddhism 
by Hinduism was almost coiqplete. %h@n Bihar and Bengal, the last two 
Buddhist outposts, were occupied by the Muslims, and the shaven-headed 
priests expelled or slain. Buddhism in India was dead. Perhaps the major 
underlying cause was ideological —  that fighting and battle, sanctified 
through the Hindu caste system (Warrier Caste: Esatxdya), held preference
^The year of Gautama's death coincides with the landing on 
Lanka by Vijaya and his followers. For argument that these two events 
occurred in the same year see Geiger, The tfaĥ vamsa. pp. xx-lii. It is 
sometimes stated that both occurred on the same day. However, the 
chronicle. The Dipsavamsa. states that Vijaya came to Lanka at the time 
of the death of the Buddha, not precisely on the dav of the death.
in moral duty to Buddhism's ahima* (non-violence). Whatever the sugges­
tions as to the demise, all are purely speculative.
Buddhism was exported to Lanka from India by the great Maurya 
en^eror Asoka in May, 246 B.C. He sent his son Mabinda, a Buddhist monk, 
to Devanampiyatissa, King of Lanka, with a message of the Buddha. His­
tory records that later Asoka himself became a monk after having embraced 
the religion out of remorse over the carnage he had caused by aggressive 
warfare. Some rock inscriptions which are among the earliest intellig­
ible written records surviving from ancient India, give evidence of the 
emperor's sincerity and remorse.
As to speculation for the religion's survival in Ceylon, the
ground is a little more fixm. There was the positive factor of strong
Sinhalese Buddhist rulers whose periodic reigns were powerful enough to
hold Hinduism within tolerable limits. And on the positive side was the
progress in arts, culture, and social organization accomplished under
Biddhist kings. This evoked a feeling of pride among the people and
acted as a unifying force in religio-nationalism. But perhaps even more
iiqiortant were the n^ative, self-defeating methods, manners and approaches
of the Europeans. Bailey sights an exaiq)le,
'We charge you' wrote the King of Portugal to his Viceroy in the 
East, 'to discover all the idols by means of diligent officers, to 
reduce them to fragments and utterly consume them. . • .ind because 
the heathens submit themselves to the yoke of the Gospel not alone 
through the convictions of the purity of the Faith and for that thsy 
are sustained 6y the hope of Eternal life, they should also be en­
couraged with some temporal favors. . • .And, therefore, you should 
earnestly set yourself to see that the new Christians from this time 
forward do obtain and enjoy all exemptions and freedom from tribute.^
(̂̂ Bailey, Cevlon. p. 42.
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In the contest between Christianity and Buddhism, coercion and 
confusion were the hallmarks of the Europeans. Illustrative of the lat­
ter is the story of the Sinhalese who was given a copy of the New Testa­
ment a Jesuit missionary. A short time later, the Sinhalese in be­
wilderment returned to the priest. "Jesus Christ," he said, "had never 
taken money f rom anyone. Why were the Portuguese Christians so grasping?"^^ 
And again:
Christian man say only one God got, only one religion everybody got, 
but Christian Baptist man say his God right, his religion right, no 
other: Wesleyan man say his God, his religion right, no other; Sal­
vation Army man say his God, his religion right, no other; %urch of 
En^and man say his God, his religion right, no other. .
Nevertheless, circumstances were such that a spiritual vacuum was created
wherein the people gradually lost contact with the old ways with the con?-
sequent breaking down of traditional ethnic relationships. It was the
getting in touch again with the "old ways" which was the heart of the
renaissance of Buddldsm in Coylon, a subject which will be taken up later
in this chapter.
Theravada is Pali^^ terminology for "Teaching of the Elders". 
Iheravada Buddhism lays claim to preserving the original doctrine as 
handed down from the days of Gautama. Strictly speaking. Buddhism is a 
concept of life founded upon a religion psychological in nature, rather
^^Ibid., p. 39*
52comer, Paradise of Adam (London: John Lane, 1918), p. 264.
53pali is the Prakrit language of the Buddhist scriptures. It 
is taken from the Sanskrit nali-bhasa. literally, canon language.
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than theological or metaphysical. The Doctrine (Pali: Dhamma^ reflects 
a fondamental and universal moral law based upon the Four Noble Truths:
1) sorrow is the manifestation of evil in the world,
2} sorrow arises from human desires lAich spring from passions 
and hatreds,
3) desire comes from an attachment to the transitory features 
of a material world, and
4) sorrow ceases only idien desire ceases, the cessation of 
desire coming about through discipline in moral conduct.
The moral code is based upon the Hoble BLehtfeld Path, or Ways, 
which, in summary, embraces righteousness in one's intentions, efforts, 
conduct, thoughts, concentration, speech, knowledge and livelihood. Man 
is said to be reborn into successive lives which are filled with sorrow. 
The sorrow is brought about through subjection to worry, pain, and suf­
fering iMch are produced hy man's material desires. To escape the sor­
row, to gain salvation man must overcome desires. Only by so doing does 
he reach the state of Mwranfl ("blowing out"), that condition lAich grants 
escape from subsequent rebirths and sorrow.
In substance, then, the doctrine amounts to spiritual and mental 
disciplining for attaining the correct views of life. There is much 
doubt as to the original messages of the Buddha. Undoubtedly, many of 
the words attributed to him were actually those of his disciples. There 
has been considerable expansion of his teachings since his death. In 
about the first century Â.D., there occurred a division into two schools 
of thought, the IHnavana and Maha,vana.^ The salient points which brought
further subdivision has occurred mainly in the Mahayana
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about the schism are far too cong*lex to detail here, but in summation 
these are theistic arguments relating to the priesthood, the elaborate 
rituals, shrines, processions, and the like.
Generally, the Westerner, having been reared in the ideology of 
monotheism, finds much that is confusing about Buddhism. The Westerner 
recognizes God as an omnipotent living Being, having an "is” quality, and 
"aliveness". Prayers and oblations are offered to this Immortal usually 
as supplication for help of one type or the other, and because of the idea 
of "existence”, there is faith that prayers mill be "answered". The ex­
istence is an unquestioned truism, therefore "God" assumes a human status. 
The Buddha does not possess this "human" quality; he cannot help man with 
worldly problems. He is not thought of as a deity in the conventional 
use of the term. Bather, the Buddha is acknowledged as having lived in 
the past, of having communicated to his followers a code of ethics and 
morals by which to conduct their daily lives. Still, the Buddha occupies 
a principal place in a hierarchy of gods. He is one among many deities 
who have been givm places of honor in the pantheon, these having been 
integrated into the structure over the centuries as new rituals were In­
troduced. Wore will be said about these "other gods" presently. In the 
worship of the relics of the Buddha, it is his "personality" vAich is 
being venerated, rather than a "human" with immortal attributes.
stream resulting in offshoots lAich can now be considered schools in 
their own right, for exang>le, Tibetan lamassary idiich extends into Bhutan 
and Sikkim, as well as Mongolia, and Zen Buddhism in Japan. The Mahayana 
stream is found in Tibet, Nepal, Korea, China and Japan. Theravada 
Buddhism is fundamentally of the HLnayana stream and the principal doc­
trine in Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia and Thailand.
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Shrines. Relies and "Lost Cities”
For centuries Cqylon has attracted the adherents of Buddhism 
from the world over. It was common practice for Chinese engerors to send 
a continuous flow of missions to learn more of the doctrine, and to ob­
tain sacred writings and relics of the Great Teacher. The grand KuKLai 
sent envoys "first in order to request —  in vain, as it turned out —  
the ruby^^ belonging to the king of the island . . .  and then procure —  
lAich they did —  some relics of the B u d d h a .  "^6 Marco Polo was undoubt­
edly aware of the power of Buddhism in the East.
Marco had a vague idea of the moral greatness of this remarkable man, 
but only after having learned something about the historical Buddha 
in the sanctuaries of Ceylon, on the way home at the end of his great 
adventures; he could then say . . .  that 'for certainty, if he had 
been baptized a Christian he would have been a great saint before 
God. *57
The number and magnificence of the Buddha shrines have long been 
common sights on Lanka. Called dagobas.5̂  most are vast structures of 
brick and stucco, bell-shaped and spired, as large as a pyramid; others 
are the village type, less ornate and rarely more than twelve feet in 
height. Their pretentiousness evolved from a rather humble beginning.
^%arco Polo described this rut^ as "the grandest ruby that was 
ever seen, being a span in length, and the thickness of a man's arm, 
brilliant beyond description and without a single flaw." See %lliam 
Marsden, ed.. The Travels of Maren Polo. (London: Unwin and Green, 1948), 
p. 174’. The story goes that the Kublai offered the island king the value 
of a city if he, the monarch, would relinquish possession of the gem.
^The words are those of Marco Polo quoted tqr Leonardo Olschki. 
Marco Polo's Asia. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press), I960, p. 398n.
^Ibid.. p. 256.
^Rpom "datu" meaning relic, and "ghabbhan" meaning shrine.
More precisely translated "relic-chamber".
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wOriginally stupas (burial places), they began a rise to splendor at the 
time Devanampiyatissa received from Asoka the collar bone and the aiwa 
bowl of the Buddha, and gradually became r^ositories for things assoc­
iated with him.^^ There are processional ways tdiich encircle the dagobas 
and used by the and laymen alike i&ile meditating on the words
of the Master.
In all Ceylon, no relic is considered holier or more miraculous 
than the Tooth of the Lord Buddha. It rests today in the innermost of 
seven golden caskets at the Dalada (Tençle of the Tooth) in
Kandy. The story goes that the Tooth was found following the death of 
Gautama and was guarded for eight hundred years in a Buddhist monastery 
in what is now Bihar Province. In the fourth century the Buddhists fled 
to Ceylon in order to escape persecution in India. According to histor­
ical accounts, at the time of this exodus, the Tooth was borne to Lanka 
by a princess from Orissa who concealed it in her hair in order to pro­
tect it against desecration. The relic remained in Ceylon for more than 
a thousand years until I56O when, supposedly, it fell into the possession
Asoka* s time, monks had begun deviating for the practice of 
wandering through the countryside with begging bowls in hand and had taken 
to settling in monasteries iddch had been erected on lands granted by 
kings and wealthy patrons.
^^Desecration of relics is certain to trigger civil uprisings. 
This is also true among the Muslims with regard to relics of the Prophet 
Mohammed. The most recent case involving the Mislims occurred in 
Srinagar (Kashmir) December 27, I963 when a silveiveapped glass phial 
containing a three-inch long hair of the Prophet was stolen from the 
Hazratbal Mosque. It was later recovered on January 4, 1964 by the 
Central Intelligence Bureau of Kashmir. Meanwhile, however, there were 
riots and mourning processions.
6lRikkas is Pali for "beggars". Rhlksn in Sanskrit has the 
same meaning, however, the more preferable translation is "monk".
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of the Portuguese vho, triuiqphantly, took it to Goa i^ere it was destroyed 
with fire by the Archbishop in the presence of the Viceroy* It was, of 
course, an idolatrous object to the Portuguese* But Sinhalese tradition 
denies that such was the fate of the Tooth* Rather, it maintains that 
the relic which was seized by the Europeans was an imitation; that the 
genuine object had been secretly safeguarded against just such an eventu­
ality* Whatever the facts, the Tooth of the Buddha has long been paid
62homage by way of a great national pageant, the Bsala Perahera*
For sheer beauty, the Esala Perahera finds no match anywhere in 
the world* This major Buddhist festival began during the reign of King 
Gaja Bahu (U>13^) as a purely secular event, a victory parade in the 
monarch's honor for having successfully invaded India* The Buddhist sig­
nificance dates back approximately two centuries when a religious revival 
took place in Kandy under KLrti Sri* Now each year, more than a hundred 
elephants, beautifully caprisoned, escort the Maligawa (Tenple) Elephant 
through the streets of Kandy* The Tengile Elephant, splendidly attired in 
a panoply of velvets and gems, bears upon his back a jeweled casket con­
taining the Tooih» And there are standard bearers, torch carriers, drunh> 
mers, dancers, and ten^le priests* The festival has a distinctive char­
acter idiich no Western nation could emulate* There is no more important 
symbol of Sinhalese religio-nationalism to be found on the island today 
than that of the Tooth; from the time of its coming to Ceylon, it has 
linked the past with the present and it is the core of faith in the to­
morrow*
^^Esala is the Buddhist month of August; Perahera means pro­
cession or festival* Hence, literally August Procession*
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The relics of the Lord Buddha cross international boundaries to 
make an impact upon political relations between states. For example, a 
few years ago Peking won itself new friends amoag the people of Ceylon 
idien the then Chinese Aabassador to Ceylon, Chan Tsen Mng, arranged to 
bring to the island another Tooth which was in China's possession. It 
arrived by aircraft to a reception lAich would have done justice to a 
visiting high dignitary of state. The Prime Minister was on hand as 
were scores of officials, jet aircraft roared overhead while sarong-clad 
Kandyan drummers pounded their drums —  and Kandyan drummers pound the 
drums only on the most solemn occasions. The Tboth, encased in a gold 
casket, was placed aboard a motorized chariot trimmed in gold and red, 
and escorted to Colombo's Memorial Hall behind a motorcade. Wherever 
this relic was exhibited during the lengthy island-wide tour, long queues 
of the faithful paid homage lAile orators eulogized the generosity of the 
Chinese government. In terms of international politics, it was a diplo­
matic coup, a masterful stroke by China in rebuilding its image which 
had been somewhat tarnished by the suppression of Lamaist Buddhism in 
Tibet. The gesture of the loan undoubtedly will be remembered much longer 
Idian will the tragic Chinese sacking of the Buddhist Tibetan monasteries 
and the persecution of the Lamas in 1959*
In Ceylon —  a land ladened with legend «id myth —  the people 
find little reason to differentiate between the miraculous and the ordi­
nary, and no attes^t is made to separate religious fable from religious 
fact. There is the exasple of the worship of Sri Pada —  1±e Sacred 
Footprint. Sri Pada is a clear and distinct giant-size ingpression of a 
>111 wan footprint upon an enormous boulder atop Adam's Peak. Devout Bud-
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dbists revere it as the place ̂ ere the Buddha supposedly left the im­
pression of his foot on a visit to Lanka centuries before the religion 
came to the island. To the Buddhist, its sacred rank is second only to 
that of the Tooth, But the faithful of other religions also lay claim 
to the phenomenon, Muslims attribute it to Adam, the first man; Hindus 
believe the impression to have been made by the great god Saman, and 
Christians maintain it is the imprints of the foot of St, Thomas, the 
Apostle of India, placed there when the saint visited Ceylon, Each year 
thousands of pilgrims make a long and weary trek to the summit of Adam's 
Peak, For centuries, it has been the object of veneration by Buddhists, 
Muslims, Hindus and Christians alike, "for the footprint on the rock, 
that which men go out into the wilderness to see, is sacred to them all,”̂ 3
Adam's Peak rises like the spine of a Gothic cathedral to roughly 
7000 feet. Legend has it that its summit was once the famed seat of wor­
ship of the ia.ndu mountain deity Saman, and it is known in histozy and 
literature as the Samamtha-Kuta. The Peak of Saman, He, then, is the god 
of Adam's Peak charged with the guardianship of the mountain and of the 
province of Sabaragamawa wherein it is located,^ Muslims call the moun­
tain "the hill of Father Adam", hence the name Adam's Peak, There are a 
myriad of stories which connect the first Man with Ceylon, One tale has 
it that on the Peak, Adam and Eve mourned the death of Abel and on the 
rocky precipice Cain was forced to live out his days. The English author,
^3john StiU, The Jungia Tide (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co,,
1930), 22,






Colombo A Adam's Peak
Galle
Fig. 6.— Location of Adam's Peak and DambuUa
5?
Caroline Comer, refers to the island as Tfaa ParaHlse mf Mam,
so the story goes, "found something wanting when driven out of Eden. He 
parted from Eve on the Plains of Mesopotamia prior to his banishment to 
Ceylon, the Paradise of Adam."^ Another version says that Adam, having 
been driven out of Paradise, was given, through the benevolence of God, 
his choice as to where he wished to reside to live out his life. Adam 
chose Lanka, because next to Paradise, this was the most beautiful land 
on earth. ̂  So go the legends of the Footprint and of Adam.
gy no means can the famed Bodhi (or Bo) Tree of Ceylon be over­
looked when reference is made to things sacred. Again, according to 
legend, a branch of that original tree beneath which Gautama sat at the 
time of his enlightenment was carried from India to Lanka in 2i|>5 B.C.
From this branch
Miraculously grew eight shoots, which were planted in various parts 
of Ceylon, becoming the progenitors of thousands of Bo-trees on the 
island today, all deeply revered by devout Buddhists. What is be­
lieved to be the parent tree, said to be the oldest living thing in 
the world, still grows among the noble ruins of Anuradhapura after 
twenty-one centuries.^
The "noble ruins", too, have religious significance. Thick-set 
forest has overrun those areas ïdiere once stood the proud cities of 
Anuradhapura, Tissa, and Polonnaruwa, which were at one time or another
6 5 C a ro l in e  C o m e r ,  The P a r a d i s e  o f  Adam.
^Ibid.. p. 4.
^7Accounts such as this with variations have been told to me on 
several occasions. They vary in blandishments depending upon the en­
thusiasm of the teller.
68Argus John Tresidder, Cevlon. Akl Introduction to a Resplendent 
Land (Princeton; D. Van Nostrand Company, I960), p. 72.
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among the magnificent capitals of the ancient world* Devout Buddhists 
still make pilgrimages to these places to worship at the great dagobas, 
the only remaining architecture on the jungle-shrouded landscape* These 
ancient sites are among the famed "Lost Cities" of Ceylon which, in their 
prime, rose and flourished in an atmosphere ecclesiastical rather than 
civic, with their foundations rooted in Buddhism in the same manner as 
the medieval towns of Europe were d^endent upon the Church* To be sure, 
enormous sums were spent by Lanka's kings and nobles to satisfy their 
luxurious appetites, but these expenditures were equaled by the appropri­
ations directed toward the building of teBq>les and shrines* The one 
measurement used to determine the piety of royalty toward the Buddhist 
religion was subservience to the doctrine; the most noble of kingly puz^ 
suits was the protection of the bhikkhus*
jitiistJiaàâ
Hinduism has contributed significantly to the spiritual life of
the Buddhist* Many Hindu deities occupy prominent places in Buddhist
tenples and are honored along with the Lord Buddha. This relationship
Is not altogether surprising if we remember that Buddhism was orig­
inally an offshoot of Hinduism, and that in Ceylon the two religions 
have coexisted for over two thousand years, sometimes with the Taadl 
Hindus dominant *°9
The Buddha is at the vertex of this pantheon, but Hindu deities such as 
Vishnu, Pattini, and the aforementioned Saman, among others, have retained 
popular favor* Vishnu, for example, is second in status only to the Bud­
dha, as it was he, Vishnu, who was appointed by the Buddha himself as the
69lbid.. PP* 184-185*
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guardian of both the religion and the country of Ceylon. Pattini is the 
great goddess whose matemalistic benevolence has long been a source of 
hope. In addition, there are other gods which are believed to hold any 
number of powers. Changing social conditions necessitated changes in 
religious rites and the Introduction, from time to time, of new rituals. 
Thus, old gods were resurrected from limbo and took auspicious places in 
the pantheon. The roles of the Buddha and the Hindu deities are quite 
separate and distinct. The Buddha can in no way help man with worldly 
problems; he can only furnish guidance and spiritual salvation. The Hin­
du gods, on the other hand, are believed to have the power to aid mankind 
in finding solutions to the worldly dilemmas he faces. The combination 
of the two —  the Buddha and the deities —  is the channel for man's 
peace within himself.
There are representatives of other religions in Ceylon, of course. 
Problems which exist in the interrelationship of these religious commun­
ities are largely ethnic in nature rather than of pure religious base.
The interrelationship will be discussed in a more appropriate place.
Here need only be mentioned that the majority of the population, approx­
imately seventy percent, are Buddhists; the second largest religious 
group, eleven percent, are adherents to Hinduism. Christians, Huslims, 
and Free Thinkers follow in that order, Zoroastrians and Agnostics con­
stituting the minute remainder.
^^These are communal problems rather than religious although 
the latter aspect cannot be eliminated entirely. The collisions occur­




To this point in this chapter, the focus has been on those com­
ponents iMch lend themselves to the formation of Sinhalese Buddhism* It 
was the national religion prior to the European era. Before that time 
there ware influences militating against the philosophy, nevertheless it 
was the principal force in guiding and directing pre-sixteenth century 
Sinhalese society. Hindnism, and to a lesser extent Islam, were largely 
sterile opposition. Buddhism had managed to contain both challengers.
On Lanka, Buddhism had absorbed Hinduism the reverse of tHoaX had taken 
place in India. It con^rised the nationalistic fervor of the Sinhalese —  
a religio-nationalism —  neither element of idiich could have stood by 
itself without support from the other, ühis "religio-nationalism" was 
the construct of lAat is fondly referred to as the "old ways" of the 
Sinhalese people, ind it is this nostalgia for former Sinhalese great­
ness which brought forth the embryo of the Buddhism raiaissance movement 
in Coylon some eighty years ago.
The brink of Buddhism's survival in Ceylon had been reached about 
mid-way in the British Period. It cannot be denied that the missionaries 
of European religious denominations had more than minimal success in lur­
ing into their folds large numbers of Buddhist laymen. Economic coercion 
were valuable Portuguese and Dutch tools in conversions, Englishmen need­
ed only to anplify those policies established their predecessors to 
assure that British interests would best be served. Under Sinhalese 
kings, bhikkhus had played an iiqportant role in leadership among the 
people; under foreign domination, this status was no longer tolerated by
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governing authorities. Te#le schools, ^Aioh had been fountainheads of 
Buddhist education, were gradually throttled, thereby forcing Buddhist 
families to send their children to Christian missionary institutions.
This coercion appeared in a rather subtle manner. Eüÿloyment in govern^ 
ment service was not only a source of relatively lucrative income but a 
mark of the highest prestige attainable. %us, it became a much-sought- 
after prize. Still, government positions were filled on a highly disorimr» 
inatory basis and this same preferential treatment was meted out in the 
commercial world. Virtually the only avenue open to either type of emr 
ployment was a Christian school education. The Buddhist had very little 
choice.
The embryo efforts of Buddhism to regain its pre-sixteenth cen­
tury status are attributable almost entirely to an American, Henry Steel 
Olcutt (I832-I907). An adherent of the philosophy and a world traveler, 
Olcutt landed at dalle (Ceylon) in 1880. He was quick to note the demor­
alized state of Buddhism on the island and the plight of the Buddhist 
monk and laymen alike. He set about marshaling forces iMch would breathe 
new life into Sinhalese Buddhism. He edited and published the Buddhist 
catechism and designed a Buddhist flag. He had envisioned a banner as a 
rallying symbol, an instrument for unifying all sects worldwide; by 1950» 
this flag had become the universal standard of Buddhism in some sixty 
countries. The colors in the flag are the same as those which appear in 
the aura around the head of the Buddha: blue (neale), yellow (petta), 
red (lehita), ^^te (odata), and light red (manjetta),^^ aligning these
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in five vertical strips. A sixth color is an agglomerate of the five but 
for design purposes was distilled and used horizonally in the same order.
Olcutt went on to found the Colombo branch of the Theosophical 
Society^^ then turned his attention to reestablishing Buddhist schools.
In this undertaking he was joined by a young Buddhist, David Hewavitharana, 
lAo acted as interpreter. The two crossed and criss-crossed the island 
urging the people to shun foreign customs, to return to the ancient
y^Olcutt was the founder of the American Theosophical Society 
in New York in 1875* idiose principal tenets were the establishing of a 
nucleus of brotherhood of humanity, and the systematic studies of the 
mysteries of life and matter and conparative religions.
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Sinhalese culture, to join together in the crusade toward r^nstituting 
Buddhist education* At the time that Olcutt and Hewavitharana launched 
their casgiaign, there were but four Buddhist schools in Ceylon; today 
there are over four hundred.
D av id  H e w a v ith a ra n a  (1 8 6 4 -1 9 3 3 ) r e s ig n e d  h i s  p o s i t i o n  w i th  t h e  
B r i t i s h  g o v ern m en t s e r v i c e  t o  accom pany O l c u t t .  He ch a n g ed  h i s  nam e t o  
A n a g a r ik a  ( t h e  H o m eless) D h a rm ap ala , an d  u n d e r  t h i s  name w as t o  d e v o te  
h i s  l i f e  t o  u n i f y i n g  n o t  o n ly  S in h a le s e  B u d d h is ts  h u t  t h e  r e l i g i o n ' s  d e ­
v o te e s  th ro u g h o u t  A s i a .  H is  w o rd s a n d  p ro m p tin g s  t o  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  ^ o ld  
w ay s"  s e r v e d  a s  a  p i v o t  i n  t h e  r e n a i s s a n c e  o f  B uddhism  an d  d i d  much t o  
f a n  t h e  f la m e s  o f  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  in d e p e n d e n c e  among t h e  S in h a l e s e .
But it was in India that Dharmapala achieved perhaps his great­
est work in helping the country to rediscover its great Buddhist heritage. 
The well-known sites idiich are connected with the life and teachings of 
the Lord Buddha and lAich annually attract thousands from the world over 
—  places such as Baddha Gaya, Samath, Kusinara, Sanchi and others —  
owe their glorious contemporary stature to Dharmapala under idiose guid­
ance these sacred places were restored to their former glory* There is 
little question that the rebirth of Buddhism in India, which is one of 
the most extraordinary events of the modem religious world, can be attri­
buted, partially at least, to Dharmapala. The "increase in the number of 
Buddhists during the last 10 years has been phenomenal indicating a mighty 
wave of conversions*"^^ During the decade of 1953-1963 the membership 
increased from a mere 181 thousand to 3*^5 mdJLlion*̂  ̂ New centers of
73The_mnda. Weeklv Review. Nov. 11, 1963, p* 4*
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learning and meditation were founded to provide the Buddhists of Ladakh, 
Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal the spiritual guidance for lAich they formerly 
looked to Tibet prior to 1959. Dharmapala died on April 29, 1933» but 
his spirit stays on to guide the renaissance of Buddhism in the land of 
its birth.
In Ceylon during the years which followed the rather tenuous re­
vival of Buddhism, many people were to join the crusade. The movement 
attracted the aid of wealthy Sinhalese businessmen and syng>athetic edu­
cationalists from other countries. But it is to Olcutt and Dharmapala 
to idiom the Ceylonese Buddhists are perhaps most indebted. Both men have 
become national heroes. Henry Steel Olcutt has been adopted by Ceylon as 
one of its own. Each year on February 17, the anniversary of his death, 
there are island-wide commemorative ceremonies which pay homage through 
eulogies, unveilings of his portrait, and public oratory which retells 
the story of his untiring efforts on behalf of C^lonese Buddhists. 
Dharmapala is paid the same respect and nationally acclaimed as one of 
the country's great social refonaers.
The resurgence of Buddhism is not confined only to Ceylon and 
India. On the contrary, like activity elseidiere has been keynoted by idiat 
was perhaps one of the great religious events of the twentieth century.
On November 30» 1952» the 2500-year-old relics of Sariputta and Noggal- 
lanna, two of the earliest disciples of the Buddha» were reintemed at 
Sanchi in central India in a new vihara (monastery) constructed especial]^ 
for this purpose. This ceremony was part of an International Buddhist 
Conference held in India and attended by hundreds of Buddhist priests and 
thousands of laymen from Asia, Europe and the United States. And in the
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United States, earlier that same month, a Kalmuck^^ Buddhist len^le for 
some 250 Russian Buddhists was dedicated at Farmingdale, New Jersey, The 
Kalmucks were brought to the United States by the Church World Service 
and the Tolstoy Foundation following release from displaced persons canps. 
The New Jersey community was among the first organized Kalmuck settlements 
in the post-war world.
At Rangoon, the Buddhist Great Council opened May 18, 195̂ » the 
first Council of its kind since I87I, and only the sixth since the death 
of Gautama, It attracted more than 50»000 adherents, monks and laity 
alike, from nearly all countries. As a gesture to the opening, the gov­
ernment of Burma commuted all death sentences of criminals to life im­
prisonment, and the penalities of other prisoners were reduced by three 
months. These were but some of the events in mid-twentieth century which 
keynoted the revival of Buddhism,
There is no way to determine what rather suddenly rekindled the 
interest in the moral conc^ts of Buddhism, In any case, the reawakening 
was a concurrent phenomenon with the mergence of the independent Asian 
states, ând despite its conten^lative, nonmaterialistic nature. Buddhism 
now has surrounded itself with a political environment. No longer con­
fining itself to the purely religio-social aspects of life, it has incor­
porated political agitation into the mainstream of its philosophy.
The political militancy of the Buddhist leaders in Saigon need 
not be given elaboration here. Their roles in spearheading the religious
7Kalmucks are descendants of the Mongolian followers of Genghis 
Khan, In Russia their republic was abolished and its citizens sent to 
Siberia because of their failure to support Russia in World War II,
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sud political caiq)aigns against South Vietnamese governments is certainly 
well known. They have moved into the forefront in insisting upon a cease­
fire in the guerilla warfare and an end to all foreign intervention. 
Largely, the political decision-making machinery is the Vien Boa Dao. the 
Institute for Secular Affairs. The Institute was a provision of the char­
ter national oi^anization, the Unified Vietnam Buddhist Church, the aims 
of which was to establish Biddhism as a permanent political and social 
force in South Vietnam. The national organization?* was the product of a 
four-day national Buddhist convention held in Saigon in early January, 
1964.
The Vien Hba Dao is the political and social arm of the church. 
This single national organization has the tailored opportunity for devel­
oping a mass political base and certainly must be reckoned with as a 
springboard for political action. The charter provides for a powerful 
eight-man leadership group and an organizational network extending into 
all of the nation's forty-two provinces and districts within them. The 
pyramidic hierarchy is on the order of a government structure, with the 
directions filtering downward from the major Buddhist institutes in Saigon 
to regions, provinces, districts, cities and villages.
77In Japan the growing strength of the Sokka Gakkai. the militant 
Buddhist organization, is being watched with considerable attention. It 
claims a membership of approximately ten million in 255 chapters through-
76%e charter of the Unified Vietnam Buddhist Church also sets 
up the Bien Tans Thone. the Institute of Religious Affairs. This, and 
the Vien Hba Dao, are the two main government bodies.
77sokka Gakkai means "Value Creation Society.”
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out Japan. Regardless of whether the membership is as high as claimed, 
Sokka Gakkai has made a successful entry into Japanese politics. Aside 
from its cultural and religious program, the organization's political 
arm, the Komei Seiji Renmei —  the League for Just and Fair Politics —  
had fifteen members in the upper house of the Diet and more than one 
tiiousand members in the perfectural assemblies and municipal councils all 
over Japan. Komei Seiji Renmei reflects no consistent domestic philosophy 
other than aiming toward the elimination of corruption in politics and 
promoting the welfare of the people. Internationally, it seeks peaceful 
coexistence, the condemnation of nuclear armaments, and opposes rearmament 
of Japan. Sokka Gakkai is a highly disciplined organization with a de­
clared policy of the promotion of world peace and a denial of militarism.
In Ceylon, Buddhist political shock waves were first felt in the 
1956 general Sections. Ascetics, as a group, joined a Nationalist- 
Trotskyite coalition to wage a fuU blown campaign against the incumibent 
Prime Minister, Sir John Kotelewala. The bMklchwa denounced Sir John on 
a number of issues primarily for his failure to advance Buddhism to that 
status which they considered to be its rightful place, and for leaving 
unfulfilled his promise to make the Sinhalese language the official lan­
guage of Ceylon. These same issues were to remain points of contention 
during succeeding administrations, about which more will be said later.^^ 
Mention of this campaign is made at this juncture since it was the haiv 
binger of future political activity. The Nationalist* Trotskyite-Buddhist 
coalition scored an overwhelming Section victory.
7^Both of these issues remain today as the basis of communal 
and political ferment, and are taken up fully in later chapters.
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Buddhism in Ceylon assumed a new role in secular affairs. And 
there was little question that henceforth the voices of the bhikkhus 
would be influential instruments in affairs of state. Prime Minister 
Soloman West Eidgway Bandaranaike was the standard-bearer of the Buddhist 
rights during the campaign and remained the champion of the cause after 
his party's victory. But subsequently this new force —  the voice of 
Buddhism —  within the structure of secular politics was to be viewed 
with a great deal of trepidation by officialdom and by the people alike. 
The government was forced to acknowledge, reluctantly, the participation 
of the Buddhist monks in the Sinhalese-Tamil civil disorders of 1958.?9 
The press gave the matter of Buddhist participation the low-key treatment, 
exonerating the monks on the basis of being innocent victims in the mael­
strom of cynicisms, fear, and hatreds of the pluralistic society. Grad­
ually, this explanation gained general acceptance. But the apologists 
were forced into a hasty retreat the latter part of 1959*
On the morning of September 25, Prime Minister Bandaranaike was 
assassinated at his residence, Rosemead, the victim of a bullet fired by 
a young, saffron-robed Buddhist monk, Talduwe Semarama There. The polit­
ical overtones in the assassination were only indirectly related. The 
gunman, it seems, reportedly was angered by the Prime Minister's refusal 
to go all the way in giving precedence to ancient Eastern medical tech­
niques known as Avurveda. Bandaranaike had consistently followed a course 
of Westernizing public hospitals and clinics. More will be said about 
the assassination and its aftermath in a later chapter.
79%$ story of civil disorder which racked Ceylon is told in 
Chapter III.
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Heretofore, the political activities of the ascetics had boi 
deemphaeized. by government and press alike; now, all avennes were ope 
to make certain no facts were suppressed. In bold type, the Ceylon 
Observer called to the attention of its readers that the Inspector G* 
of Police
Wanted the public informed that mischief makers [are] trying to 
spread a rumour that the person arrested in conneetim with the 
assassination of the Prime Minister [wa^ not a Buddhist priest. 
He confirms that the person concerned is a Buddhist priest.^
In November, 1959» an ad hoc committee was set by the Go; 
General of Ceylon to consider ways and means of Inpleaenting some gee 
suggestions put forth earlier by an unofficial Buddhist Coauissiom st 
ing reorganization. Among the recommendations were* the total ban tn 
participation by Buddhist monks in party policies, business, or in ai 
istration of tenqple lands; no Buddhist monk should be appointed to as 
post for lAich he would be paid a salary or other remmeratiai; and ; 
ations of the Buddhist educational institutions would fall within the 
purview of the state. There were other recommendations, but these w; 
the principal ones. The following March, the Ministry of Internal kt 
warned that seditious and inflammatory panphlets, lAich were being m  
chiefly to Buddhist monks, could have disastrous effects. The pai^I 
exhorted the Buddhist clergy to lead the way in militant action agai-: 
other religious denominations.
The structural power base of the religion's political inf lus 
and activity in Ceylon is the Saneha. the monastic order of the Buchih 
clergy. Originally, the Saneha were cave-dwelling, wandering hermite
SOcevlon Observer. Sept. 27, 1959, p. 1.
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Heretofore, the political activities of the ascetics had been 
deenghasized by government and press alike; now, aU avenues were opened 
to make certain no facts were suppressed. In bold type, the Cevlon 
Observer called to the attention of its readers that the Inspector General 
of Police
Wanted the public informed that mischief makers [^e] trying to 
spread a rumour that the person arrested in connection with the 
assassination of the Prime Minister [wag not a Buddhist priest.
He confirms that the person concerned is a Buddhist priest.60
In November, 1959» an ad hoc committee was set up by the Governor- 
General of Ceylon to consider ways and means of ing>lementing some general 
suggestions put forth earlier by an unofficial Buddhist Commission study­
ing reorganization. Among the recommendations were; the total ban on 
participation by Buddhist monks in party policies, business, or in admin­
istration of teng>le lands; no Buddhist monk should be appointed to any 
post for lAich he would be paid a salary or other remuneration; and oper­
ations of the Buddhist educational institutions would fall within the 
purview of the state. There were other recommendations, but these were 
the principal ones. The following March, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
warned that seditious and inflammatory pamphlets, which were being mailed 
chiefly to Buddhist monks, could have disastrous effects. Ihe pamphlets 
exhorted the Buddhist clergy to lead the way in militant action against 
other religious denominations.
The structural power base of the religion's political influaice 
and activity in Ceylon is the Sangha. the monastic order of the Buddhist 
clergy. Originally, the Saneha were cave-dwelling, wandering hermits
QQCevlon Observer. Sept. 2?, 1959, P. 1.
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whose principal duty was the fulfilling of the spiritual needs of the 
people. Later, the tenqple became a beacon of learning, a fortress of 
cultural heritage, and, as has already been mentioned, the monks settled 
in monasteries, to carry on their work. Despite this transition, the 
Saneha remained subject to rule by their own ecclesiastical laws; there 
was no leader, no authoritarian power. Ihis complexion is undergoing a 
change today and it is becoming obvious that an internal power struggle 
among the Saneha is in the offing.
The Buddhist clergy, like its counterpart in other religions, 
has, from time to time, broadened its function to meet the changing needs 
of the people. As in other religions, each time a change has taken place, 
questions have been put forth by the conservative wing (in this case, of 
the Saneha) as to whether or not the innovations did not represent an 
even further departure from the original doctrine. There are approxi­
mately 15,000 monks in Ceylon living in about 6,000 tençles. There is a 
loose division among the Saneha which lacks authoritarian leadership.
These divisions are: the conservative wing, on the order of a vigilance 
group watching over the purity of doctrine and living along the lines of 
the original code; the middle-of-road group, moderate and con^laisant, 
who refrain from entering the controversy; and the activist wing who are 
spearheading a new atmosphere in which those roots, vdiich were dying out 
under foreign domination, can be transplanted to flourish in the mid­
twentieth century. It is the latter lAo argue for wider participation 
in sechlar affairs.
Today, the Saneha is again under scrutiny. It has entered —  
perhaps reentered would be more correct —  the world, but now in the
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political area. Critics point to the wide deviation between this and the 
earlier path of cave-dwelling and life of meditation. Their role in past 
ages found no place for dabbling in politics; the farthest extension of 
such activity could be found in an advisory capacity to rulers. The con­
servative factor maintains that it is not necessary to poke fingers into 
the administrative process since religious guidance has no common meeting 
ground with politics. The Sangha is faced with the problem of how to be 
a part of the woyld being in the world. In other words,
to what extent should the clergy enter the spheres of activity normally 
defined as purely secular in order to equip the clerics with modem 
knowledge to be of service to modem man? The solution may be found in 
the not too distant future through the calling of a Saneavanawa (a Bud­
dhist Council conference), not for discussion of doctrinal matters, but 
rather to clearly define the place of the Saneha and the conduct of the 
laity in the modem state.
What is the future political role of Buddhism in Ceylon? It 
seems unlikely that its voice will be quieted, and it may well predestine 
irreparable divisions in Ceylonese society. As a political force, it was 
heralded in 1956 as one which would bring about a new era lAerein the 
pristine glories of Lanka would be revived on a partnership basis between 
society and the Saneha. The partnership flourished for awhile, but in 
1959 the death of the Prime Minister was laid at the doorstep of the 
Saneha» s political activity.
Buddhism is a great religion, with a noble philosophy of life.
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Its saintly Founder set guidelines for the bhikkhwa such as meditation, 
self-control, and service to mankind» If there is a negation of these 
principles in preference to the heat and dust of politics (and politics 
here is meant as the active participation in national and local adminis­
tration), then surely adversaries of the religion will utilize every inch 
of ground for criticism. The urgings to return to the religion of the 
ancestors will, it would seem, have a hollow ring, the tone being one of 
political power rather than spiritual ministry. And there is the para­
mount question as to Aether any one religion has the right to be the 
vanguard of political strife if the interest of the people are threatened.
History is filled with the tragic consequence where religions 
have been mixed with politics. Marching across the pages of historiogra­
phies are the persecutions and brutalities of Jews and Gentiles, Hindus, 
Buddhists, and Muslims, Protestants and Catholic, one against the other. 
Far from serving the ideals of public peace, tolerance, and brotherhood 
of men, chaos and disorder followed hurriedly lAen clerics have descended 
their pulpits to mount political rostrums. And history is filled too 
with dire consequences lAen civil government has abrogated its principal 
raison d» etre and delivered itself into the grasping hands of religious 
groups; the oppressions and suppressions which followed do not make a 
pretty picture. In the infancy of the human race, priests existed before 
kings. %th the advancement of civilization, clerical authority has be­
come subservient to the temporal government.
There is no defying that in C^lon, under Sinhalese rulers, the 
Sangha contributed greatly to education and culture, nor is it to be de­
nied that an equally great contribution could be made in the twentieth
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oeutury. But the politics of religion in Ceylon may introduce a ̂ ole 
range of problems: a permanent rupture in the plural society, outrageous 
demands upon government, and a collision between a religious oriented 
culture and a secular econcmdc life. The role of Buddhism in Ceylon, it 
would seem, is that vital connection between the descriptive and prescrip­
tive —  and between the state and society —  elements in the nationalizing 
process. Between these two lie the social and economic institutions based 
upon law, order, unity, toleration, and justice. And all of these are 
explicit in the moral code of Iheravada Buddhism's Noble Eightfold Path.
CHAPTER m  
THE POLITICS OF COMMONITÏ
The populace of Ceylon is a mosaic society of articulate commu­
nities.
There are the Sinhalese and Tamils, Europeans and Burghers, Moors, 
Malays, and the Veddahs. The Sinhalese are divided among the Kandyan 
Sinhalese and the Lou^country Sinhalese, and the Tamils are identified as 
Ceylon Tamils and Indian Tamils. In no other country of such small geo­
graphical area in the world is there the broad spectrum of races and the 
intermingling of minorities. One of the overriding problems is finding a 
process which will meld all social, political, economic, and religious 
forces into a unified ̂ ole. To the present time, nothing resembling a 
nationalism has begun to appear. Whatever degree of social cohesiveness 
is manifest, it is a resurgence of individual group identities mainly 
along ethnic and religious Unes and further subdivided on economic and 
religious bases.
Deep gulfs began appearing in Ceylon's socio-political groupings 
as the dusk of British rule began settling over the island. Prior to 
independence, there was a competitiveness, of course, among the social 
strata, and there did exist a division among the groups. % e  exodus of 
the foreigner and the dawn of self-government introduced a new form of
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competition —  the straggle for political power. Old alignments among 
the communities were shattered as reorganized groups and subgroups cast 
about for new coalitions idiich offered the promise of rewards either in 
status or, minimally, a few comforts of life. As population pressure 
has increased upon the land, with a concomitant decrease in carrying 
capacity for support of the population, lebensraum has taken on a very 
real meaning.
Poniil Ation Femal e
Q jThe census of I963 estimated that 10.625 million people were 
crowded into Ceylon's 25,332 square miles. Based upon this estimate, 
there are roughly 238 persons per square mile, and the overcrowding con­
dition is well on its way to worsenii^. The rate of increase in 1946 was 
1.5 percent, by 1953 it was 2.9 percent, and the average annual rate of 
population increase between 1958 and I963 was 2.7 percent. A United 
Nations population study in 1958 projected that by 1970 there would be 
13.3 million people in Ceylon; 18.3 million by 1980. Assuming these 
projections to be substantially correct, by the latter date the island 
win have a density of a staggering 715 persons per square mile. Table 1, 
page 76, gives the annual population increase since 1946.
There has been only modest fluctuation in the birth rate since 
1900. There have been periods of rise and decline but the changes were
®%nited Nations, Demographic Yearbook. _1963. p. 155# The 
first dicennial census of Ceylon was undertaken in I87I. The population 
then numbered 2,400,380.
82united Nations, The Population of Southeast Asia (Including 




















♦Sources United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1962, pp. 134-135»
slight. In Ceylon, as in other areas of the world, the rapid increase in 
population is due largely to better sanitation and more widely distributed 
health services. Putting it simply —  more people are living longer. The 
health and sanitation practices begun by the British in I85O progressed 
rather slowly until 1939» They were given inpetus between 1939 and 1946, 
and the strides made in the cure and prevention of diseases have been 
extraordinary.
The [deathrate] decline is sometimes attributed to malaria control 
by DDT spraying, begun in 1946. The influence of this measure is 
undoubtedly great, but the contribution of economic prosperity and, 
flowing from it, of improved sanitation, health services and dis­
tribution, should not be forgotten.83
8%. K. Sarkar, The Demography of Cevlon (Colombo î Government 
Press, 1957)» P» 166.
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Population pressure upon the land is a major factor contributing 
toward communalism in Ceylon. The imbalance between human numbers and 
economic development threatens to depress what has been to the present 
time a relatively high standard of livix^ in an Asian country.®^ Communal 
divisions within a country usually coincide with races, religious groups, 
and castes. These have a bearing upon Ceylon's social problems certainly. 
But the root cause of Ceylon's divided communities is more directly attri­
butable to economic causes, especially the competition in securing gov­
ernment positions and official appointments. The elbowing of one another 
is the manifestation of a struggle for power. The value of "power" was 
first illustrated by European colonialism, and power has been adopted in 
a new dimension by Ceylon's plural communities. Those lAose name, caste, 
or economic strata once guaranteed the comforts and amenities of living 
are now challenged by sociopolitical discontented groups lAo are seeking 
new ways and means for gaining prestige and power. The self-centering of 
the old elite, at the cost of the general welfare, led to the political 
revolution of 1956 idiich brought a Leftist coalition into government.
Approximately 70 percent of the population are Sinhalese.
Their language is Sinhala although a large number are fluent in Ehglish, 
and they take pride in dating their ancestry to the days of Vijaya.
There is both unity and division within the Sinhalese community. The
®̂ *The economics of Ceylon are dealt with in Chp. I".
^^Details as to the causes and results of this political change 
are more appropriately a part of Chp. VI.
®^For the estimated distribution of Ceylon's population see 
Table 2, page 78.
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ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION 
ACCORDING TO RACE*








♦Source: Government of Ceylon, Department of Census, I963.
unity is for developing those interests which are parochial to the Sinha­
lese people, but division is the result of political, economic, and se­
curity self-interest. E3q>loitation of one another is most apparent in 
the power and status struggles, principally where elections to Parliament 
and local governing bodies are concerned. Very few persons can become 
members of the administrative organizations. This creates disunity and 
distrust among those individuals ;Ao feel they have an inadequate share 
of opportunities. Some economic inequalities have always existed between 
the peasantry and the more sophisticated, but the commercial age produced 
sub-groupings according to economic pursuits and intracommunity exploita­
tion. Despite the long history of the Sinhalese as rice farmers, today's 
middleclass look upon those who grow the rice as inferiors notwithstanding 
the fact that the cultivator class —  Govieama —  is considered the high­
est caste in Ceylon. Because low-country Sinhalese outnumber the Kandyans 
by a wide margin, they find themselves in economic and political competi­
tion with their counterpart from the Kandy area.
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The Kandyan Sinhalese have departed less than the low-oonntry 
Sinhalese from ancient customs. • • • There are fewer Christians 
among the Kandyans than among the low-country Sinhalese. Caste 
organization is still stronger up-country than in the more sophis­
ticated urban communities along the coast. The low-country Sinhalese 
have been more rec^tive to industrial, commercial, and social changes 
than the Kandyans, many of whom look back with regret on the passing 
of their feudal privileges.®?
The Tamils too are disunited. The language is Tamil, the reli­
gion is Hinduism, there is a common ancestry but here the similarities 
end. (Die ancestors of the Cevlon Tamils came to the island centuries ago; 
the Indian Tamils are rather recent arrivals. Collectively, Tamils make 
up roughly 22 percent of the total population, ühe Ceylon Tamil is a re­
spected meznber of Ceylonese society, recognized for having made many con­
tributions to Ceylon and its people. Ibstly the Tamils are concentrated 
in the North and Eastern provinces —  the Dry Zone —  and since the cli­
mate offers limited resources they have, for decades, sought other economic 
pursuits primarily in government posts for which they were trained by the 
British.
The Indian Tamil came in a constant stream from India during the
days of British control to work the tea, rubber, and coconut estates when
the Sinhalese refused to leave their own lands for en^loyment with the
British entrteneurs.
From about 1823 onwards we find the growth of new plantations in this 
country, first coffee, then tea and rubber became ingzortant indus­
tries. The local inhabitants of Ceylon did not desire to work in 
plantations and leave their farms, so the Ehiropean planter idio owned 
the plantations were compelled to bring people from South India to 
work in them. This is how the Indian Tamils were brought to Ceylon.^®
®?Argus John Tresidder, Cevlon; An Introduction to the 
p. 3i*
®®I.D.S. and Marguerite I. Weerawardana, Cevlon and Her Citizens 
(Madras: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. ^5»
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Bat the estate worker migrating from India did so under a catalog of 
British guarantees such as minimum wages, medical care, and educational 
facilities. The Ceylon Tamil had no such guarantees. Gradually, he grew 
more resentful toward the immigrant and began to make political demands 
of the British government that some type of regulation be instituted.
The British could overlook these demands; the autonomous government of 
Ceylon cannot. Numbering about 975 thousand today, it is primarily the 
Indian Tamil which is the heart of a national and international contro­
versy, the details of which will be taken up in sequence here.
Among other minority groups, there are the Burghers, Moors, 
Malays, and the Veddahs. The Burghers are descendants of Portuguese and 
Dutch colonists who have varying amounts of native blood. In percentage 
th^ make up less than one percent of the population, are Christies, 
have adopted English as the communication media, and show a decided pref­
erence for European dress and customs. The Burghers are recognized for 
their energy and craftsmanship, and for more than two centuries have 
played significant roles in government. They continue to cling to some 
official posts, although their hold is becomix^ increasingly tenuous.
And they have made many contributions to law, medicine, and education.
There is a very small group of Malays, less than one-half of 
one percent, whose ancestors were soldiers under the Dutch and British. 
Today, they are found mostly in police and security forces. The Moors 
are of Arab extraction, make up about seven percent of the total popula­
tion with a religious attachment to Islam. The language is Arabic, how­
ever, they are conversant in the predominant language of their resident 
area, idiich is mostly the western section and the coast of the Eastern 
province.
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The Arabs have left their mark on Ceylon. During Idie Middle Ages 
they carried on much of the foreign trade of the island, and some 
settled there and took Ceylonese wives. Their descendents, the 
Moormen, have retained their Moslem religion and form a separate 
community. They control much of the retail trade, and are scattered 
throughout Ceylon.89
The Veddahs are a vanishing community. They live deep in the 
jungles of the backward province of Uva. They bear a close resemblance 
to the pre-Dravidian tribes of southern India and take pride in asserting 
that their ancestors came to the island when Ceylon was still physically 
linked with India. In the curious admixture of Ceylon's races, the 
Veddahs form the most primitive of surviving peoples, lingering on in a 
world to vblch. they have been unable to adapt themselves. The government 
takes a special interest in rehabilitating these ill-educated, ill-equipped 
people, and some progress has been made in assimilating them with the rest 
of Ceylon's society.
There are very few Chinese on the island, thus there is no prob­
lem of the "overseas Chinese" iddch is found elsewhere throughout South- 
Southeast Asia. Unofficial estimates place a total of perhaps as few as 
200 Chinese currently in Ceylon which includes the wives and children of 
members of international missions. There are a few Buddhist priests and 
religious workers from China, and Visit Visas holders issued to visitors 
to the IslMd for a period not to exceed six months.
Among the Sinhalese and Tamils particularly, communal divisions 
began occurring midway in the sixteenth century. Small clusters of indi­
viduals saw opportunities in casting their lots with the European. The
89m111s, Britain and Cevlon (London, Longmans, Green & Co.,
1945), p. 10.
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inter- and intra-oomzmmity gaps widened steadily, the gulf reaching its 
widest breach during the last months of British rule. The exodus of 
colonial government set the stage for indigenous conçetition for polit­
ical power; there has been no retrogression in the power struggle to the 
present time.
Caste
The caste system is still a factor in Ceylon society, but of 
someiriiat lesser importance than perhaps twenty-five years ago. In the 
ideal structure of the Sinhalese caste system, like that of Hinduism, 
each person was assigned a position in life by lAich attention and ser­
vice were rendered to other members of society.In the social struc­
ture of ancient Ceylon
At the top was the royal family; then came the chiefs, priests, and 
monks, and at the bottom the cultivators and craftsmen. The "middle- 
class" if any was insignificant. . . .  And as time past, with the 
joint family as the unit of society . . .  the caste system was grad­
ually adopted by the rest of society too.91
Gradually, changes brought about caste displacement and replacement, with
the cultivator being accorded the highest status. The man who tilled the
soil belonged then, as now, to the Govieama. the highest grouping within
the system. The caste stratification began to lose historical significance
and sanction during the British occupation. The crown abolished raiakariva
—  a rule conçelling people to give free service to the state —  in 1832.
90por a comprehensive study of the caste system in Ceylon see 
Bryce Ryan, Caste in Modem Cevlon; _Ihe_ Sinhalese System in Transition 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953)» Also, the same author’s 
Sinhalese Village (Coral Gables: Univ. of Miami Press, 1958)»
91g. C. Mendis, Cevlon. _Todav and Yesterday, p. 29.
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In breaking down this arrangement of cooperative feudalism, it prepared 
the way for increased efforts in a competitive commercial age and allowed 
free choice in occupation irrespective of caste or class. New occupations 
demanded by the plantations and allied fields led to cutting across caste 
lines in employment opportunities. This eventuated in the rise of a 
ndddleclass amoi^ Sinhalese society which, with its economic foundation, 
ignored the traditions of social stratification according to caste.
Bryce Ryan notes that in the past decade the Goyigama claim to 
the highest caste has been challenged, particularly by the Karavas caste 
(fisherman). According to Ryan, the challenge is also being made by the 
Salagamas. (cinnamon peelers). The Karavas claim descent from the 
Ksatriya warriors who came to Ceylon with the invading Indian kings, une 
Salagamas claim descent from Brahman ancestry. In both cases, linage is 
basis for the challenge.
In view of urbanization and the influence of Western modes, there 
are now few uncrossable caste lines. The lessening of the importance of 
social stratification has become more prevalent among the Sinhalese in 
the low-country districts. In the cities and towns, there is increasing 
reluctance to acknowledge another's superiority simply on the "higher 
birth" traditionalism. This is all the more true idien the person of high­
er caste is no better off financially than his social inferior. However, 
there is also another aspect. Where very close friends and marriage are 
concerned, caste has retained much of its importance. The same holds true 
in politics. Candidates for public office are usually of the same caste 
as the majority of the constituents in a particular electoral district, 
and politicians dwell upon their caste origins.
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Yfft Mil.
There are few more potentially explosive social problems aiQrwhere 
in the world today than that of the Sinhalese-Tamil in Ceylon. It burst 
forth in savage fury in 1958, quieted, and now rests in an aura of uncer­
tainty. It is a package of exaggerated fears and misunderstandings. No- 
^ere in the history of ancient or medieval Lanka does one come across 
the deep gulf now prevalent. Both the Sinhalese and Tamil s are striving 
for cultural identification lost more to the Sinhalese than the Tamil dur̂  
ing the European era of Ceylon. The Sinhalese are preoccupied with the 
idea that the Tamils wish to dominate; the latter, in turn, fully believe 
that they have been marked for cultural liquidation through laws and other 
regulations established by the Sinhalese-dominated governments.
The seeds of the conflict are also economic. There were in Ceylon 
people of Indian extraction prior to European colonialism. With the arri­
val in droves of the Indian Tamil as plantation workers, the Sinhalese 
sensitivity of racial, linguistic, religious, and cultural consciousness 
was awakened. The British, for their part, had no alternative in light of 
the reluctance of the Sinhalese to work the plantations. Ihe ü̂ tmils made 
a successful bid also for other enployment opportunities, especially in 
coveted government posts and other prestige-connected appointments. Dur­
ing the days of the British occupation, the educational, economic, and 
political advantages held by the Tamil over the Sinhalese was greatly out 
of proportion to their numerical minority.
The Sinhalese demonstrated little competitive spirit during the 
early Tamil emigration. But as greater numbers of the Indian-bom arrived.
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as the land for support of an increasing Sinhalese population began to 
shrink, as the economic status between Tamil and Sinhalese widened, dis­
content gave way to hatred. The British, from time to time, had made 
concessions to the Sinhalese in something of a half-hearted attençt to 
ameliorate the dissidents. Hope for a whole catalog of equities was 
stimulated when the British appointed an ad hoc commission for direct 
negotiations with the Sinhalese leaders.9^ The matter of the Tsunil immi­
grant was set aside during the war years and until 1948 when the C^rlon 
Citizenship Act of that year brought matters to a head. The provisions 
of the Act and its ramifications will be taken up shortly. The problem, 
then, being economic is concomitantly one of preserving cultural identity. 
The long decades of subservience created an environment of humiliation 
for the Sinhalese particularly. Self-government set the course for the 
Sinhalese community to regain its former status and, in the process, eco­
nomic and political blows were struck against the Tamils. The Tamil feels 
his culture is threatened, and without culture as the basis of racial 
existence he cannot preserve his identity and racial dignity.
Citizenship and the "Stateles^w
There is in Ceylon a large segment of the Tamil people who are 
called —  for want of a better term —  the "stateless". Numbering some- 
tdiere in the neighborhood of one million persons, these are immigrants 
from India, yet for political and other reasons are citizens of neither 
India nor Ceylon. These immigrants fall into two categoriest shopkeepers,
9^Wlth these negotiations began an international problem between 
Ceylon and India which at times threatened to disrupt the otherwise 
cordial relations. Details of this dispute appear in Chp. V.
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servants, municipal employees and the like, are in one category; planta­
tion workers are in another. The problem of the stateless relates to 
the latter, the plantation laborer.
These people were considered by the British as a special class.
In 1923, for exaaiple, the British established an agency. Controller of 
Indian Immigrant Labour, to oversee their affairs lAile in Ceylon, l&th 
the end of British rule, the status of the immigrants became internal 
and external matters of both India and Ceylon. The latter, of course, 
has the right to decide idio will be granted citizenship and who will not; 
India likewise. And that residue of the population lAich cannot qualify 
for citizenship under the laws of either country are, legally, no one's 
responsibility.
The immigrant problem has political, legal, and economic facets. 
Politically, it is a question of allegiance to Ceylon. A considerable 
number of these people refuse to renounce their homeland, India, choose 
their wives in India, and cling to the cultural attributes lAich distin­
guish the Indian Tamil community from the Tamils of Ceylonese extraction. 
Culturally there are considerable differences. Marriage ceremonies, birth 
rituals, funeral rites, dress, worship of the gods, are different. Even 
the Tamil language is not the same. Only a small minority have profic­
iency in the Tamil language of Ceylon and hardly any can claim a working 
knowledge of Sinhala. The legal phase involves the satisfying of certain 
provisions in the Ceylon Citizenship Act which will be taken up shortly. 
The economic quantum focuses on employment in jobs i^ch, if vacated by 
the Tamil immigrant, would be filled by either a Sinhalese or a Ceylon 
Tamil. The return to India would open, then, additional opportunities
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for Ceylon citizens, something mhich is critically needed. The matter 
involves the future status of a sizable portion of the Tamil population.
The contents of the Indo-Ceylon negotiations will be considered 
in a later chapter. But in passing here it might be well to mention that 
a number of atteng)ts have been made between India and Ceylon to affect a 
settlement as to the disposition of these stateless. On October 10, 195̂ » 
Sir John Kotelewala, then Prime Minister of Ceylon, and Jawaharalal Nehru 
concluded the Delhi Pact setting forth procedures by lAich the people of 
Indian origin in Ceylon could opt for citizenship. An inducement plan 
was first offered in 195̂ » but it was not until ten years later that the 
Government of Ceylon proposed something concrete. The scheme was a gra­
tuity payment not to exceed Rs. 1000 (US$200) per family idio had applied 
for citizenship but had failed to obtain it because of legalities. It 
was mainly applicable to the plantation workers, but all Tamils yAvo reg­
istered with the Indian High Commissioner were also eligible, thus indi­
cating a desire to return to India. However, anyone idiose assets exceeded 
Rs. 5U00 (US$1000) could not qualify for payment. A scale set the amount 
each person would receive depending upon the age of the individual. The 
maximum amount of Rs. 1000 would apply, for example, in the case of a man 
below 45 years of age with a wife and at least three children. Table 3» 
page 88 gives the amount of payment each person would receive according 
to the age categories.
If plans had materialized according to the provisions of the 
Delhi Pact, there would be only two classifications of citizens in Ceylon 
todays those with automatic citizenship under the Citizenship Act, and 
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«Source: Hindu Weekly Review. April 6, 1964, p. 14.
Aich however was not to be the case. A third grouping of people have 
emerged —  those who can not legally claim Ceylon citizenship, but 160, 
nevertheless, give no indication of their intention to return to India. 
These are the stateless.
Ceylon* s Citizenship Act was promulgated on S^tember 21, 1948, 
and later supplemented with the Indian and Pakistani Residents Citizenship 
Act of August 5» 1949. Prior to 1948 there was, of course, no citizenship 
law, inasmuch as all British subjects were enfranchised providing they 
met the qualifications as set forth by the British. But today in Ceylon, 
one, is a citizen bv-descent, not .baibirth.. Normally every person inherits 
the domicile of his parents at the time of his birth. Ceylon differs 
because
There are in Ceylon . . • persons of recent Indian descent, mai^ of 
whom regard India (or Pakistan) as their home and idio intend to re­
turn to that home in due course. In order to sort out those who 
have an "abiding interest" in Ceylon from those who have not, and 
at the same time to avoid the complications involved in determining 
domicile, a substantial period of residence with wife and children
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have been prescribed. Since many of those i&o are in truth "Indian” 
have children bom in Ceylon who eventually return with their parents 
to India, citizenship is not based upon birth but descent.93
Citizenship is granted in the following ways:
Firstly, to those idiose ancestors have been in [th^ country for a 
long time (called citizenship lay descent; . . . Secondly, . . .  to 
those Indians and Pakistanis who have been in Ceylon for a consider­
able time and idio intend to make Ceylon their country. Thirdly, . . .  
under certain conditions, to those lAo are married to Ceylon citizens 
and resident in Ceylon, because their marriage and residence show 
their intention to make Ceylon their country. Fourthly, . . .  to 
those foreigners lAo have given distinguished service to [th^ 
country. 9^
Particularly in the case of people of Indian descent, some proof must be 
furnished that either the male parent, male grandparent, or paternal 
great-grandparent were also bom on the island. This requires a birth 
certificate, and here is the hitch. Many persons bom on estates find 
it difficult to obtain their own certificate, since there may have been 
a long delay in registering the birth, or the certificate may have been 
lost or destroyed. How much greater then is the task of obtaining those 
of the male ancestors. There is also the control of illicit entry into 
Ceylon from India, a matter which has plagued the island for years. The 
requirement of establishing proof of citizenship by the birth certificate 
is by no means a fhlly effective weapon against illicit immigration, but 
it is an instrument of partial control.
Ceylon has always considered the Indian Tamils as being Indian
93jennings, The. Dominion of Ceylon, p. 79. For a couçrehensive 
discussion of Ceylon citizenship see also S. Naraasivayam, Parliamentary 
.G.ovemment_in.Ceylon. 1948-1998 (Colombo: K.V.G. De Silva & Son, 1959)*
pp. 17-22.
9^,D,S. Weerawardana and Marguerite I. Weerawardana, Cevlon 
and HerCitizens, pp. 118-119.
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nationals* It was on this premise that the Indian and Pakistani Resi­
dents Act was passed and ioçleiaented» and under which the people of 
Indian origin, according to the Kotelewala-Nehru pact of 195̂ t would opt 
for citizenship of either country. The process of registration began 
almost immediately, but dragged along until 1962, since neither country 
was anxious to fblfill the agreement. Ceylon has acc^ted 31 thousand 
people as citizens, has rejected 205 thousand applications; India has 
granted citizenship to 53 thousand. Ceylon's position is that only those 
whose applications have been allowed are citizens and that the remainder 
are Indian nationals. India refuses to accept this argument. There was 
the basic assu#tion in the 195^ agreement that those persons Wiose appli­
cations were rejected but who did not apply for Indian citizenship would 
automatically be granted it by Ceylon at the end of ten years, or in 1964. 
It was assumed then that only a small number would be in question. In 
this, practicalities outdistanced assunQ>tions. An official estimate set 
the number of persons whose status is still in doubt at 975 thousand at 
the end of 1964.^^
Since the stateless people are physically in Ceylon, it is obvi­
ously Ceylon's problem as to their disposition. Excluding the ethnic 
phase, they are of little concern to India. Essentially, it is an inter­
nal matter, but one 'cddch can only be settled through bilateral negotia­
tions, Whatever agreement is reached eventually, there will remain in 
Ceylon a residue of people in the stateless category for whom some pro­
visions must be made. It is unfortunate that the presmt state of affairs
^^These figures are taken from Prime Minister Bandaranaike's 
statement in the Senate, Nov. 11, 1964. Qioted in the Cevlon Weekly 
Times. Nov. 18, 1964, p. 3»
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involves many persons iriio have been in Ceylon for a long period of time 
and who have contributed to the growth and prosperity of the island. It 
is an irony that some of the individuals have had no connection with 
India, many have not set foot upon India's soil, yet are caught in the 
entangling web of legalities. A new set of proposals^^ brought a glimmer 
of hope in 1964. But there is no guarantee that a satisfactory solution 
is in the offing. Legal everts and politicians continue to indulge in 
polemical and hair- splitting discourses as to whether the people concerned 
are "stateless”, Indian subjects, Ceylon subjects, or for that matter, 
British subjects. In any case, approximately ten percent of Ceylon's 
population is involved. While there are the political, economic, and 
legal points to be considered, there is also the human aspect, the misery 
and frustration which "statelessness” entails, meanwhile, the hope of 
the people continues to linger on based on the proposition that somehow 
and in some way justice will be done.
jĵ jahala tolv"
The growing animosity between the Sinhalese and Tamils, and the 
feeling of depression by the latter, hit new heights in 19̂ 6. In June, 
the Ceylon Parliament passed the Official Language. Act idiich declared 
whal a97 to be the only official language in Ceylon. Thus English, which 
had been the general communication media without the benefit of law but 
merely through custom and usuage, no longer held its prominent place.
96see Chapter V, pp. 183-185.
^Sinhala is peculiar to Ceylon being spoken in no other country. 
There is no closely related tie to any other language with the exception 
perhaps of a vague connection with Bengali.
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Tamil also, d̂iich from time immemorial had been considered something of 
a national language, no longer was on a par with Sinhala. In agencies of 
the government, the deadline for in̂ >lementation was fixed for January 1, 
1961, with full implementation in a U  other areas set for three years 
later in 1964. The passage of the Language Act was to have enormous con­
sequences, manifested by civil unrest^® idiich swept the island for two 
years.
The Tamils charged that the legislation was an instrument for 
destroying their culture, a device of humiliation and subordination.
This was only part of a much larger picture. It placed the Tamils at a 
distinct disadvantage. Under the law, all Tamils idio held government 
posts were faced with dismissal unless they could attain a proficiency 
in Sinhala. Further, the number of public service appointments which 
heretofore had been open to them would be decreased substantially, and 
the chances of promotion greatly lessened. It produced an enormous sense 
of frustration among the Tamil youths particularly in the Jaffna area 
since here had long been the geographical source of Tamil appointments 
to government positions. Of the total population in 1956 (8.9 million) 
some six million Sinhalese were considered fluent in Sinhala while the 
number of Tamils conversant in the language was extremely small. Those 
who had the most to lose were the Tamils.
The adoption of Sinhala as the official language was an atten^t 
to solidify the common efforts of the Sinhalese community, and an attempt 
to efface the remnants of the European era. But the politics of language 
was also the language of politics. The elevating of Sinhala was an
98See below.
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emotional issue raised by the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (Peoples United 
Front) political party in its successful bid in the I956 general elec­
tions. Upon taking office, the M.E.P. coalition made it priority legis­
lation. It was argued that because the Sinhalese people coinprised the 
vast majority of the population it was only right that Sinhala be made 
the official language.
Despite the pro-Sinhalese argument, protests arose on many sides. 
The mercantile community was unhappy that the heads of departments would 
be forced to correspond in Sinhala; work stoppages became prevalent in 
industry, and waves of student demonstrations protested the plan. In 
May-June, 1957» riots swept some quarters of Ceylon. The seriousness of 
this dissent was disclosed when the Prime Minister told the House of 
Parliament "that 159 people lost their lives in the Tamil-Sinhalese riots 
between May 26 and June 26."^^ But all of this was only a prelude to the 
terrorism which befell Ceylon a year later.
Sinhala became the official language for all of Ceylon on January 1, 
1964. The Prime Minister, Madame Sirimavo Bandaranaike, marked the oc­
casion by attending an all-night Buddhist ceremony in Independence Hall 
while in the Tamil areas the occasion was observed as a day of mourning.
The government did make a last-minute minor concession to officials in
99ûverseas Hindustan Times. July I7, 1957, p. 4.
lOOp^r Buddhists and maiqr Hindus, January 1st is not the begin­
ning of the new year in Ceylon. The new year during 1964 began April 4.
In Ceylon, January 1, 1964 was known as the "Day of the Switchover". Not 
only did Sinhala become the official language replacing English, but also 
all import and distribution of petroleum products became the monopoly of 
the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, all insurance business was nationalized, 
and the People's Vigilance Movement was inaugurated.
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the technical, scientific, and professional service by exeng)ting them 
from the language requirements, but emphasized that in the matter of 
promotions, preference would be given to those persons proficient in the 
Sinhala language.
This matter of the language has produced a division of gargan­
tuan proportion between the Sinhalese and Tamils. It has been respon­
sible for terror and brutalities, hatreds and fears, and no one can pre­
dict where, how, or idien the end will come. For more than seven years 
the Tamils have held hope that the government would relent and find some 
manner and means by lAich to solve the issue at a much lesser cost to 
the minority people; but these hopes are receding rapidly. The Tamils 
continue to maintain that the object of the legislation is aimed primar­
ily at destroying their culture by deen^hasizing the Tamil language. 
Obviously, where there is no need for it in public administration, com­
merce, or education, the Tamil language would be of little value. But 
the fear that the Tamil language will be driven out of the Tamil provin­
ces appears to be unfounded. It is virtually impossible to supplant one 
language with another in a contact linguistic community. The years of 
dominance of the English language in the British Isles have done nothing 
to obliterate the Welsh, Scotch, and Irish languages; in Ceylon, the more 
than the century and a half of English political domination and English 
language has done nothing to kill Sinhala.
Adoption of Sinhala as the national language would appear, at 
first, to appeal strongly to national sentiment, but this was only par­
tially true. Implementation of the Act also produced a division within 
the Sinhalese community itself. The rupture here occurred between the
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upper niddleclass English-educated and lower mddleclass Sinhalese- 
educated. Thus, the former are as much a victim, temporarily at least, 
as are the Tamils. The upper middleclass have for decades subordinated 
Sinhala to English. The Act demands that the learning process begin 
anew; the language which gradually fell from usage among families and 
kin must now be returned to its former status. An internal problem with­
in the Sinhalese community is thus created and, again, it is a matter of 
status. Among mai%r people, independence really made little change inso­
far as status was concerned. The Sinhala-educated people remained social­
ly inferior, counting very little in the economic and political spheres.
The Tamils seem unable to grasp the fact that the Language Act 
makes victims of the English-educated Sinhalese as much as it does the 
Tamils. The Act is, then, a movement of the Sinhala-educated Sinhalese 
of the lower middleclass against the English-educated Sinhalese of the 
upper middleclass. The Buddhists of Ceylon have been vocal in their de­
mands for Sinhala as the national language. Their role in the contro­
versy has been directed against the Siglish-educated, but indirectly it 
is also a movement against Christianity in Ceylon, specifically the Roman 
Catholic Church.
A ï e r m
As political independence had drawn near for Asian countries, 
Asian philosophers had cautioned that the people faced an enormous task 
in building their societies. They had warned that the human mind most 
generally seeks out political, economic, social, and religious self- 
interest, thus dictating man's behavior according to the degree which
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the parochialism best serves the individual. Communalisms, said the 
sages, begin as swiftly moving subterranean currents among the people, 
undertows which must be stilled in order to prevent them from later sur­
facing and bursting forth in torrents of discords and hates. Nationalism 
demanded tolerance of and for all races, castes, and creeds.
If the people of Ceylon had listened with a more attentive ear 
to these prong)tings, then perhaps the blood bath of May-June, 1958, would 
never have happened. As it was, this infinitesimal period of time in the 
island* s history was a remarkable record of man* s inhumanity to man. 
Hundreds of people —  no one will ever be sure of the exact number —  
were either fatally or seriously injured. Men, women, children, clerics, 
merchants, and government officials, all were caught in the terror which 
swept Ceylon, The property toll was enormous. Sinhalese and Tamils 
clashed in a savagery which left ugly sores still not completely healed.
In the political campaign of 1956, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and his 
coalition party, the Maha.iana Eksath Peramuna (M.E.P.) had chanpioned the 
cause of "Sinhala Only”. During the campaign, the party also promised 
the Kandyan peasants that Indian Tamils would be driven off the estates 
thereby providing more employment opportunities for the Ceylonese. The 
M.E.P. swept the general election^except in the predominantly Tamil 
area where the Federal Party, which represents Tamil interests, led by 
S.J.V. Chelvanayakam captured ten seats in the lower house of Parliament. 
The enactment of the Sinhala Only Act came just two months after the 
M.E.P. took over the government. The passage of the bill triggered the
lO^Sixty seats were at stake. The M.E.P. won 51*
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first incident of race-hatred when Sinhalese clashed with Tamil in the
Gal Oya Valley, on the eastern side of Ceylon. Other racial violence
continued in scattered parts of Ceylon during the following year.
In June, 1957» the Federal Party threatened a civil disobedience
ompalgn planned for August. Bandaranaike appealed to the party leaders
to refrain from plunging the country into the chaos idiich would result.
On June 13th the Federal Party MPs walked out of Parliament when the
Governor General read the Throne Speech in Sinhalese and English but not
in Tamil. The threatened satyacrgaha. was narrowly averted whai the Prime
Minister made a half-hearted concession by promising reasonable use of
the Tamil language, but he ruled out equal status with Sinhala. Bandaranaike
said that while making Sinhalese the official language, he would "give due
recognition to the Tamil language for all practical purposes, with the
102sole exception of this sentimental attachment to the idea of parity."
At the same time, he assured the Sinhalese community that Sinhala would 
remain the official language of Ceylon. Chelvanayakam accepted the 
"reasonable use" agreement for the Federal Party. Meanwhile, the Ministry 
of Lands and Land Development had proposed the resettlement of roughly 400 
Tamil families in the Polonnarauwa and Anuradhapura districts. Many of 
the older Sinhalese families had always considered this area as tradition­
ally Sinhalese and, furious over the resettlement plan, lost no time in
venting their feelings upon Tamils already in the district. Sinhalese 
laborers organized themselves into a striking force to prevent implemen­
tation of the plan. The government dropped the proposal.
lÔ Overseas Hindustan Times. July 17, 1957, P. 4.
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On April 9» 1958, Bandaranaike made a radio broadcast in which 
he announced abrogation of the pact he had made with Tamil leaders rel­
ative to the use of the Tamil language, Tamil leaders called for a non­
violent civil disobedience campaign. VB.thin a few days, the Public 
Service Workers* Trade Union Federation and the Ceylon Trade Union Feder­
ation called strikes for more political rights and a decrease in the cost 
of living. It was estimated that more than 125 thousand workers were 
idled. Troops and armed police patrolled the streets of Colombo. While 
all this was going on, race-hatreds were in evidence elsewhere in Ceylon.
The racial situation was completely out of control by late May, 
1958* Terror struck in Colombo where demonstrators tossed homemade bombs, 
smashed shop windows, and stoned passing vehicles. The terror swept 
northward to Jaffha. At Polonnaruwa, "a crowd —  nearly a thousand 
strong —  invaded the premises of the Polonnaruwa railway station. They 
assulted everybody in sight, including Sinhalese travelers and railway 
officials, and damaged a good deal of railway p r o p e r t y . A n d  in 
Polonnaruwa,
The Tamil labourers in the Polonnaruwa sugar-cane plantation fled 
when they saw the enemy approaching and hid in the sugaivcane bushes. 
The goondas wasted no time. Th^ set the sugar-cane alight and 
flushed out the Tamils. As they came out screaming, men, women, and 
children were cut down with homemade swords, grass cutting knives . . .  
or pulped under heavy clubs. 10^
Looting and killing on a massive scale took place in Pettah, Ratmalana,
Kurunegala, Kalutara, Galle, and Matera; from one end of the island to the
other.
lO^Tarzie Vittachi, Emergency '98: The Storv of the Cevlon Race 
Biots (London: Andre Deutsch, 1958), p. 36.
p. 40.
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Blood was all the goondas wanted. In the chaos . . .  it was almost 
impossible for anybody to keep a count of who had been injured, who 
had been lynched, and what had been burnt —  so swiftly did the 
goondas move from area to area, and so ruthlessly did they set about 
their tasks of destruction. . . .  Men, women, and children were 
pulled out of their homes —  wailing and screaming for mercy —  and 
beaten, more often than not, to death. Houses were set ablaze and 
law officers were powerless.
Shortly after noon on May 27 the government declared a state of 
emergency. At 2:00 p.m. the Prime Minister delivered the following mes­
sage to the people of Ceylon:
This morning the Cabinet further considered the deteriorating situ­
ation in the country and the increasix^ lawlessness and violence.
Under the circumstances, the Cabinet has invited the Governor- 
General to proclaim a state of emergency under the Public Security 
Ordinance. I have also advised His Excellency to bring into oper­
ation immediately the necessary regulations under this ordinance.
The proclamation meant the suspension of civil authority enabling the 
military to handle law and order. There was a dusk-to-dawn curfew, meet­
ings and processions were banned, and censorship of the press. The 
Federal Party and the Jatika Vimukti Peramuna. a recently formed organi­
zation of Sinhalese membership, were banned as both represented the ex­
treme in the conflict.
The decision to declare the state of emergency had been made 
reluctantly, apparently, as up to the very moment of the proclamation the 
Prime Minister had seemingly ignored the civil strife and brutalities. 
Despite the raa^aging, looting, raping, and killing, Bandaranaike had 
done nothing to stem the tide. Early on the morning of the 27th a group 
of prominent citizens had called at Rosemead Place, the official residence,
p .  5 3 .
Weekly Review. May 29, 1958, p. 15.
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begging him to take the necessary steps* The chief-of-govemment is 
supposed to have replied that many of the stories being told were merely 
exaggerations and that the situation did not require a state of emergency. 
"Bis supplicants later said they were appalled at the insouciance with 
3d)ich the Prime Minister appeared to be taking the mass murders, looting 
and lawlessness lAich had broken out everywhere in Ceylon. At mid- 
moming, Governor-General Goonetilleke had gone to Rosemead to add his 
voice to the several demanding that some action be taken. Perhaps 
Bandaranaike was overconfident that Buddhism would prove to be the stabi­
lizing factor. He had stated on a number of occasions that the solution 
to the Sinhalese-Iamil problem lay in invoking the principles and tenets 
of Buddhism —  the Middle Path —  while reminding his audiences that not 
only was he the Prime Minister but a Buddhist Prime Minister; and that 
from the tenets of Buddhism would come communal harmony, brotherhood, and 
national unity.
On May 29th, a government spokesman said that the situation was 
well in hand and that the military authorities would have law and order 
throughout the island within a few days. There were a few other skirm­
ishes tAich were quickly put down. June 2 was the first day of complete 
quiet throughout Ceylon since the communal disturbances had begun some 
two years before. The people of the Jaffna district in the Northern 
province were asked to surrender their licensed and unlicensed firearms 
or face heavy penalties. The leaders of the Federal Party and the Jatika 
Vitnuktl Peramuna were placed under house detention on June 5 and released
l07Vittachi, Bner^encv ' 98. p. 54.
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on September 4. On September 6, the government again permitted polite 
ical meetings» But the state of emergency remained, and was indefinite­
ly extended on September 25» It was not revoked until March 13, 1959»
An-ApiaaA.g?A
Today, six years after the rioting of 1958» the lack of national 
solidarity is still the most acute problem in C^lon. In all areas —  
racial, linguistic, religious, economic —  there is much greater interest 
shown in the piling up of allegations of one group against the other than 
there is in attempting programs of cooperation. A sense of social pur­
pose is nowhere to be found, because of the racial-linguistic strife 
generated over the past years. The urgency for reaching an understanding 
on these social problems stands heavily underlined, not so much on the 
need simply to accord equality and justice to the minority groups, but 
more so from the standpoint of ensuring an efficient and purposeful func­
tioning of the idiole society as a productive mechanism.
Since 1956 there has been very little effort made by a Sinhalese 
oriented government to find ways which would enable the Tamil people to 
consider themselves equal partners in a great common endeavor to build a 
united Ceylon, The overwhelming numerical majority makes the Sinhalese a 
powerful factor in the political structure. Unfortunately this power has 
been used, on several occasions, injudiciously, in a discriminatory way 
against the minority groups, especially the Tamil community. If, in being 
powerful, one group denies another certain rights because of race or 
language, then it follows logically that other rights —  religion, caste, 
locality or some other yet undiscovered distinction —  may also be denied
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eventually. This prospect is the very heart of the racial issue. Polit­
ical misadventures, oriented to favor the Sinhalese, have taken a toll by 
dissipatating the energies of society. In a domestic country such as 
Ceylon is attenpting to build, the recognition and toleration of diversi­
ties is certainly more in^ortant now than at any time in its long history.
The long decades of coercive subservience to a foreign power 
were lived in an environment of humiliation especially for the Sinhalese. 
Commercialization, brought about through Western self-interests, changed 
the social relationship from one of collaboration among the communities 
to one of competition. This change was not an overnight phenomena; it 
was the product of decades, even centuries. Today, a return of effortful 
cooperation will require a long period of time. No single community any­
where in the world has a monopoly on wisdom. In Ceylon, Sinhalese and 
Tamils alike have made exceptional contributions to the society of the 
island. The Tamils accept their position as a minozâty group. Their de­
mand is only that their culture be guarded and that mechanisms in direct­
ing cultural particularisms and attainments be preserved.
The question as to what brought about the intense violence of the 
civil disturbances has never been fully and concisely answered. The 
Sinhalese blamed the Tamils; the Tamils accused the Sinhalese, and right- 
wing elements in the government saw the events engineered by Moscow through 
local agents, the Marxists. But the answer, partially at least, lies far 
removed from any sinple propositions. Economic challenge by the majority 
against the minority —  and vice versa —  triggered the open warfare. The 
government’s plan for relocating Tamil families appeared as a permanent 
allocation of economic resources in areas considered by the Sinhalese to
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be traditionally Sinhalese, Added to this were the demands by the Kandyan 
peasantry for the removal from the island of the people of Indian origin 
in order that vacancies thus created in employment might be filled by 
Kandyan Sinhalese, On the Tamil side, the Official Language Act was con­
sidered as only the first step in the loss of cultural identification.
The demands made by the government insofar as mandatory language profic­
iency in a number of job areas placed the Tamil in an unfair conç>etitive 
position. In summary, on both sides there was the fear of being elbowed 
out of ençloyment and future security. And on both sides, there was the 
prospect of loss of potential living space and resources which both re­
quire to care for their increasing human numbers.
Yet, it is the language dispute which transcends all other issues 
dividing the Sinhalese and Tamil, And in this matter, both are guilty of 
ngropic, unconpromising attitudes. It is true that the Tamils are justi­
fied, perhaps, in their bitter resentment over the government's policy,
A language is, of course, a mode of communication, but it is more. It is 
a means of national identity, a repository of cultural history, a symbol 
of aspirations, 'Where diverse groups intermingle, it is a vehicle of 
communication by which a better understanding among the peoples may be 
had. The Tamils must be given the assurance that requiring a proficiency 
in Sinhala is not intended as a means of sacrificing their individuality 
and culture. They must receive a guarantee that the use of Tamil within 
a broad, well-defined area not only will be permitted but even encouraged. 
At the same time, it appears only fair that, should the Indian Tamils 
desire to remain in Ceylon, they give some indication of a readiness to 
break down separatist barriers and attençt to identify themselves with
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the indigenous population by better coimnunication.
A delaying game in finding a solution to Ceylon's racial prob­
lem is disaster ridden. Race distinction and race antagonism is very 
much of a reality, Whatever hope there may have been at the time of 
political independence for nationalism proved disappointing as cultural 
identities lost themselves in racialism. Whether or not there %ill be 
a gradual mutation into a national consciousness, no one can foretell. 
Nationalism depends almost entirely on the people themselves. The unity 
of a nationalism has many advantages, but it also has a major disadvantage 
insofar that it demands some degree of depersonalization of social group­
ings. In this respect and in the large picture of society about all which 
remains is a personal bond to some impersonal entity called the "govern­
ment", and specific communities very often become abstractions. If, then, 
the sought-for nationalism is finally to be attained, both majority and 
minorities must take a scrupulous appraisal of the total contributions 
which can be made by all communities in the society. And general accept­
ance of the ideas —  and ideals —  which underline each segment must be 
looked upon as the guardian of the country's moral and political progress.
CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICS OF RESOURCES
In January, 1964, the Hew York Times gave the following assess­
ment of Ceylon's economy: "Despite a record tea crop, the economic out­
look for this island nation remains bleak. Unemployment runs high, dwin­
dling prices have cut tea profits, and foreign investment is still l a g g i n g . "^08 
Another source noted that "the Ceylonese Government of Premier Mrs. Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike . . .  is facing growing pressure to set the island's chaotic 
economy right.Nothing had changed to brighten the picture as the
year grew to a close. Economic clouds have hung over Ceylon since about
195̂ . Nothing on the horizon indicates their dispersion in the near future.
This economic condition is in contrast to that prevalent at the 
time of political autonomy. The country had prospered during the war.
One country alone (in Asi^ was better off than before the war, Ceylon.
Her national income was in 194? nearly half as much again as in 1938,
d̂iile her population had gone up only one-sixth. Rice production 
doubled; the fish catch was nearly trebled. Government expenditure 
multiplied four times and still the budget was balanced.
The economy was sustained during Korea by virtue of demands made upon crude
^®®The New York Times. Western edition, Jan. 21, 1964, p. R3.
^°%e Asian Student. Jan. 18, 1964, p. 5.




rubber production. Traditionally, Ceylon has always depended upon ex - 
ports to finance the importation of many manufactured goods and roughly 
50 percent of food supplies. Until about 195̂ » this system had worked 
well. The average Ceylonese had enjoyed a livii^ standard appreciably 
higher than most Asians.
When Ceylon had become politically independent in 1948, the 
people exuded enormous pride in the new status. Concomitantly, they were 
seized with a forceful determination to have for themselves all of the 
luxuries of life. The facts of colonial commercialism had made the 
Ceylonese a resentful people. Decade after decade, they had watched the 
foreigners mobilize in commanding fashion the island's resources and, 
with equal aplomb, amass material wealth. As the land had produced more 
and more, there was the hope that the increased productivity would reap 
some benefit for the dependent people. But the increases had been taken 
from them, and with the taking had died their hopes. It left a trail of 
frustration and bitterness. In view of the prosperity during the early 
days of independence, it appeared to the people highly unrealistic that 
they* should delay the fulfillment of economic wants.
Ceylon went on a buying spree in 1954. There were virtually no 
import controls and luxury goods flooded the markets and shops. This 
policy, begun under the United National Party, was supplemented in 1956 
with a wide range of social welfare legislation under a successor govern­
ment, the Maha.iana Eksath Peramuna (MSP), the People's United Front.
Among other things, it gave the people one of the best public health pro­
grams to be found anywhere in Asia, free education for all, and subsidies 
galore, even subsidization of rice, the basic food. Like a child who.
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having been denied sweets for a long period of time, is certain to become 
ill when offered all he can eat, Ceylon was headed for economic ills.
Yet, even to suggest an austerity program would have meant political sui­
cide for the party in power. The national econony went from bad to worse 
forcing Ceylon to make radical readjustment in I96O. The government cur­
tailed inqports, increased tariffs and taxes, discouraged foreign travel 
to conserve foreign exchange, and initiated a steppedrup drive for state 
control of production and distribution. The severe restrictions on im­
ports, in order to stem the outflow of foreign exchange, have had a de­
pressing effect on the internal commercial life. Uneng)loyment stands at 
a record high. And for political reasons, the government has been unable 
to curtail its expenditures on food subsidies and welfare services.
Estates, and Agriculture 
The history of Ceylon estates begins with cinnamon. The British 
took over this Dutch monopoly concurrent with political rule in 1796. It 
was the mainstay of revenue teit̂ orarily, but the amount of taxes collected 
in the feudal eoonocgr was extremely small, resulting in annual financial 
deficits in the operation of the colony. Cinnamon was made the principal 
export item to European mazkiets under a policy of restricted sales, in 
order to assure demand over supply and, consequently, a higher price. 
Cassia, a lesser quality cinnamon, from southern China and Southeast Asia 
gradually made its way into trade channels as a conpetitive product to 
the Ceylon cinnamon. The latter, although excelling in quality, eventu­
ally lost its markets, despite the government's reduction of the London 
inpoii duty. Ceylon cinnamon as the principal export gave up the ghost
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in 1833• European investors sold their plantations to Ceylonese, turning 
their attention to coffee«
The initial attençt at coffee cultivation was made in the Kandyan 
mountains in the 1820s. Although only partially successful in the early 
years, the venture attracted British investors who reaped a windfall of 
profits between 1837 and 1843. There was a downturn in 1847, then grad­
ually a slow recovery by 1833* Meanwhile, agitation was growing among 
the planters for a new transportation method for hauling the increasing 
shipments of coffee beans from the inland area to the port of Colombo.
The existing mode of transport, the cattle-drawn cart, could scarcely 
meet the challenge. The C^lon Railway Congoany was formed in Ehgland in 
1843; the first ei^ine landed in Ceylon in January, 1864. The line from 
Colombo to Kandy, the heart of the coffee industry, was completed on 
April 23, 1867. The rail lines to other parts of the island were taken
in stages. By I878, some "273 thousand acres of coffee were under culti-
111vation.” A coffee blight appeared in 1868 and by 1882 had swept the 
whole planting area with almost every coffee tree destroyed. A few plant­
ers managed to survive but coffee cultivation in Ceylon was doomed.
Coffee growing had enormous consequences for Ceylon.
Coffee was the key-signature marking the transition from old to new 
Ceylon, and not constitutional and legislative enactments. The new 
tune to lAich planters, government, and -Wie populace adjusted their 
steps was coffee and "the unexampled prosperity" (to use the stock 
phrase of those times) it brought to all those associated with it.
Not only the European planter who owned most of the plantations 
benefited; coffee sent money downwards from the bills into the West­
ern and Southern provinces. It brought into being practically 
everything associated with modem Ceylon —  its characteristic 
economy, its changed social structure, its altered landscape and
^^^mUs, Cevlon Under British Rule, p. 59*
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even its political development. Coffee means little or nothing to 
preseni>day Ceylon dependent for the 'bulk of its revenue on tea, 
rubber, and coconuts, but there is nothing these products have 
brought about in Ceylon’s economy which coffee had not set up 
before.112
Despite the fluctuations in Ceylon's colonial economy due to a 
single principal item of export, the ingenuity of British entrepeneurs 
had permanently turned the financial tide in the 1850s. Small quantities 
of other agricultural commodities and cottage products were shipped to 
Europe and elsewhere within the British Empire so that "from 1855 onwards 
there was an expanding revenue and a growing annual surplus. Ceylon be­
came one of the wealthiest and most prosperous of the Crown colonies.
Where coffee had acted as an economic bridge with the abandonment 
of the cinnamon trade, cinchona bark assumed that role between coffee and 
tea. For five years to 1883» cinchona exports to Europe increased rapidly 
until they collided with Dutch export of the commodity from Java. A mar­
ket glut pushed prices downward until cultivation was finally abandoned 
in preference to what had been, to this time at least, supplementary crops: 
tea, rubber and coconuts.
The tea bush can rightly be called Ceylon's Tree of life. The 
economic fortune of the island depends heavily upon the earnings from tea 
and the ancillary trades allied with the industry, packing, transport, 
storage, and insurance. A small tea estate had been established in the 
high country about 1845.^^^ Little interest had been shown in cultivating
^̂ L̂udowyk, The Story of Ceylon, p. 190.
^^%llls, Cevlon Under British Buie, p. 4?.
ll^he Botanical Gardens of Ceylon are supposed to have received 
the first tea seeds from China in 1824, and later from Assam in 1839*
no
the crop for comnieroial purposes, as long as coffee together with cin­
chona, were profitable items in international trade. With the coffee- 
plant blight and Dutch contpetition in cinchona, by I887 euçhasis was 
given to tea cultivation. By the early 1900s, small individuany owned 
estates had been absorbed within corporate structures, financed and op­
erated by London concerns. To people in many parts of the world, Ceylon 
and tea are synonymous as are Ceylon tea and Thomas Upton, The story 
of Idpton, his initial venture in tea, and the growth of his estates in 
Ceylon are beyond the scope of this work. Any one interested in this 
phase of Ceylon’s tea industry, or in the man himself, will find The 
Linton -Sborv by the renowned British author Alec Waugh a rewarding li1> 
erary e^gerienoe,^^^
During I963 and 1964, a precarious situation was developing in 
Ceylon’s tea industry despite the all-time highs in production. Soil 
conservation, the use of better fertilizers, replanting of high yield 
varieties, and intensive cultivation, all have contributed to record 
yields. Production for the year 1964 promises to be somewhere in the 
area of M90 million pounds, A conçarative figure of thirty years ago 
(1934) was 224,7 million pounds attesting to the enormous growth of the 
tea industry. The Table on page 111 gives production and acreage under 
tea for the period 1957 to 1964,
The somewhat uncertain future of the industry is centered in 
circumstances over lAich Ceylon has little or no control. Just as pro­
duction has been on the increase in Ceylon, tea crops in other parts of
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the world have been increasing also. A major question facing the whole 
tea industry is whether or not world markets will be able to absorb the 
larger volumes of production. India is the world's largest producer of 
tea and its crop largely determines the level of world output. It is 
estimated that India will have an annual production of one billion pounds 
by 1970. There is no evidence available which leads one to suppose that 
world consumption can keep pace with increasing production.
In Great Britain, tea consumption is in a race with coffee and 
other beverages. It imported I76.8 million pounds in 1962; in I963, there 
was a drop of 3 million pounds. Tea circles in Ceylon are increasingly
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concerned about the flight of technical experts to East Africa for the 
rapidly developing tea gardens in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. East 
Africa is almost certain to become a major competitor in the world mar­
ket. The main factors for the departure of some personnel of the Tea 
Research Institute^were the attractive terms offered East African 
plantation proprietors. Qy comparison, the Ceylon plantation owners are 
subjected to high taxation, exchange restrictions, increasingly powerful 
labor unions, and ever increasing operating costs. A part of the uncer­
tainty for the outlook of the tea industry is of the government's own 
making. It has suggested an acreage tax of Rs. 60 per acre on all estates 
of one hundred acres or over, instead of the ad valorem tax which has 
been applied only to sales which have brought Rs. 1/85 a p o u n d . T h i s  
gives a decided advantage to the estate idiose products demand high prices 
but might well annihilate the production of the low-grown variety which 
averages below Rs. 1/55* The margin of profit of most of these estates, 
after the payment of the direct export tax is now less than Cts. -/15 per 
pound.
Ceylon's rubber industry, like that of tea, has much the same 
unhealthy glow. The market has changed considerably since the boom years 
of the Korean War, and through expansion of synthetic production by the 
industrialized countries.
ll^The Institute, lAich continues to do much in the way of ioM 
proving the commodity, was established in 1925.
^̂ 7rs. 1/85, in Ceylon currency is one rupee, 85 Ceylon cents.
It should be kept in mind the rate of exchange in U.S. currency is 
approximately 5 rupees = U.S. $1,05* Therefore, Rs. I/85 equals approx­
imately US 37 cents.
^^%oughly US 3 cents per pound profit.
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Prior to the Second World War natural rubber producers dismissed the 
test tube material as a bogey, and their attention was confined 
chiefly to balancing supply and demand. The extraordinary demand 
for rubber during the Second World War, however, led to far reaching 
changes. Within a few years a formidable synthetic rubber industry 
was brought into existence, and in the post-war pericd synthetic 
competition has assumed menacing proportions. The plantation indigo 
industry in India was killed by the development of synthetic dyes,
and in some quarters there [bas been) considerable concern whether
the same fate will befall the natural rubber industry. 119
Ceylon was the birthplace of the rubber industry in the East. 
Rubber was first grown in 18?6 from seeds imported from Brazil, planted
in England, then taken to Ceylon as young plants. Its position as a
principal crop came very slowly. Difficulties in cultivation were con­
siderable due primarily to incorrect methods. Research undertaken by 
the i^rlculture Department in the Botanic Gardens eventually was rewarded 
and the commodity was perfected for a number of usages. The developing 
automobile industry in the United States and the introduction of the 
motor vehicle in Ceylon in 1902 added impetus to production. % e  United 
States, during this period, "normally required ?2 percent of the annual 
world output.Ceylon was a principal supplier. In 1922, the Stevenson 
Commission was established in London especially to handle rubber exports 
from the Crown colonies. It contrived a quota system; the intent being 
to assure Great Britain of a high-demand, high-price market. But the 
system was to have a dire effect. Limiting as it did the exports of nat­
ural rubber, world buyers turned to other sellers particularly Dutch en­
terprises in Southeast Asia. "By 192?» Britain's share of world produc­
tion had decreased to 5̂  percent while the Hollanders had increased their
^̂ 9(jeyion, Central Bank cf Ceylon, PbinetAri (Colombo: Dept, of 
Economic Research, August, 1964), p. 13.
^^Omils, Britain and Ceylon, p. 66.
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121portion of the market from 25,5 percent to 40 percent." The impor­
tance of rubber during the two world wars, the reconstruction periods, 
and the Korean conflict hardly needs mentioning.
The industry has been in a recession since I96I, causing a great
deal of concern in Ceylon as both state revenue and the producers are
vitally affected. There was a flurry of activity in the sheet market in
October, 1963, as speculators took advantage of the tensions created over
the Malaysian issue; it is still too early to gauge the world effect of
the stepped-up war in Vietnam. The Central Bank of Ceylon in a recent
issue of its monthly publication, the Balletin. struck an optimistic note,
however, in forecasting increasing future world demands of natural rubber.
Said the Bulletin.
The demand forecast . . .  is based on estimate of growth in G.N.P. 
and industrial production in consuming countries. This increased 
demand has been considered sufficient to absorb the augmented output 
of natural rubber from the areas being replanted or newly planted.
Some of the big manufacturing companies . . . also appear to place 
considerable reliance upon the future for natural rubber as they are 
themselves undertaking new rubber plantings in Africa, South America, 
the Philippines and Southeast Asia.122
Thus, prospects are brighter but still the question remains as to the
permanency of the technical advantage of natural rubber, and the price
which consumers will agree to pay vis-a-vis the advantages and price of
the synthetic products. The real issue then is ̂ diether or not the rubber
producers can recover cost and earn a reasonable profit.
Currently there is some reseeding taking place. However, old and 
uneconomic rubber lands are being devoted to alternative crops, such as
p. 67.
l^^Bank of Ceylon, Bulletin, p. I3.
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cocoa, coconut, coffee, and tea. The foreign exchange earned from rubber 
is vital to Ceylon. But equally important is the increase in the number 
of unemployed should the Ceylon rubber industry fail to meet the produc­
tion cost-ceiling price onslaught of the synthetic. The following Table 
gives the rubber acreage and production for the years 195? to 1964.
TABLE 5
RUBBER ACREAGE AND PRODUCTION, 195?-1964*










* Sources; Weekly Times. July 29, 1964, p. 3» and Ceylon Chamber 
of Commerce correspondence August, I965.
The coconut is the island's third largest money crop and a native 
of Ceylon. Tea and rubber were transplants to the island, but the nut- 
bearing palm trees have always grown there, and in such abundance as to 
take care of the needs of the people besides millions of nuts for exten­
sive export. There was a record harvest in 1964 of roughly 3»15 billion
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coconuts or about 40 thousand tons. "The coconut is the friend, the 
fetish, and the universal provider of the Sinhalese, In it are contained 
all the seeds of humanity, they affirm, besides as many uses as there
are days in the year,”^^^ The coconut gives food and drink, rope, fen-
124ces, matting, firewood, oil, and "beauty for even a poor man's yard."
The record 1964 crop was the result of modem cultivation meth­
ods, liberal use of fertilizers, and favorable weather conditions. But 
production figures can sometimes be misleading. For the past few years 
there has been a downward trend in the prices of coconut products on the 
world market. There is also considerable attention being given to a much 
needed program of rehabilitating those growing areas currently afflicted 
with soil deterioration. The nut-bearing palm trees are owned almost ex­
clusively by Sinhalese in a multiplicity of small holdings, the number of 
which greatly outdistance similar ownership in tea and rubber lands. If 
the coconut industry continues to deteriorate, it will be the small pro­
ducer who will lose the most as he lacks the financial resources and, in 
many instances, technical know-how.
The Ministry of Agriculture adopted a program in mid-1963 for 
the expenditure of Rs. 7 million chiefly for fertilizers on a subsidized 
basis. Some progress has been made in replanting, however, the pace re­
quires acceleration with special attention to repairing the soil. The 
government subsidy allows fifty percent on the purchase of the fertilizers 
and, in the case of small producers, the individual's share of the cost
^^^Comer, Paradise of Adam, p. 162.
l^residder, Ceylon8 An Introduction to the Resplendent Land.
p. 145.
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may be loaned by the People's Bank, canalized through the Cooperatives,
to be repaid in produce installments after 18 months. The rehabilitation
program is a long range project.
At the rate of 50 million more nuts to provide for Ceylon's explo­
sive population increase, at least there will be little to fear for 
ten years. Qy that time most of [bh^ replanting areas which should 
be at least 250,000 acres (25,000 acres are replanted per annum 
according to present plans) or one-fourth of the total acreage of 
one million acres, should be nearing full production too.
The current acreage of coconuts is 1.1 million acres. There has been a 
certain amount of new planting, but no accurate information is available 
as to whether or not the goal stated above has been reached. (Die follow­












Letter from Coconut Research Institute 
July 1, 1965.
^^^statement by M.L.M. Salgado, Director of Coconut Research 
Institute of Ceylon in Ceylon Weekly Times. September 4, 1963.
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In 1854̂, the British author Sir Samuel W. Baker wrote the fol­
lowing concerning rice production in Ceylon:
The chief article of native consunç>tion, "rice”, should be an e:q)ort 
from Ceylon; but there has been an unaccountable neglect on the part 
of the government regarding the production of this isqportant grain, 
for the supply of which Ceylon is mainly dependent upon its inçorta- 
tion.126
If Sir Samuel had written these words more than a century later, his 
statement would still be partially correct; that portion concerning the 
"unaccountable neglect of the government" would not apply, Ceylon is 
still a major importer of rice. Baker noted that "in the . . .  general 
resources of Ceylon, the cultivation of rice [had] scarcely been deemed 
worthy of n o t i c e . T h e  British of course had emphasized expansion of 
estates rather than enlarging acreage for food supply. N. K. Sarkar has 
compiled the Table on page 119 pertaining to the expansion of estates 
vis-a-vis rice cultivation during the British period. The comparative 
years until 1921 vary slightly, however, Sarkar points out that, "consid­
ering the rise in population, rice cultivation [had] been a decaying in- 
dustry." The population between I9OI and 1946 had increased by some 
three million people, yet the comparative acreage for the cultivation of 
rice was substantially less.
Since earliest times, the economy of Ceylon was based upon rice 
production. Vast intricate artificial irrigation systems were an old and 
familiar part of the scenery predating 1505» Water from the mountain tops
Samuel W. Baker, Eight Years Wanderings in Ceylon 
(Chicago; Belford, Clarke & Co., 1854), p. 63.


















♦Source; Sarkar, The Demoeraohv of Gevlon, uu. 210-211.
was canalized into "tanks" for storage until required for the rice.
The foundation of the ancient system of rice cultivation was based 
on the irrigation works and great care and attention was paid to 
water conservation. The system of irrigation and water conservation 
was constructed in such a way that the topography and the climate 
of the country was fully utilized for the purpose. The cap of the 
dense forest at higher altitudes received the heavy monsoon rains, 
which then flowed down the slopes, often in underground streams, 
and were stored in tanks for the purpose of irrigation, , , , The 
plantations struck at this vital link of the system, destroyed most 
of the forests, altered the climate and rainfall and created a dif­
ficult problem from soil erosion and the silting up of irrigation 
tanks, canals and rivers,^̂ 9
Lanka's rulers looked to a food supply grown by the people themselves.
p. 213,
120
The whole society was organized on that basis and the system of land 
tenure depended upon it. Hill streams were tapped and their water 
guided into the giant storage-tanks below, some of them four thousand 
acres in extent, and from these, channels ran to other large tanks 
farther from the hills, and from them to others still more remote.
And below each great tank and each great channel were hundreds of 
little tanks, each the nucleus of a village; all, in the long-run, 
fed from the wet mountain zone. 130
The philosophy concerning the tanks was that "none of the rain 
which fell in such abundance in the mountains should reach the sea with­
out paying tribute to man on the way."^^! % e  tanks and the irrigation 
system were perhaps among the greatest achievements of ancient Lanka's 
peoples. A comparable system was to be found nowhere else in the world, 
not even in India. There is a bit of a historical nystery here since no 
trace of mathematic formulas or any instruments have been found, yet, it 
is somewhat inconceivable the methods used could have been transmitted 
orally. In any case, the system demonstrated an extraordinarily high de­
gree of technical ability. Even in this seventh decade of the twentieth 
century it would be considered a major undertaking.
Much has been done by the Government of Ceylon to increase the 
yields of the paddy lands. It enacted the Paddy Lands Act in 1958 giving 
security of tenure to the tenant-cultivator and supplied other incentives 
for increased yields. A rice cultivator's Cooperative was established, 
subsidized fertilizer to the extent of 50 percent, guaranteed the price 
at Rs. 12 per bushel, and established an island-wide machinery for provid­
ing rural credit. The Crop Insurance Act of I96I gave legal sanction to 
an insurance scheme of protection against drought, floods, plant disease.
3̂0sbill, The Jungle Tide, pp. 76-77.
74.
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and the like. The dividends which the additional time, money, and efforts 
have brought can be determined from the increase in production as illus­












♦Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook. 1963. p, 124,
Equivalent of metric tons, 1 metric ton =1,1 ton approx.
Elsewhere in the agricultural sector, Ceylon has a long way to 
go toward increased efficiency in production, A new undertaking which 
could reap great benefit is the land allocation policy for jobless youths. 
Under a State subsidized colonization scheme, the Ministry of Land, Irri­
gation, and Power has made available several thousand acres of jungle land 
suitable for cultivation purposes for a limited number of crops. The 
initial projects were begun in Galle, 72 miles south of Colombo, and in 
Ealutara, 40 miles south of the capital. The maximum for each person is
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two acres. Each receives subsidy for clearing a tract, free planting 
materials and fertilizers, technical assistance, and an allowance, in 
the form of monthly wages, for a specified period of six to twelve months. 
Suggested crops are those which will produce a return within six months 
such as Plantain (banana), yam, and cereals. Assistance is also given 
to encourage poultry and livestock raising. The products are channeled 
into government and privately operated markets for local consumption. 
Hopefully this plan will make possible fewer foodstuff imports with a 
consequent saving in foreign exchange,
A good example of the chaotic state of Ceylon's agricultural 
undertakings is the case of sugar production. It is an essential food 
with annual consumption of approximately I50 thousand tons. Production 
has amounted to only two percent of the requirement. Only 82 hundred 
acres have been devoted to sugar cane since 1952. There are additional 
thousands of acres available for cultivation and the government has poured 
millions of rupees into the erecting of two modern mills. Yet, sugar pro­
duction in Ceylon is ridiculously small. The United Nations Statistical 
Yearbook. 1963 gives the following production figures in thousands of 
tons: i960, 3*3» 1961, 4.4; 1962, 11.0.̂ 32 ^ huge portion of foreign 
exchange could be saved through increased production for domestic consump­
tion. Sugar cane production and refining are handled by the Sri Lanka 
Sugar Corporation, a government enterprise.
The Co-operative movement has not been altogether a happy one. 
Co-op Societies increased spectacularly during the war and shortly there-
I32united Nations, Statistical Yearbook. I963, p. 230.
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after. Gradually they became patrons of the government assuming the 
roles of distributors rather than amphasizing production. They have the 
appearance of being more interested with profit motives rather than as 
instruments of self-help for national regeneration. The Co-op Societies 
are the arteries of rural development movements. The latter have been 
plagued by the absence of a clear concept to guide and unify common ef­
forts. There has been little coordination between the village organiza­
tions, and the government has not provided adequately trained personnel 
and field training so that available facilities might be used more effec­
tively. The vacillation in national policies has been due mainly to 
political rivalries, especially between those in charge and the lesser 
figures at the local level. The government has sinply failed to provide 
either the inspiration or the tools by which the food supplies could be 
substantially increased. Still, the government continues its food sub­
sidies policy, an expenditure which has averaged roughly Rs. 100 million 
(US$20 million) annually. The everwidening subsidies program is depriv­
ing the country of urgently needed resources for capital investment.
Development in Ceylon, as in other emerging countries, stems 
from the preoccupation with industrialization, population growth, inabil­
ity of an agricultural economy to absorb the increase, and the premise 
that the well-being of the people is the responsibility of government. 
Especially since 1956, the government has become more and more deeply 
entrenched in influencing and directing investment and production in in­
dustrial development. It has never tried to hide the ultimate goal —  a 
socialist state.
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A nine-point program for economic growth was drafted in 195^ 
which, in summary, contained the following:
1) promotion of small scale enterprises
2) encouragement of foreign investments in large scale under­
takings
3) government assistance to all sizes of industries
4) directional control of capital movements
5) government participation in private enterprises
6) re-drafting of industrial legislation
7) acceleration of industrial research
8} coordination of training facilities
9) standarization of industrial products.
The plan had no chance of success. Ceylon simply did not have all of the 
financial requisites nor the organization or management skills for proper 
ingplementation. A series of supplemental proposals espoused tighter state 
control over the private sector while bidding the central government to 
follow a course of e:q)anding its control over the four factors of produc­
tion: land, labor, capital, and aitrepeneur.
Economic development in Ceylon got off to a shaky start for sev­
eral reasons, first, industrializing rapidly in order to gain some parity 
with Western institutions was unachievable but, unfortunately, went unrec­
ognized. The Ceylonese set out upon a course of using Western methods 
without apparently giving thought to the necessity of adapting the impor­
tations to suit the indigenous environment. The Ceylonese had long been 
observers of British financial and management policies, but there is a 
difference between participant and observer. The people demanded immediate
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maximaDi gains, refusing to accept the premise that short term results 
were not, in themselves, all of the thrust needed for continuing devel­
opment over the long haul. As economic conditions worsened, the people, 
disappointed and frustrated, made increasing demands upon government for 
guarantees of well-being and future security. The last of these —  well­
being and future security —  was conceived to be paramount in importance 
from the standpoint of political expediency.
The "well-being and future security” of the people dictated
broad social welfare schemes which predestined the growth of government
power in all sectors of the economy. To the proponents of the laissez-
faire philosophy, the argument that government is the proper directing
force for industrial development is unpalatable. Still, a government* s
position, is well summed in the general observation made by Margaret Mead:
If extensive intervention by government has made it possible for such 
countries as Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, 
West Germany, and the United Kingdom to maintain an optimum standard 
of living, then government appears to be the appropriate instrument 
for benevolent economic change; the welfare of the people is thought 
of as inextricably related to the activities of government and the 
focus is on the nation —  which has a government —  as the appropri­
ate unit in developing the means of improving the well-being of a 
people.133
From 1956 Ceylon's economy has slowly moved into crisis and chaos. 
Mr. Maithripala Senanayake, Minister of Rural and Industrial Development, 
during a speech in the House of Representatives in August, 1964, said 
"there was no need to despair and there was no need to heed the prophets 
of despair in regards to Ceylon's industrial development."^^ The Bank
l^^Margaret Mead, "The Underdeveloped and The Overdeveloped", 
Foreign Affairs (Vol. 41, No. 1, October, 1962), pp. 83-84.
^34ceylon Weekly Times. August 12, 1964, p. 3.
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of Ceylon took a dimmer view. It noted that the foreign exchange crisis 
was gradually worsening, imports were exceeding exports, unenployment 
stood at an all-time high, increasing public debt threatened to acceler­
ate the process of inflation, and there was an unprecedented increase in 
the price of essential consumer items.
The government meanwhile has been moving full-speed toward cor­
porate state structure for a number of enterprises, about which more will 
be said presently. Regarding private enterprise, the government has never 
precisely defined the limits of the private sector in the industrial 
sphere. Directives issued to guide this end of the economy have been 
stop-gap measures, arbitrarily decreed by some ministry. Private enter­
prise has become a formidable target particularly in the matter of tax­
ation and is always faced with the threat of expropriation. Taxation and 
other restrictions negate the development of industry under conditions 
which are conducive to long term growth. The Weekly Times said, that “a 
repeated complaint has been that the tax burden is already so heavy that 
it is in fact killing private enterprise.The press elaborated by 
offering as an example a privately owned company whose earnings during 
1963, "amounted to Rs. Ilf lakhs; of this the amount paid in income and 
dividend taxes to Government totalled over Rs, 8 lakhs, compared with 
only about Rs. 3 lakhs left over for the 1,125 shareholders.”^37 Indus­
trial development usually takes place in an environment of low taxation
^̂ ^Cevlon Observer. Nov. 29, 1964, p. 8.
^^^Ceylon Weekly Times. Dec. 25, I963, p. 7.
137lbid. A lakh = 100,000.
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and few restrictions. Development in Ceylon is faced with the extremes 
from the other end. Government policies have the appearance of a shrewd, 
slow-bu.t-sure liquidation of the private sector. It would be misleading 
to leave the impression that Ceylon is not expanding the industrial sec­
tor, On the contrary, the opposite is true. But, what is being done is 
tak±ng place almost entirely through state ownership and operation. And 
the expansion of private industry falls mostly within the Cevlonization 
policy. In the private sector all applications for starting a new indus­
try, regardless of size or potential, must be approved by an Industries 
Acceptance Commission, This Commission is composed of the Director of 
the Development Division, Director of Rural Development and Cottage Crafts, 
and the Controller of luçorts and Exports, It has broad powers to estab­
lish saturation points among private enterprises in order to control the 
growth of the private sector. It also has the power to decide whether or 
not a particular entrepeneur should be allowed to establish a business, 
or whether an existing enterprise should be allowed to expand,
Cevlonization aims to discourage non-Ceylonese from entering or 
continuing in private or joint ownership of enterprises. In companies, 
the majority of directors must be nationals and, in almost all cases, 
employment must be confined to Ceylonese except in special circumstances 
where approval of non-national labor may be obtained from the appropriate 
government agency. There have been instances where even Ceylon citizens 
not possessing Sinhalese names have been asked to prove citizenship, and 
especially in instances where linage is Ceylon Tamil, Arab, or Malay,
Late in January, 1963, the government approved legislation which banned 
the sale of land to non-nationals, a move aimed at preventing non-Ceylonese
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from buying tea and rubber estates. Toward the end of that year the 
Controller of Imports and Exports issued notices that only registered 
Ceylonese traders would be permitted to import textiles. Gradually, the 
list was expanded to include several dozen items, and cooQ)lete Ceyloniza- 
tion of trade was to become effective on January 1, 1965»
This policy affected Ceylonese and nonrCeylonese alike, although 
greater hardship to the latter as Ceylon nationals could be gradually 
absorbed into those businesses taken over by the State or ty Ceylonese 
entrepeneurs, Nevertheless, there were a number of Ceylonese added to 
the uneng)loyment role as the Ceylonization policy forced off the island 
a number of foreign employers. Particularly hard hit were the Indian 
merchants. An estimated eight thousand were engaged in the import, whole­
sale, and retail trade of textiles, subsidiary foodstuffs and pharmaceu­
ticals, pawn-broking, money lending, and small provision shops in the 
provinces. The Throne Speech of July, 19&4, placed the deadline of 
January 1 on all Indian business activity in Ceylon, Merchants were per­
mitted to take out of the country a maximum of only Rs, 25O thousand of 
their assets, with the balance allowed to be withdrawn in annual install­
ments of Rs. 25,000, As a result, the Indian government is faced with 
the problem of providing special facilities for the displaced Indians,
In addition, it must find ways and means of aiding rehabilitation of the 
merchants through tax exeng)tions and other economic increments. Appeals 
to the Ceylon government for reconsideration of the policy went unheeded. 
As 1964 drew to a close, a large number of Indian entrepeneurs had closed 
up shop.
Total Ceylonization of all trade is scheduled during 1965-1966,
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According to government and trade circles, this policy and the establish­
ment of the State Trading Corporation will save about Rs. 15 million 
(US$3 million) in foreign exchange each year. It is much too early to 
make a guess as to the effect of Ceylonization upon labor. Replacements 
in ai%r number of commercial areas are not as easy as sometimes appear on 
the surface. A nation of shopkeepers cannot be created overnight.
Whether or not the government is correct in its Ceylonization 
program obviously cannot be answered now. Some pain inflicted during the 
transition period to the socialist state may, in the end, result in great­
er good for a larger number of people. It is of course necessary that if 
a public corporation is to do the job, something more than merely a legal 
structure is required. Persons in authority must have the confidence of 
the people, a reputation among the public vdiich is uninç>eachable. This 
confidence and uninçeachable reputation are apparently lacking in some 
government agencies in Ceylon. The outgoing chairman of the Ceylon Mer­
chants Chamber said.
It is also becoming increasingly obvious now that most of the State 
Corporations are running at a loss. These corporations for the 
greater part are run by inexperienced men and are quite often riddled 
with corruption.
Millions of rupees belonging to the tax payer are poured into these 
corporations and this would appear to be nobody's business. 3̂9
However bleak Ceylon's industrialization process appears to be 
in light of all the foregoing, there are a number of government policies 
lAich have gone far in starting the island on the transition from an
^38Burma adopted a similar policy toward Indian entrepeneurs in 
May, 1964, forcing them to leave Burma. See The Hindu Weekly Review.
May 18, June 8, and July 20, 1964.
^39ceylon Weekly Times. Sept. 11, 1963» P» 2.
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agricultural to an industrialized eeonomy, A few exan^les deserve men­
tion here.
Several aids to small industries became effective in I96I, %e 
intent was to facilitate the development of cottage and other small-scale 
undertakings. Government loans to individual craftsmen were raised, and 
credit limits to private industrial workshops were increased. Concessions 
were made to new private industries lAich accepted some state participa­
tion in operation and/or product distribution, and idiich began production 
before March 31* 1963# These received a corporate income tax exen^tion 
over a five-year period which also applied to dividends paid investors, 
adjustments in tariffs, protection tkrough import controls, land for fac­
tories, loans, technical advice, state marketing, and government patronage,
Ceylon's first industrial estate is rising on a 70-acre tract on 
the outskirts of Colomibo, Developed according to a three-stage plan, 
some ho manufacturing units are in operation turning out a variety of 
consumer items from carbon paper, suitcases, and wire nails to kerosene 
cookers, cables, and mirrors. Items such as these heretofore have been 
imported. It is said that altogether some 975 new entexp:ri.ses represent­
ing capital investment of Rs, 92 million have begun operations in Ceylon 
during the past two years. The locally produced consumer items it is 
estimated, will save millions of rupees in foreign exchange each year.
Although the waters surrounding the island hold a variety of 
seafoods, Ceylon must import roughly Rs, 800 million (US$1,6 million) in 
fish and fish products annually. The government took over the importa­
tion and distribution in I96I, and instigated a modernization program.
The traditional method of fishing off Ceylon* s shores was by the thepuan.
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a few logs tied together and powered by a triangular sail. The theooan 
is giving way to mechanized craft. Ice plants for storage and fisheries 
harbors have been completed or are under construction at a cost of mil­
lions in rupees, Eish catches have substantially increased and if all 
goes well the day is not far off when the island* s fishermen will be 
netting a U  the fish Ceylon requires for domestic eonsujiq>tion.
By the end of 1964 the following had come under control of state 
corporations: steel, engineering, rubber tire production, insurance, 
banking, harbors operations, a few estates, and the petroleum industry, 
cement and ceramies, leather products, chemicals, textiles, sugar, and 
imports.
Trade
Higher e^ectations of comfort, increased capital requirements
for economic development, an unprecedented rise in world market prices
of imported goods particularly foodstuffs —  all have contributed to
Ceylon's expansion of imports. At the same "Wme, prices of tea, rubber,
and coconut products have been in a downward spiral, Ceylon's foreign
assets have been at a critically low level since 1960,^^ In that year,
Ceylon managed to reduce its trade deficit by some Rs, 123 million through
an increase in exports, a substantial decrease in imports, and stringent
measures governing travel abroad.
The basic Ceylonese foreign esœhange quota for tourist travel, lAich 
was previously [Rs, 4,2003 for a period of four years and was granted 
for travel to most foreign countries, was withdrawn on September 1, 
i960. In the future, any person leaving Ceylon will have to make an
140gee Table 9» page 135»
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application for foreign exchange, and each application is to be 
treated on its merits ohly.141
Another provision denied Ceylonese «ho had traveled abroad during the 
preceding five years any further foreign exchange for future travel.
This policy was still effective in 1964. The legislation was aimed pri­
marily at those who wished to travel out of the country on vacation, how­
ever, other restrictions limited travel of students and persons visiting 
other countries on business. In each case, the individual application 
is subject to the approval of the Controller of Exchange.
The iBg>orting of diamonds, soap, and crude sugar was virtually 
banned beginning in January, I96I, and from the same date the importation 
of textile material is no longer permitted exc^t on individual license. 
Importers were requested by the government to cancel all outstanding or­
ders. The import of foreign automobiles was strictly controlled. The 
following year another 4? items were transferred to individual licensing 
from the open general license list among which were such items as electric 
laaps and lamp shades, paper, and cheese. And a general ban was placed 
on the importation of 22 different items. À new regulation prohibited 
nonresident firms and persons from sending out of the country any proceeds 
from sales of movable or immovable property in Ceylon.
Inports of all merchandise in 1962 fell ly about Bs. 43 million 
over 1961, and were Rs. 300 million less than in i960 \dien import con­
trols were first applied. Ceylon ended 1962 with a surplus in its bial- 
ance of trade of Rs. 148 million as opposed to a surplus of only Rs. 30
^^^Intemational Monetary Fund, Intematioi#!,
Survey. October 7, I960, p. 356*
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million in I96I and a deficit of Rs, 128 million in 1960,^^^
In November of 1963» the Ceylon government moved to Ceylonize its 
import trade. The Ministry of Industries and Commerce submitted a scheme 
restricting such trade to nationals only, and increasing the quota allo­
cations to Ceylonese traders while correspondingly reducing the quotas of 
the non-Ceylonese merchants. It might be well to again mention the re­
quirements for classification of a C^lonese trader under the Colonization 
program. To qualify, a trader must be a Ceylon national by descent or 
registration, and all of his work force must be Ceylonese nationals. The 
major investment in the firm must be owned ty Ceylon nationals. The firm's 
directors or partners must be Ceylonese.
Concurrently with this trade policy, the Ministries of Industries 
and Commerce suggested a State Trading Corporation lAich was finally ap­
proved by Parliament in August, 1964. Under the legislation, the Minister 
of Internal and External Trade and Supply, is authorized to deal in im­
ports, e:qports, and distribution of such commodities as milk foods, tex­
tiles, fertilizers, cement, drugs, and pharmaceuticals. It is merely a 
matter of time until the list will be lengthened considerably. The fea­
sibility of a State Trading Corporation was based upon a number of argu­
ments idiich, in summary, were
1) that the Ceylonese business community did not possess suffi­
cient financial resources nor sufficient e^erience,
2) to prevent malpractices by unscrupulous importers such as 
the overloading of invoices,
^̂ Ŝee Table 9, page 135*
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3) to prevent remittances of profits and dividends out of Ceylon,
4) that trade agreements with other countries could be more 
effectively fulfilled.
The private sector mercantile group, those most directly affected, refused 
any of these premises. There were charges that private enterprise was 
being liquidated. There is no question that the State Trading Corporation, 
and other government corporations, are encroaching into the private sector, 
nevertheless there is also hardly any doubt that government corporations 
are in Ceylon to stay.
It is estimated that the trade deficit for 1964 would be in the 
neighborhood of Rs. 98.7 million. This is in oorq)arison with a surplus 
of Rs. 240.7 million in 1963. Again, the costs of most essential ingwrts 
vis-a-vis the decrease in world market prices for Ceylon* s principal ex­
ports is reflected here. Table 9> page 135 supplies data with regard to 
Ceylon's external assets, import-export volume, and balance-of-trade be­
tween 19^ and 1964.
Ceylon's number one trading partner among Asian countries is
China, a relationship which can be summed up in three words: rice for
rubber. Ceylon accorded recognition to the Communist government of China
in 1950, but delayed diplomatic recognition until 1956 due to political
pressure brought by the United States upon the rightest United Rational
143Party which held the reins of government.
Xn 1952, there were indications of an impending downward trend 
in rubber market prices. Peking made overtures to Colomibo agreeing to
^43The political relations between Ceylon and China will be 
taken up fully in the next chapter.
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TABLE 9
EXTERNAL ASSETS, IMPORTS & EXPORTS VOLOME 




Imports Exports Balance of 
Trade
1957 1,061,9 1,804 1,682 - 122
1958 933#2 1,717 1,711 - 6
1959 734,0 2,005 1,754 - 25L
i960 5H#3 1,960 1,832 - 128
1961 531#7 1,703 1,733 + 30
1962 503#9 1,660 1,808 + 148
1963 462.3 1,500 1,730 + 230
1964 324.5 1,974 1,875 - 99
♦Source: 1956-I962, United Nations, Mnnt.hiv Rniiatl» nf
Statistics. July, 1963; Ceylon Observer. Nov, 29, 1964, 
p. 8.
the purchase of a considerable amount at prices well above those prevail­
ing on the world market. Over objections the United States, a five- 
year agreement covering 1953-1957 was signed on December 18, 1932. It 
provided for an annual barter of 50 thousand tons of rubber for 270 thou­
sand tons of rice. The pact stimulated trade between the two countries 
from less than US$1 million in 1950 to approximately US$95 million in 
1953# It leveled off to an average of US$55 million for 1955-1957#
China, in 1956, undertook an expansion of trade with Ceylon by 
offering a variety of manufactured goods to progressively liquidate debts 
to Ceylon incurred under the rice-rubber bartw agreement, "China* s debt
136
• • • to Ceylon [wa^ considerable reaching . . . US$37 *8 million in 
1957*”^ ^  A new five-year agreement was signed September 19, 1957 iddch, 
in addition to rice and rabber, involved other commodities including iron 
and steel. Concurrently, China granted Ceylon Rs. 75 million in economic 
assistance to be utilized over a five year period primarily for the re­
habilitation of rubber plantations. The 1957 agreement provided for a 
minimum of US$20 million in trade both ways. Two years later
In accordance with the provisions of the "Trade and Payment Agreement 
between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Gov­
ernment of Ceylon* concluded on the 19th September 1957 between the 
two Governments, representatives of the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the Government of Ceylon, after negotiations 
conducted in Colombo, have signed the "Protocol Relating to the Sm* 
change of Commodities between China and Ceylon in 1959̂ , as well as 
the contracts for the purchase of [33,00Q tons of rubber by the 
Government of the People's Republic of ddna from the Government of 
Ceylon and for the purchase of ^53»OOÇ0 tons of rice by the Govern­
ment of Ceylon from the Government of the People's Repubüe of China 
for 1959.145
The volumes for I960 dropped someidtat with 22 thousand ttnss of rubber 
being exchanged for l60 idiousand tons of rice. The following year Ceylon 
exported to lËdnland China 34 thousand tons of sheet rubber and received 
200 thousand tons of rice. "A renewal of the rice-rubber agreement be­
tween Ceylon and China (Mainland) provides for C^lon to inport 200 thou­
sand tons of rice from China in 1964, and to supply in return 35 thousand 
tons of rubber." Another trade protocol signed in I963 at Hong Kong 
provided for an exchange of other commodities in the amount of approzi-
l^Shao Chuan "Communist China's Economic Relations with
Southeast Asia", Far Eastern Survey. Vol. XXVIH, No. 1 (Jan. 1959), p. 7*
145Embassy of Ceylon, Newsletter. July 6, 1959.
"^international Monetary Fund, International Financial News 
Survey. January 10, 1964.
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mately Rs* 100 million*
China entered the Ceylon tea auctions on a large scale in 1964 
purchasing amounts of 50 thousand pounds* There is indication that it 
uiU continue its activity in the C^lon tea market for some time* But 
the type of tea purchased led to some speculation as to its di^osition* 
"The Chinese buying of (black) medium tea —  as against green tea con­
sumed by her people —  lent support to the belief in tea trade quarters 
* * that it mas intended for sale to countries with idiom she had bi­
lateral trade connections*"^^
India and Ceylon renew their bilateral trade agreements on a 
year to year basis with the commodities holding fairly close to tradi­
tional lines* India supplies dried fish, tamarind fruit, unrefined sug­
ar, and hand-loomed products; Ceylon exports mainly rubber, copra, and 
coconut oil. The framewoxk for Indo-Ceylon trade is a general agreement 
finalized in 1961 with an annual value of approximately Rs. 55 million 
both ways*
On February 8, 1958, C^lon concluded its first trade pact with 
the U.S.S.R», idiile expandi%% its trade with other Eastern European 
countries that same year* Two-way trade is under a general license to 
Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslavakia, Bingary, Poland, and Rumania* 
Incidentally, the same open general license agreement is also applicable 
to China and the U*S*S*R*
Today, oil is the base of Russo-Ceylon trade*
Ceylon, in 1964, agreed to buy 6l0 thousand tons of petroleum
147ceylon Waaklv Timas. Oct* 14, 1964, p* 9.
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products in addition to the 250 thousand tons bought annually under a 
five-year contract signed December 15» I96I, Ceylon's oil requirement is 
estimated at one million tons, 60 percent for internal consumption and 
the balance for bunkering ships. The oil trade pact is part of a larger 
story which has to do with the esqpropriation of Anglo-American oil refin­
ing and distribution facilities in Ceylon. The details are more appro­
priate in Ceylon's relations with the United States and hence forms a 
portion of the next chapter. Here, however, it should be mentioned that 
the U.S.S.R. oil pact, the formation of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation 
(CPC), the expropriation of Anglo-American properties, and stoppage of 
United States aid and assistance to Ceylon were all intimately connected 
events.
The CPC was established by an act of the Ceylon Parliament in 
May, 1961. A two-fold purpose promoted the formation. The Ceylonization 
policy was gathering momentum, and the new corporation would save a large 
amount in foreign exchange. It would permit the government to buy petro­
leum from the U.S.S.R., Rumania, and the United Arab Republic at lower 
prices than those offered by the Anglo-American companies i&ich held the 
monopoly on petroleum distribution. Early in 1962 the first shipment of 
Soviet oil arrived in Ceylon. Additional legislation gave the CPC a mo­
nopoly of importation and domestic distribution.
The U.S.S.R. has become Ceylon's major oil supplier. There is 
no doubt as to a considerable expansion of general trade. A fair estimate 
is Rs. 300 million in trade turnover by 196?, congaared to a few years ago 
idien the figure stood at about Rs. 20 million. The U.S.S.R. has agreed 
to increase its agricultural inports from Ceylon during I965-I966. Ceylon
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and India have largely replaced China as the tea supplier for the Soviet 
Union* In S^teznber, I963» the U.S.S.R. withdrew from the Colombo tea 
auctions for two months then resumed its purchases. Daring 1963 and 1964 
the tea volume was approximately six million pounds each year. This is 
expected to increase indicating that tea perhaps will be the main pur­
chase item among other goods such as leather footwear, shirts, towels, 
and other industrial consumer products included in a trade agreement of 
September, 1964. The Soviet Union will export to Ceylon various types of 
machines and equipment, cement, cotton piece-goods and, of course, petrol­
eum products.
Trade talks with Poland, Bxngary, and Czechoslovakia have brought 
contracts for purchases of products from Ceylon* s developing industries 
with gradual volume expansion both ways. Aid to Ceylon has been promised 
by supplying equipment to industries on the basis that any excess produc­
tion of such industries would be purchased by the East European countii.es. 
Negotiations have begun for setting up a petroleum refining and fertilizer 
plant. The Italian State oil agency, Enta p%s^fnaTe Idrocarburl (ENI) and 
Teebncexport of Czechoslovakia have submitted offers, the latter acting 
for that country's Kralcvopolska Chemical Plant Fabrication Works. The 
Ceylonese have high hopes of having their own refining installation some­
time during I967. As to idiether or not oil deposits exist must await a 
future day until a complete geological survey is eoBQ)leted. A start on 
such an undertaking was made in the early 1900s by one Dr. Ananda E. 
Coomaraswamy, but his efforts were centered on a comparatively minute 
area. Since his death, no surv^ of any consequence has been undertaken. 
There is a mineral ei^rt company, the Mineral Sands Cozporation, govern-
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ment operated and established in 1957* Its chief export is graphite, 
however the volume is infinitesimal» Only very recently the corporation 
is showing some promise through shipments of ilmenite to Europe and Japan» 
Even a small volume of mineral e^rts would help, of course, in diversi­
fying the e^^rt trade of tea, rubber, and coconut products»
Trade with the United States was begun in the midr1800s idien the 
British exported Ceylon's three main agricultural products» Ihe trade 
grew slowly through World War I, then suffered a sharp reversal as the 
U»S» Congress placed sweeping restrictions on imports from a number of 
countries. In 1918, the United States bought 11 million pounds of tea,
25 thousand tons of rubber, and 20 million pounds of dessieated coconut* 
Currently Ceylon enjoys a substantially favorable balance of trade with 
the United States which is the second-best tea customer outside the Cosh> 
munist world, the United Kingdom holding the number one q)ot» An expan­
sion of general trade has been hanpered by controls and restrictions im­
posed by C^lon during the past three years, but equally so the market 
has been curtailed by the United States because of U.S. prices, credit 
terms, and shipping costs. A third factor here is the conpetition, es­
pecially from the Commonwealth countries lAich enjoy ̂ .referential customs 
rates. The international climate between the two countries which was 
precipitated by Ceylon's e^ropriation of the American oil properties has 
made only little change in trade relations» Throughout the negotiations 
attendant to the conpensation for the expropriated installations the mat­
ter of decreasing trade was nofdiere discussed. %at the future holds in 
this regard must await another day.
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PlannlMf
The increasing number of people who mast be housed, clothed, and 
fed, for mhom jobs mast be found, the transition of an agricultural to an 
indastrial economy, the increased demands for goods of all types, these 
things make economic planning for Ceylon of crucial isçortance.
definition, niamniM* means the exercise of rational, deliber­
ate, and continuous efforts channeled in specific directions to farther 
the process of economic development# Ceylon inaugurated its economic de­
velopment program in June, 1959* vhen the National Planning Council pre­
sented the to the Parliament. The 500-page detailed
document aimed at "providing for the first time a comprehensive Flan of 
development for the Ceylon economy covering both the public and private 
sectors# It vas the product of three years of intensive study and 
research by a 13-member National Planning Council in cooperation vith an 
eight member Planning Secretariat, assisted by United Nations and Colombo 
Plan consultants#^^ The Council Chairman vas the then Prime Minister 
S.W.R.D# Bandaranaike# As stated by the government, the purpose of the
PI aw was, in general
To meet the needs of the people# These are food, clothing, and shel­
ter; health and education; work and leisure. It aims to provide for
^^Ceylon, National Planning Council, The Ten^Year Plan 
(Colombo; Government Press, 1959).
^^Ibid.. p. iii.
150The Planning Council also had the assistance of a number of 
economists idio visited Ceylon at the Council's invitation, dhey were; 
John E# Galbraith, J#R# Hicks, Ursula E# HLcks, Nicholas Ealdor, Oskar 
Lange, Gunnar l̂ yrdal, and Joan Robinson# All contributed to Papers bv 
Visiting Economists, published by the Planning Secretariat, 1959.
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schools, hospitals, and houses. It mast try to make sure there are 
enough jobs —  be they for peasant or labourer, factory worker, 
nurse, teacher, manager or civil servant —  so that the people may 
earn incomes and so provide for their dally needs and for the enjoys 
ment of leisure. It seeks first that all shall be able to do this.
It seeks next to provide for an increase in the level of their 
standards of living.151
The Council stressed the Plan provided
A focal point around iMch the efforts of the nation should hence­
forth be centered. It is therefore of the greatest inertance that 
the Plan (should} become the subject of nationwide discussion. . . .  
Informed criticism and comment, and suggestions concerning both the 
Plan itself and its inqplementation would be of particular value.15%
The Ceylonese hardly needed such invitation. The Plan was greeted by the
public with mixed emotions. It was termed by some a document of faith,
hope, and promise; by others, a masterpiece of induced optimism; by still
others as not worth considering seriously because such an extraordinarily
ambitious undertaking was doomed in advance. Be that as it may, the T«i-
Year Plan was a significant attempt by the National Planning Council to
find ways of solving the economic problems.
A longer than usual period —  ten years as opposed to three or 
five years —  was chosen since the Plan proposed to bring about a shift 
in the nature of the economy. V£Lth its agrarian base, it pr^ared the 
way for rapid industrialization in the 1970s. A major shift from land 
enployment to the factory was not anticipated immediately. It recognized 
that much remained to be done from the agrarian standpoint of employment 
a.r>d output, and it incorporated a vigorous program for small scale and 
cottage industries. It was the intention of the Plan to e^>and on the
^5̂ Ceylon, Government Information Department, Cevlon News-Letter 
(Colombo: Government Press, July 6, 1959)*
^52rhe Ten̂ Year, Plan, p. 1.
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already existing large-scale industries and dowly to provide new ones 
wherever possible. The total investment over the ten years, 1959-1968, 
was estimated at Rs. 13*601 billion of which Rs. 4,4?0 represented in­
creased annual domestic production. It envisaged that by the end of the 
Plan period some 1,39 million additional persons would be esqsloyed.
Table 10 presents in summary the gross investment, production increase 
in value, and estimated increase in eoployment.
TABLE 10
Gross Investment, Increase in Production and Increase in Ehplopment













Tea 507 317 158
Rubber 4 n 115 6




fisheries harbours) 223 142 13




cations 1,941 203 54




health & education) 1,026 231 109
Other Services 711 491 327
13,601 4,470 1,390
Source: Compiled from Cevlon Rews-Letter. July 6, 19^, and
Colombo, 1959*
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It was intended that by 1968,
Eaeh year 100 million more pounds of tea will be produced, almost two 
and a half times as much paddy, three times as much new land will be 
opened up, five times as much fish • • • 123,000 more houses being 
built, six times more electricity and twelve times as much cement.
In 1962, the Minister of Finance presented, along with his Budget 
Speech, a draft of a short-term ioplementation policy covering a three- 
year period. It was officially called The Short-Term Implementation 
P r o g r a m m a . Its objective was to reexamine the realities of Ceylon's 
economic condition in light of changes and "to examine past policies crit­
ically, [lay| bare the weaknesses, where they exist, and [eaipound] the 
measures required to strengthen the economy and prepare the way for a 
better f u t u r e . T h e  Prime Minister said that "the prospect before us
legis far from rosy though certainly not one of defeatism," and that what 
Ceylon was launching was "a struggle for |th^ very survival as a free 
community. Another program, the third, was presented covering fiscal 
1964-1965.^^ The implementation plans dealt mainly with unenq>loyment 
and underenq>loyment, diversification of the economy with less dependence 
upon the three major export crops, an equitable distribution of national 
income, and stabilization of price levels. The general economic develop-
^^3ceyion News-Letter. July 6, 1959*
^^mylon. Department of National Planning, The Short-Term 
Tn̂ al gpantation Programme (ColomboS Government Press, 1962).
^55lbid.. Foreword
5̂8ceylon, Department of National Planning, The Development 
Programme 1964-69 (Colombot Government Press, 1964).
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ment program of Ceylon is a Plan operating within a Plan within a Plan.
The end of the ten-year program is still a few years away. At 
the mid-way point prospects for fulfillment of the goals are anything but 
bright. The economic problems are not intractable and much can happen by 
1968. The current crisis arises from vbat the government has done, and 
has not done, and wAat the people themselves have done, and have not done.
In the face of steadily declining external assets, the government 
has attenpted to supplement revenue by e patchwork of taxation measures. 
Taxes have sapped the strength of industry for expansion and the wage 
earner of his purchasing power. The following list of taxes were appli­
cable to a considerable portion of the population in 1963$ sales tax, 
wealth tax. National Develq^ent Tax, income tax, profits tax, personal 
tax, rice subsidy tax, land tax, estate duties, stasis, and fees for the 
registration of businesses and professions. In the Budget proposal for 
fiscal 1964-1965, the Minister of Finance, Dr. N.M. Per era, suggested an 
acreage tax on tea, a special tax on residential property, export duty on 
gems, and an excise duty on cigarette tobacco.
The Ceylon government has not created the proper atmosphere iMeh 
invites private foreign investments. While stating emphatically that the 
government welcomed private capital from foreign sources, tiie following 
conditions govern such investments:
1) It should generally be for productive purposes, particularly 
in new fields of industrial activity or in fields vb.eve the 
private sector has not already established itself in Ceylon.
2) It should generally be permitted in collaboration with local 
enterprise, such collaboration being dispensed with only if
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capital from local enterprise is not forthcoming or if the 
enterprise undertakes to manufacture products for export under 
trade names of vide usage.
3) It should lead to the progressive domestic manufacture of 
goods that ultimately will replace inports to the highest 
practicable degree.
4) It should provide for local training in management and skills,
5) It should generally not enter fields reserved for the 
expansion of the public sector.
Meamdiile, American and British oil properties have been e^ropriated, 
and the spectre of estate nationalization hangs heavy over British tea 
interests in Ceylon. %is matter will be taken up fully in the next 
chapter. There is also the expanding encroachment by state owned cor­
porations into practically all industrial fields, constantly increasing 
taxation, and foreign exchange restrictions. This is hardly an environ­
ment which would invite to Ceylon financial ventures from private foreign 
sources.
A case in point as to what the government has not done to further 
its development program is found in the nonutilization of economic assist­
ance. According to one observation.
The chief cause seems to be the absence of planning ahead. Certain 
projects . . .  were dropped (at the request of the C^lon Government) 
long after the signing of the agreement because the preparatory work 
had not been done idien the time came to inplement the project.
Or gifts or money in kind lay idle for years.
The machinery of government departments lAioh are usually called upon 
to implement these projects is frequently found to be unequal to the
^59xntemational Monetary Rind, International Financial Hews 
Saaargz, v. xn, No. 67 (oct. 21, i960),p. 379.
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desaands upon it, in particular on account of the dearth of trained 
personnel, chiefly technical officers* Though much also has been 
spoken of overcoming the shortage of such personnel, little practi­
cal headway has been made.lGO
Another source rapped the government for its lackadaisical approach to
utilizing assistance made available hy the Colombo Plan, It was pointed
out that,
Ceylon, unfortunately, has still to demonstrate that the very best 
use is being made of foreign aid, Colombo Plan or any other* * * *
On the development front, possible deeds have unfortunately got 
drowned in s m s  of words, in speeches, plans, programs and memo­
randa* * * *lol
The Colombo Plan is an économie ozganization, the blueprint for 
iAich was drawn up by the Foreign Ministers of the Commonwealth countries 
in January, 1950, meeting in Colombo, hence The Colombo Plan.^^ The 
original members were Australia, Great Britain with the Federation of 
Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, and Sarawak, Canada, Ceylon, India, New 
Zealand, and Pakistan* It was not treated as a purely Commonwealth devel­
opment program* Rrom the very beginning, membership was open to other 
countries in SouthrSoutheast Asia and to non-Commonwealth countries from 
outside the area* Thus, Japan and the United States also joined* The 
present membership stands at twenty-three*
^^®Ceylon Weekly Times. March 11, 1964, p. 6*
lélQuoted from the gfiylffftJBriJbÜfeW? in the 
January 15, 1963, p* 7.
i^^An excellent survey of the aims and objectives will be found 
in Frederic Benham, The Colombo Other Essays (London: Oxford
Univ* Press, 1956), Reports dealing with a U  phases of the Plan are made 
periodically by The Colombo Plan Bureau, Colombo, C^lon*
^^^The present membership includes all countries of South- 
Southeast Asia, and Japan, Great Britain, and the United States*
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The Colombo Plan's objectives are a close parallel to those
found in the Marshall Plan, but on a much smaller scale. Efforts are
devoted to «ays and means of improving living standards in South-South-
east Asia by providing economic and technical assistance through the
cooperative membership, from, the outset, The Colombo Plan has been «am-
ly received by Asian area governments and peoples alike to the extent
that it exceeds the reception given programs of the United Nations and
individual donors. The reasons are not difficult to find. There are no
po«er bloc commitments, no guardianship, no "strings". It is Asian in
origin, for the most part Asian directed, Asian administered, and the
recipients are Asians. Predicated upon its past performance, it seems
Uke]y^ that The Colombo Plan «ill be around for a long time. Initially,
it vas dravn up to cover a six-year period from 1951 to 1957# Its life
«as extended to June, 1961, again until June, 1966, and recently until
June, 1971# Fev other organizations can boast of the achievements made
by this multilateral organization in assisting developing countries.
Ceylon seems to have been unable to take full advantage of the programs.
The reasons «ere summed in the foUoviz^ statement by the Ceylon press:
The best the Igoloidsî  Plan can do is to help nations help themselves, 
but Ceylon has either spumed such help or spent it «ith a profligacy 
almost unmatched in this region. Valuable equipment has too often 
lain unopened in crates. Some of it is sent out to places «hich 
neither asked for them nor appear to need them. . . .  Experts come to 
C^l<m and make studies of specific problems, but the studies remain 
academic documents left to collect dust. . . .  Men sent out for train­
ing come back to be misfits, being assigned to duties that have noth­
ing to do «ith their specialities.165
164It is virtually impossible here to do justice to the activities 
connected «ith The Colombo Plan. The reader is referred to The Colombo Plan 
Bureau, Progress of The Colombo Plan (Tokyo: Bunshodo Printing Co., 1963).
1^5oaoted from the in the MaXLjBbAdPAt,
January 15, 1963, p. 7#
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Foralgn Aid and Asalatanea 
Despite these criticisms, each year Ceylon includes assistance 
from foreign sources in the Budget to help offset the deficit. Receiving 
foreign assistance is one thing; making the best use of it —  or use of 
it at all —  is something else. There is sufficient evidence to prove 
that the chief cause of non-utilization is the absence of planning. Also, 
perhaps there remains the psychological factor of su^icion in the minds 
of the Ceylonese as to the donor country's intentions idien offers are 
made. It does appear that Ceylon has overcome its wariness in this re­
gard, an attitude lAich was prevalent until about 1955* Then, it was 
generally acc^ted that aid was connected somehow with imperialistic ven­
tures hy the major countries. No observer can be sure as to Aether or 
not there remains some thread of distrust as to motives*
The current rate of utilizati.on of foreign aid does represent an 
improvement over previous years. This has helped considerably in view of 
the critical condition of foreign assets. Still, much remains to be done 
in this respect.
Ât July, 1963, of a total of Rs. 1,151*7 million of foreign aid re­
ceived by Cqylon in grants and loans, only Rs. 7&0.3 million has 
been allocated ̂  projects, leaving an unallocated balance of Rs.
391.4 million, loo
During fiscal I964-I965, Ceylon hopes to receive somewhere in the region 
of Rs. 250 million. A considerable portion of this amount has been agreed 
to by Peking, currently the chief donor. Canada too, will contribute 
substantially through the Colombo Plan.
Mainland China has been sending increasingly large amounts of
l66ceyion Jwe 3, 1964, p. 6.
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aid to Ceylon since the first bilateral agreement was signed in 1957» -At 
that time, Peking agreed to a grant of Rs. 75 million, part of which Cey­
lon used to erect a cotton-spinning and weaving mill in I96I, A gift of 
1200 power looms was made in November, I963, the value of lAich, by esti­
mate, was said to have been Rs. 5 million. The looms were scheduled for 
delivery over a three year period. The most recent China aid is an 
interest-free loan of Rs. 20 million, along with a considerable amount of 
machinery and other aids for the agricultural sector, and a gift of 25 
million yards of Chinese textiles valued at about Rs. 20 million.
Canadian aid totals roughly Rs. 130 million to date, almost the 
entire amount being outright gifts. The largest single block of the total 
was made available in March, 1964, with a grant under the Colombo Plan 
amounting to Rs. 33*8 million for improving Katunayake airport and for 
developmental projects in that area.
The U.S.S.R. signed an aid agreement with Ceylon in 1958 for Rs. 
150 million r^ayable in either pounds sterling and/or goods. About 25 
percent of the amount had been utilized through 1962, however a number of 
major plants conqpleted and underway will involve another Rs. 40 million.
Whether or not the United States will lift its suspension on aid 
to Ceylon, imposed in 1962 when American property was expropriated, cannot 
be predicted. Between 1956 and I963, United States assistance amounted to 
about Rs. 425 million (US$85 million), the major portion in the form of 
food supplies under Public Law 480. There were a number of developmental 
projects underway at the time of aid suspension. The course of future 
evaits between Ceylon and the United States d^ends largely upon some 
conqpensation for the privately-owned oil properties.
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So such then for some things the Government of Ceylon has done 
and has not done which inhibits economic development*
Labor
Now to some of the things the people themselves have done and 
have not done tdiich has ing)eded the progress*
In 1956, the NEP coalition —  a People's Government —  came into 
power* The people of Ceylon took hold of the idea that everything was 
destined to go well aatomatically without the people having to bother 
much about work, or disciplining themselves to the rules of social coop­
eration, Later, when the National Planning Cound.1 presented the Ten- 
Year Plan, it was pointed out that in order for the goals to be attained 
it required
The understanding, cooperation and self-discipline of the ordinary 
people —  the workers, the peasants and office assistants* It §iâ  
dependent on the exercise of their skills and on the willingness to 
work hard* The Plan will either fail altogether or fall dismally _ 
short of its objective if this cooperation [wa^ not forthcoming*^^
In several sectors of Ceylon's society, not much attention was given this 
warning; the response was one of laxity in cooperation, an impatimce with 
authority, and a general desire of something-for-nothing.
At a time of a national financial crisis, it is human nature to 
blame all economic ills upon the government* There is little argument 
that many of the hardships facing the Ceylonese today are due to goyemr 
ment ineffldency and the failure of official policies* But it also has 
been the lack of discipline in the work forces lAich has in^eded the im­
plementation of official policies and economic development* In practically
^^Cevlon News-Letter. July 6, 1959.
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every occupation there has been agitation and work stoppages for higher 
condensation with less work.
Most workers in C^lon belong to one of twenty-seven organized 
labor groups. The island has bew besieged with trade union rivalries 
lAieh have been, to a large extent, responsible for the frictions lAich 
have divided the country against itself. Trade unions are appendages of 
political parties, divided according to parochial interests of a section 
of society. They are functioning in Ceylon as political agents and res­
ervoirs of massed political power; the sole objective is to mobilize 
people for political goals.
Successive governments have produced the necessary machinery for 
settling industrial disputes: collective bargaining, redress for an in­
dividual's grievances, means for negotiations, conciliation, and arbitra­
tion, and labor tribunals. Still, the government chooses not to use the 
machinery it has espoused. One excellent example of this is a work stop­
page in the ports.
The Cevlon Observer of January 12, 1964 bannered its Sunday edi­
tion with "Strike-Settlement Is Reached At Last."^^^ After seventy days 
of idleness, the ports of Ceylon resumed the handling of cargoes from 
some forty ships which bad waited more than two months whmi nothing moved 
in or out of the ports. Meanwhile, clerks of the Port Cargo Corporation, 
the Ceylon Mercantile Union, and the government chose to stalemate nego­
tiations on work conditions and salaries. And meanwhile, another forty 
ships had bypassed Colombo idiich represented "about $0,000 tons of cargo
^^Cevlon Observer. January 12, 1964, p. 1.
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• • • either shut out or overcarried» In adding up the total cost of
the port strike, it was estimated that
Ovw Rs. 35 million has been lost to revenue « . . This figure does 
not include the losses sustained in^rters and shippers of e:qiort 
cargoes. Their losses are also said to be considerable. 7̂0
The movements of tea and rubber shipments bound for world ports were hard­
est hit, with some 5^ million pounds of tea, 10 thousand tons of crepe 
rubber, and three thousand tons of sheet rubber wasting away in shipper's 
warehouses.As late as May, some four months after the strike settle­
ment, 100 thousand tons of food cargoes were still afloat aboard ships 
inside and outside Colombo harbor. The loss to Ceylon from tourism was 
also enormous; no estimate has ever been made, but conservatively it ap­
proximates perhaps Rs. 1 million. While passengers aboard freighters 
waited days upon days to disembark, only one vessel was allowed to juŝ  
a four-week long queue since it carried in its hold a top-priority item. 
The important cargo was the first-ever Siberian tiger —  Nicola by name —  
to land upon Ceylon's shores. He was bound for the Dehiwala Zoo. He was 
unloaded and carefully sol And back went the vessel to join the line of 
ships, subsequently to be unloaded of the remaining cargo in its proper 
turn.
The very life of the island is dependent upon its e3q>ort-import 
trade which can function only through the ports. The government operates 
the ports through a state corporation. And troubles in the ports —
^^9ceylon Weekly Times. February 12, 1964, p. 2.
January 22, 1964, p. 2,
^7^Ibid.. January 15» 1964, p. 2.
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strikes and slow-downs —  bring out the government's critics in full 
force. In all sectors, petty grievances have resulted in work-stoppages 
lAich cumulatively have had a crippling affect upon the economy. It is 
in the shipping trade irtiere potential disaster rests for C^lon. A mal­
functioning here results in serious drain upon the economy and is an ob­
stacle to the progress of the country. When the time arrives that the 
people give lAolehearted support to the idea that woric is necessary for 
the good of the country as a whole, the people will have achieved a great 
deal.
KLseidiere in the labor picture, the establishing of new indus­
tries and some of the development projects have done little to relieve 
the critical uaas^loyment problem. In August, 1964, the last month for 
^ c h  unemployment figures are available, the Central Bawif of Ceylon said 
there were more than l6l thousand persons without jobs, the highest ever 
recorded. This figure represents only those persons who have registered 
their availability for jobs and does not include a large number of per­
sons in the rural areas. If anything, job prospects will continue to 
worsen. In 1959, the following forecast had been made*
In an economy, organized as the Ceylon economy now is, there will not 
be places for the people vHxo will be demanding places in a few years 
time. Development is necessary in order that places should be found 
for them.172
Two years earlier, the government had ordered all future labor 
vacancies on tea estates be filled by Ceylonese rather than by immigrant 
Indian labor hoping thereby to partially solve the problem of unemployment
7̂2j,s, Hcks, "Reflections on the Economic Problem of Ceylon", 
Papers, bv Visiting Economists (Colombo* National Planning Council, 1959), 
p. 9.
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in the villages. In June, 1962, Parliament passed a law which enabled the 
Labour Ministry to determine who could or could not be ençloyed on estates. 
This law virtually dictated to estate management the number of Ceylon cit­
izens which were to be eaçloyed, and obliged the ençloyers to fill all 
vacancies with Ceylonese until the quota was reached. Its intent, besides 
insuring en^loyment of nationals, was that of an instrument of coercion.
It was hoped Indian immigrants would take out passports and leave the coun­
try. This policy has had some success.
The Ceylonization program has forced many foreign entrepeneurs to 
close their doors thereby retrenching from the labor force, present and 
prospective, non-Ceylonese and Ceylonese alike. Bestrictions on a variety 
of goods have necessitated staff reductions in several production areas. 
State corporations encroaching upon the private sectors have led to a re­
shuffling of engployees and, frequently, a reduction in the number on the 
payrolls. In almost all cases, those who join the ranks of the unemployed 
are skilled and semi-skilled workers, whose specific specialities can only 
be utilized by a very narrow sector of the economy. As economic develop­
ment continues to expand, these specialities will find a place. But today, 
it is the present which is at the crisis point. Looking at it pessimisti­
cally, tomorrow does not appear much brighter. Thousands of young men and 
women are being graduated from Ceylon's higher institutions of learning 
with proficiency in fields which are already overcrowded.
MiSàilaïi
Knowledge is the premier resource. It is based upon education 
whether or not the latter is along the lines of the more formal university
156
style, or gained through something akin to apprenticeship in the crafts. 
Colon's plight is its inability to make the most use of these resources. 
In effect, Ceylon has potential plenty in the midst of poverty. Education 
has made little or no readjustment to meet the needs of the country in 
coping with the problems of economic development. Nothing much has been 
done to interest the country's youth in fields which would ease the dearth 
of available technicians and craftsmen, so vitally needed now by the ex­
panding industrial sector. Generally, for the past decade at least, there 
has been little effort to council youi^ men and woman to choose careers 
in those skills lAich require not only mental application but manual dex­
terity as well. Instead each year graduates pour from the University of 
Ceylon with degrees lAich manifest proficiency in the arts, gravitate to­
ward a labor market to cos^ete for teaching or clerical positions both of 
lAich fields are overflowing with applicants, dhese jobs are not to be 
had because no vacancies exist. "Ihe schools are turning out tens of 
thousands of . . . qualified young hopefuls every year who are climbing 
over each other's backs to get within grasping distance of a one-hundred- 
rupee pittance a month.
Colon's problem in education has some of its roots inextricably 
tied with the British colonial past, and others of much more recent vinr 
tage linked with the Official Language Act. In a previous chapter^^^ men­
tion was made of the British deen̂ thasizing the Buddhist religion. In 
connection therewith emphasis was upon English-style education in prefer­
ence to that of the Sinhala language oriented institutions. Even the
^73ceylon Weekly Urnes. October 30, 1963, p. 6.
^7^Chapter H, pp. 61-62.
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status of the teacher varied* The historiographer Mendis points out that.
The Sinhalese schoolmaster received a lover salai^ than the one idio 
taught in a school vhere English vas the medium of instruction and 
vas given a status lover than that of the English teacher* Above all, 
the pupils in the Sinhalese Schools * * * had very, very fev avenues
of ençloyaent and had to take up posts as servants* Unen^loyaent be­
came raag)ant among them and these Sinhalese-educated began to despair 
of their future*175
Therefore, English éducation expanded not necessarily because of its qual­
ity but merely because it —  and it alone —  opened the door to a position
as a government official, or a clerk, or a professional man* Tradition­
ally these occupations, particularly in government, have alvays carried 
far more prestige than any form of manual labor*
Changes appeared after political independence* Gradually, more 
Sinhalese replaced the British as vacancies occurred but the English- 
educated Tamil remained entrenched in his position* The turnover vas slov; 
veil-paying, prestige positions did not increase as rapidly as the Sinhalese 
had hoped* Many thousand young people vere receiving their secondary school 
education in the Sinhala language yet it vas difficult for these to compete 
for entrance to the English-speaking University of Ceylon*
Â vord about the University of Ceylon appears to be in order here* 
Its campus is acclaimed by many visitors as œac of tho most beautiful any- 
lAere in the vorld* Located at Peradeniya, not far from Kandy, it is com­
paratively nev* It vas established in 1942 through the incorporation of 
the Ceylon University College, founded in 1921, an overseas extension of 
the University of London* The University of Ceylon vas initially designed 
to cater almost exclusively to a small, veil-defined group of students,
I7^endis, Cevlon: Today and Yesterday, p. 135*
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mostly Sinhalese and Tamils whose proficiency in the English language was 
above reproach. It is patterned along the lines of Western residential 
institutions. But, no longer is it an institution for the elite only.
More and more students are filling its classes under the democratization 
of education policy. The changes being wrought in Ceylon, especially 
through the Official Language Act, have been reflected in changes lAich 
have been made and are destined to take place at the University.
Among the changes, the most significant is the instituing of 
swabasha —  teaching in the languages of the country i.e., Sinhala and 
Tamil. English as a medium of instruction in the social sciences and the 
arts is practically dead. There remains only a minute number of students 
idio receive instruction through &iglish; the ovendielming majority are 
lectured in the swabashas. The English language finds a place only in an 
accelerated program in order to equip undergraduates with some reading 
conqprehension. Attendance at these classes is purely voluntary, neither 
encouraged nor discouraged. There is a dearth of reference material cur­
rently available in the swabashas: thus, these special English language 
classes do act as a medium in opening a vast storeroom of knowledge. In 
the past a knowledge of English was a requisite for entering the University 
of C^lon; now it is no longer required.
In the physical sciences also the days for instruction through 
the English medium are numbered. Much in this area is already being con­
ducted in Sinhala and Tamil. English remains the language of science in 
Ceylon but the swabashas cover the same material in parallel courses.
Such will be the case until 1968, the date established by the Parliament 
Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Education for the oo#lete switch­
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over. %.th. the English lainage gradually disappearing; the Ministry of 
Education has yet to explain how the swabasha-trained Ceylon scientists 
will keep abreast of the latest advances in the scientific and, technolog­
ical knowledge of the English-speaking world. As might be expected there 
are two streams of thought in Ceylon regarding swabasha instruction in 
science. One holds that the island is now ready to change to Sinhala and 
Tamil uo to the university level with complete adoption in 1966; the 
counter-argument runs that science students cannot be given the proper 
training except in English and for a number of years after 1968; due to 
the paucity of science texts in the Sinhala and Tamil languages.
There are other institutions of higher learning in Ceylon; all 
considerably smaller than the University. Among these are the law school 
at the University ÿ a Law College for the legal education of students; the 
Ceylon Technical College lAich provides training in engineering, vocational 
studies, and commerce; Jaffna College, an Anerican sponsored missionary 
school founded in 1828; and Aquinas University, a Catholic school in 
Colombo. In the political campaign of 1956» S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike champ­
ioned the Buddhist cause and upon election announced plans for generous 
financial grants to the island's two Pirivenas. the institutes of higher 
education for the training of the bhikkhus. These are Vidyalankara and 
Vidyodaya, both located within easy commuting distance of Colombo and both 
were granted university status as of January 1, 1959* Many of the promi­
nent Buddhists in Ceylon and India are either part-time students or in 
some way closely connected with these seats of learning.
I76gg;g@gtive in 1965, all school textbooks will be handled ex­
clusively by the D^artment of Education. These books are written by 
selected teachers for each of the different subjects in the curriculum.
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The Ministry of Education submitted a White Paper an Edneatlon 
in October, 1963, making education conpilsory, free, and nationwide for 
all children between the ages of six and fourteen. At the age of fouiv 
teen years, the child is free to leave school if employment can be found, 
attend vocational school or secondary school. Religion is a required 
part of the cirricula in all schools of Ceylon. It is a law that the 
child must be taught the religion of his parents, and that teaching must 
be done by a teacher of that religion. Further, "the head of the school 
shall be of the religion of the majority of the pupils of the school and 
teachers shall be in the same proportion as the pupils professing those 
religions in the s c h o o l . T h e  White Panar proposed that the English 
language no longer be compulsory as a second language. Instead, a choice 
is offered among Sinhala, Tamil, or English. In any case, the child is 
introduced to the second language in the third grade. The cost of the 
national system of education is estimated at Rs. 350 million (US$70 million).
There is one area which the Ceylon plan for education seems to 
have overlooked, a field made significant both by its absence from the 
national system and by its inqiortance to the island. This is Mbication in 
agriculture. By and large the younger people are seeking —  and for the 
most part unsuccessfully —  careers as public servants or in lAite-collar 
positions because of the prestige value and compensation. For years 
there have been the School of Agriculture at Peradeniya for men, the
7̂7Cevlon Observer. October 23, I963, p. 2.
^7^An excellent treatment on this subject will be found in Bryce 
Ryan, "Status, Achievement, and Education in Ceylon: An Historical 
Perspective", Journal of Asian Studies. XI, No. 4, (August, 1961).
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Kandasale for women, and the University of Ceylon had a Faculty of Agri­
culture. Nevertheless, there appears to be hardly aiqr encouragement to­
ward agriculture by emphasizing dignity in connection with working the 
soil. Preoccupied with industrialization promotion, Ceylon has relegated 
agricultural education to a rather menial position. This is paradozical 
not only because Gqylon has ancient roots in agrarianism, but even more 
because of the crying need for food supplies.
APggf̂gflJi
This has been a someidiat gloomy recapitulation of the resources 
of Ceylon, and the role of économie development. All developing countries 
have a very long list of problems, some of lAioh will require decades of 
patience, effort, and cooperation to overcome.
Colon's administration of the development machinery has been a 
patchwork of procedures implemented in haphazard style to take care of 
only an immediate situation. Little thought has been given to the long- 
run consequences. Policies pertaining to utilization of resources in 
overall planning have been is^rovisations cm a year to year basis. There 
have been all sorts of target plans, but a wide gap ezists between these 
and the achievements. While some things have been aoeonqilished, there are 
not enough to substantially affect improvements.
Tazation has had an adverse effect upon the developmental program. 
In any organized society, there must be taxes to produce revenue for the 
administration of all state services. Kktch good has come from state rev­
enue in Ceylon. Social welfare services and subsidization of foodstuffs 
have helped the island's people avoid the crushing problems of poverty and
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starvation found in some other countries. It has aided too in setting 
up the small industries giving eng)loyment to many p@@ple. But growth of 
an economy comes through a tax structure which is favorable to growth.
This growth is stagnate in Ceylon. Direct and indirect taxation have in­
tensified over the years to the extent that direct taxation yields now 
actually less than a few years ago. In 1955*1956 direct taxes provided 
26.6 percent of the total revenue; in 1963-1964, th^ provided only 21.7 
percent. Tax bases, tax rates, and other levies are so high at the pres­
ent time that direct taxes are yielding less and less revenue. C^lon is 
faced iâ.th diminishing returns in the field of direct taxation.
The tax structure has adversely affected development in other 
sectors also. Â good estimate is that about 80 percent of the gross prof­
its of estate conpanies is taken the state in the form of taxation. 
Thus, very little is left to management to put back into the land rehabil­
itation in producing the main eaport-earning crops: tea, rubber, and 
coconuts. At the same time, little or no encouragement has been given 
the private sector in agriculture to expand holdings and new taxes have 
added discouragement. A quantity of good, cultivable land is still avail­
able, there is an over^supply of labor available, but capital is scarce. 
The effect upon the efficiency of future estate operations necessarily 
depends largely on new capital for replanting and eâ ansion, but invest­
ment will not come under present conditions in C^lon. Nor will it come 
while the threat of ei^ropriation continues to permeate the private sec­
tor, whether estate or industrial.
C^lon must begin a search for new e3q>ort items in cottage crafts 
and encourage this sector through a reduction of export taxes. External 
trade generates a major force in economic development thus a concerted
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drive laast be made for new export markets* Continued industrial ezqoanr 
sion is supplying the domestic consumer with a widening variety of goods* 
But export levies give little chance for some of these same products to 
be channeled into export markets due to the price factor; lower priced 
coaparable products of other countries are stiff competition for the 
Ceylonese item lAose price is inflated by export tariff* If Ceylon were 
to withdraw all duties on iiqiort of raw materials both the domestic and 
esAemal markets for the manufactured products would perhaps increase 
substantially* Greater production in any sector is obviously going to 
increase employnent* It is much more helpful to earn foreign exchange 
by aborts rather than revenue from inçort duties* Of course, economic 
development cannot wait for exports to provide all the necessary leverage, 
but a stagnate domestic sector is very often the result of a weak export 
economy and poor trade policies* Ceylon's central problem here is the 
formulation of a tax: base and tax rates which will not kill off enterprise, 
yet will provide revenue sources lAich will permit Ceylon to proceed with 
social and developmental projects to which it is already committed*
A much needed program is one by which the people are assured of 
full protection of their rights. At the same time, the people themselves 
must voluntarily accept responsibilities by lAich the development of an 
integrated society makes possible the goals of planning* The type of 
political structure —  in this case, democratic socialism —  is not too 
important* The devices of coercions and restraints are to be found in 
all political structures* What is inportant is the form these devices  ̂
take* There is a vast difference between a work-stoppage in the devel­
oped country, and one in a country which is struggling in the developing
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stage. A longshoresMHa*s strike in the United States, unfortunate as it 
may be, does not have the crippling effect as does a port strike in 
Colombo. When organized labor unions have become appendages of political 
parties, rather than chassions of protection against maltreatment of its 
members, the government and the country can totter on the brink of dis­
aster. The ideology of a political party must be superseded by the id^ 
ology of economic development, ko^ political party in power must inqpose 
upon the population the costs of social development; idiere a people re­
fuse to pay the costs, chaos is in the offing.
Economic development alone is not the key to all of Colon's 
problems. Instead, the key which will unlock Ceylon's future is the co­
operative undertaking to realize the maximum of all resources; state in­
stitutions, organized labor, cooperative societies, the private sector, 
education for national unity, and private individuals.
CHAPTBR V 
THE POLITICS OF INTERMTIONÂLISM
Ceylon Is part of a group of Asian and African states which claim 
membership in an international commonity commonly called the «flwaUcmwri 
countries. Unquestionably, the term "nonaligned* wants for a precise def­
inition. Nonalignment differs from neutrality in the sense that the latter 
has a more direct application in time of war. According to intema^onal 
law, neutrality defines the status of a nation which refrains from partic­
ipation in a war and maintains an iiq>artial attitude toward the belliger­
ents. Yet, the difference is one of degree rather than kind. Wantyaiitv 
and nonalienment arise from unlimited sovereignty which allows a state to 
freely decide its position in international affairs. Sovereignty entitles 
the state to refrain from taking sides in any question arising among other 
states, and the right to remain aloof from any entangling alliances.
Nonalienment is a code of diplomatic behavior. It is a condi­
tioned response to international relations whereby a small state, acknowl­
edging itself as vulnerable to the retalitations of a major power, has no 
alternative other than to remain politically uncommitted to any other 
state or power bloc. Nonalignment is an attitude of the national mind. 
There is frank recognition that joining a military alliance does not auto­
matically confer equality in status with a more powerful state. And it is
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the premise that there is no single bright idea, such as military alli­
ance, mhioh will solve all the perplexing problems created by the fre­
quently unpredictable inter-nation conduct in the oong)lex modern world.
The Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, daring a foreign 
policy address to Parliament explained nonalignment in the following way.
It merely means, she said.
That each country that is nonaligned adopts independent judgments on 
foreign policy without being tied to the ideologies of opposing mil­
itary power blocs. Nonaligned nations do not necessarily stand to­
gether on any given question. They are not even aligned as to regards 
to one another; or in relation to any particular dispute. ̂79
There is no way to determine exactly idien and where the concept 
of nonalignment was bom, but certainly it was nourished at the Afro-Asian 
Conference in 1955. Commonly known as the Ba.wdntnr Cmnference.^̂ ° delegates 
representing 28 countries met in convention at Bandui%, Indonei^a. It was 
the first such intercontinental congress in history. Briefly, the objec­
tive were these; to encourage cooperation among the developing states in 
solving common economic and social problems, to determine the position of 
the Afro-Asian peoples in the world community, and to discuss the contri­
butions lAich could be made by these people toward world peace. The lat­
ter topic received the lion's share of debate.
There was peace in Southeast Asia in 1955$ although it was of the 
precarious sort. Korea had settled into a condition of armed truce, and
^79ceylon Weekly Times. January 29, 1964, p. 3.
130The Conference was held in April, 1955* An excellent account 
of the proceedings is supplied by Russel H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of 
South-East Asia. 1945-1956 (New York; Harper & Bros., 1958). The text 
of the final communique will be found pp. 512-519. Some sidelights are 
covered by Carl T. Rowan, The Pitiful and The Proud (New York; Random 
House, 1956).
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militarily at least the French had departed from Indo-China. Long range 
prospect for Asia included China's undeniable determination to assert 
major influence. Japan» meaiu&ile» had taken greater strides, under 
United States pressure, in the direction of self-defense and in 195^ had 
entered a mutual assistance agreement. American regional policies had 
as their over-riding objectives the containment —  and hopefully the 
elimination —  of the communist menace. The United States had left lit­
tle doubt as to this goal idien, in 195̂ , it had proposed the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization.
SEATO, with its purely military base, had been a source of appre­
hension among most Asian states. The alliance was assessed as being 
an American-wrought ring of steel forged in the mistaken idea that guns 
and bayonets were the surest answer to preventing the spread of inter­
national communism. It was upon thî â premise that the then Prime Minister
of Ceylon, Sir John Kotelewala, had suggested a conference of Asian heads-
182of-state at Colombo in 195̂ » Burma, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan 
were invited to attend. It was the hope of the Prime Ministers that some 
substitute for SEATO might be found, an alternate which would be accept­
able to the United States. This was not to be the case. SEATO material­
ized at Manila in September, creating an urgency among some Asian states 
as to the most judicious course in the conduct of their foreign affairs.
181f>or some views toward SEATO by the various states see below.
^^^This conference was called the Asian Prime Ministers Confer­
ence. The first session at Colombo was held April 28-May 2, 195̂ , the 
Bogor session on December 28-29. The Prime Ministers attending were:
U Nu (Burma), Kotelewala (Ceylon), Nehru (India), Sastroamidjojo 
(Indonesia), and Mohammed Ali (PaMstan).
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The Prime Ministers reconvened at Bogor (Indonesia) in December and from 
this session materialized the larger conference at Bandung the following 
year.
At Bandung, Ceylon took, indirectly, its first step toward non- 
alignment. Kotelewala had been forced, under pressure from Parliament, 
to reject the invitation to join the organization. Parliament had held 
that the military principle of its character was not conducive to main- 
taini%% peace. Sir John, at Bandung, could not bring himself to disas­
sociate his government with American-British regional policies. During 
conference debate, pro-Communist delegates hurled charges of "iag)erialism" 
at the United States and United Kingdom. In rebuttal, Kotelewala was 
vocal in defending his country's pro-Western attachment. He countered 
the imperialism charges by accusing the Soviet Union of subversion and 
neo-colonialism through ideology. He dwelled upon the thesis that if the 
West was guilty of imperialistic ventures then equally guilty, said the 
Prime Minister, was the U.S.S.R.
Later, in a report to Parliament on the Afro-Asian Conference, 
the Prime Minister reiterated the stand he had taken at Bandung. He inter­
laced his remarks with arguments as to the need of retaining British naval 
and air bases in Ceylon for security purposes. Yet, under questioning, 
the Prime Minister admitted that the Western powers might have found it 
more advantageous in the long run to have refrained from an alliance such 
as SEATO; to have sought instead measures other than those with military 
enq)hasis. He further admitted that the challenge of aspirations between 
East and West, backed with enormous military power on both sides, had the 
potential of unleashing a major confrontation.
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Parliament weighed carefully the words of its Prime Minister.
A coalition of voices in both the Senate and the House demanded reap­
praisal of Ceylon's position; these demands snowballed into a foU-blomn 
foreign policy debate. The moderates sought a middle-of-the-road course. 
The Opposition accused the government of purposely placing the country in 
an untenable position between East and West, in order that Western over- 
lordship might be returned to govern the island under the facade of se­
curity against a mythical force. Some of Kotelewala* s own political 
d'̂ seiples broke party ranks and joined the Opposition. Anti-Western demr> 
onstrations, scattered but island-wide, steamrollereù public cpiri<»« 
a mandate to Parliament. The die had been cast. Ceylon completed its 
first st^ toward membership in the nonaUgned community of Afro-Asian 
states.
Foreign Policy: Three Stages
Ceylon* s foreign policy has come by way of a three-part evolu­
tionary process. Stage one was the British Period, the interim from in­
dependence to 1956. The record was written mainly through institutional 
links with the United Kingdom; British statescraft famished the guide­
lines, and British diplomats the know-how. The second stage is the Indian 
Period, from 1956 to 1961%, The characteristic was the marked loosening 
of Britannic ties and increasing Indian influence in Colon's international 
affairs. Stage three —  the Ceylonese Period —  began in I96I. It was 
manifested by an assertiveness to prove Ceylon's foreign policy was its 
own and not that of aiqr other country.
Ceylon's foreign relations has been a diary of curious, unpre­
dictable maneuvers, at times frustrating to world capitals. During the
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United National Party's control of government, 1948-1956, there was no 
question as to pro-Westem ties. Yet Ceylon had found it expedient to 
cultivate Peking's friendship through commercial relations. Later, idien 
the KËP took over administration, the late Prime Minister Solomon Bidgeway 
Dias Bandaranaike stoutly denied to the world that his government was 
Communist oriented. But he left no doubt as to bis intentions of secur­
ing economic and technical aid from whatsoever country offered it. Commu­
nist or otherwise. C^lon demanded acquisition of British naval and air 
bases on the island, then accorded a rousing welcome to Chou En-lai on 
his first state visit to C^lon in 1957* It refused to condemn Soviet 
action in Hungary. When its ambassador to the United Nations affixed his 
signature to the majority report which was critical of the U.S.S.R., he 
was censured by Colombo. Ceylon took the position that the China-Tibet 
affair was purely an internal problem; it sided with India over the mat­
ter of Goa, but refused to join India in condemning the Chinese during 
the border episode. It has received substantial economic assistance from 
the United States, but jeopardized future amounts by e:q>ropriating American 
foreign investments in Ceylon.
Ceylon's ^neutralism" was not a spur-of-the-moment result of 
Parliamentary debate on foreign policy or of Bandung. It was, rather, the 
dredging of a new diplomatic channel upon which the machinery of world 
happenings had been at work for some time, events lAich had occupied the 
attention of all states. United States-U.S.S.R. relations were steadily 
worsening against a backdrop of the West's preoccupation with international 
Communism. Western military forces had been fought to a standstill in 
Korea thus giving new stature —  whether real or imagined —  to Asian
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military power. The French had departed from Indo-China at the points of 
Asian bayonets. By l&iy« 1955* the stability of Mao's government was no 
longer in question. SEATO had become a reality. Ceylon's trade relations 
with China were proving more fruitful. After Bandung, Moscow had taken 
to carving a new image in Ceylon. It advanced the island's membership in 
the United Nations —  a reversal of the attitude it had previously held —  
and extended an offer of economic aid and assistance.
Ceylon rejected membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organi­
zation because of the military character ef the alliance. In official 
circles, there was discussion about the fact that, at Manila, the gatter 
of Asian security had been arbitrarily undertaken mainly by non-Asian na­
tions. It was thought odd that a few countries would band together to 
protect Asian states even though the majority of the latter were obviously 
less than lukewarm to the idea. In view of this, it appeared that the 
colonial powers were really interested in maintaining their status in Asia, 
and deliberately obstructing national liberation.
The spiritual father of SEATO was the late U.S. Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles. In signing the pact on September 8, 195̂ » he referred 
to it as an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine, the prime object of which was stop­
ping any Communist caaq)aign of intimidation by violence. Dulles' plan of 
creating a solid front was to fall short of its goal. The Philippines and 
Pakistan both welcomed membership. The former stated that it relied upon 
multilateral cooperative agreements for aid in resisting subversion and 
aggression by Communist countries. Pakistan recognized it as an instru­
ment whereby its defense could be strengthened against any designs India 
might have in its quarrel with Pakistan over Kashmir. Among other countries.
1?2
the story vas different. India reflected Ceylon's view that guns and 
bayonets were not the answer to whatever troubles international Communism 
might have in store for South-Southeast Asia. Cambodia questioned wheth­
er the alliance had not been conceived to satisfy the selfish interests 
of Western powers in an attempt to reestablish hegemony in the region.
Burma thought SEATO to be a divisive rather than cohesive force, and saw 
no value in a military organization as an aid toward strengthening inteiv 
national associations. Indonesia thought it highly unlikely that SEATO 
could in any way help in solving the acute problems of poverty in Asian 
countries; and that the military aspect would increase tensions rather 
than lessen them. These were the views of some Asian states toward SEATO.
No single international event mentioned above was responsible for 
Ceylon's noucllgnment. It would be difficult to measure the amount of in­
fluence each situation might havo generated. There can be lit'U.e question 
that the formation of SEATO contributed a disproportionate share since the 
alliance was directly involved in the East-West contest. Nevertheless, 
all joined together to spell out a new definition of Ceylon's "independence" 
which was, henceforth, to be applied in the fullest sense of the word.
The MEP coalition was victorious in the general election of 1956. 
The Party's political platform was built around "Ceylon for Ceylonese", 
the campaign oratory stressing the virtue of ridding Ceylon of the remnants 
of European colonialism. These "remnants" were almost entirely British: 
military installations, estates, and other enterprises. Given the teag)er 
of the Parliament —  and even more inçwrtantly that of the people —  toward
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anything military, as expressed after Bandung, there was no reason to 
doubt that the primary targets for the MEP were the British naval base 
at Trinoomalee and the Royal Air Force base at Katunayake. If the MEP 
had needed an excuse other than that of sovereign rights, Britain's role 
in Suez offered a most convenient argument. British ships bound for Suez 
refueled at Trinoomalee; RAF planes stopping at Katunayake were suspected 
of operations against Egypt.
Political victory had come in May. %thin sixty days, on July 6, 
London announced that it recognized the right of the Government of C^lon 
to request transfer of Trinoomalee and Katunayake. Ceylon's Parliament 
had taken the position that since the government was now dedicated to non- 
alignment, indefinite British occupation of the military installations 
could not be tolerated, and that as long as the British occupied these 
bases it gave the appearance that Ceylon was on the side of the Western 
powers. Under the Defense Agreement of November, 19̂ 7» concluded just 
prior to independence, Trincomalee and Katunayake were to remain under 
the Union Jack. No stipulation had been made as to the length of time 
this treaty was to remain in force.
Formal negotiations for transfer began March 29, 195?» In Colombo 
on June 7, it was announced that Trincomalee would become Ceylon property 
as of October 15» and Katunayake on November 1. Ceylon agreed to pay 
Rs. 22 million (approx. U8$4.4 million) as reimbursement for fixed assets, 
l&thdrawal was to be completed over a three-year period, Britain accepted 
the loss of these extremely valuable assets in Ceylon as a fait accompli. 
The good manners of international diplomacy applied in the tradition of 
British statecraft. The transfer of Trincomalee, on the island's north-
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east coast, ended l68 years of British, overlordship of a seaport which 
Lord Nelson had described as the finest harbour in the world. It had 
been ingportant to the Britannic role of the Indian Ocean since the days 
of the East Indies Con̂ any; it had served as a naval base since 1898.
Whitehall has always taken pains to hold agitation to a minimum, 
regardless of the impact policy decisions by Ceylon may have upon British 
interests. Specifically, these interests are the private British invest­
ments in Ceylon, mainly tea and rubber estates. During the 1956 general 
election campaign, the MEP stated e:q>licitly that nationalization of the 
estates was very much a part of its program. In March, 195?» Bandaranaike 
gave assurance to the membership of the Planters Association that his gov­
ernment "had no intention of taking over the plantations at o n c e ."185 gut 
he stated emphatically that estate nationalization, while certainly not a 
cure-all for the country's economic ills, nevertheless would serve in the 
transition from a colonial to a free economy. Ceylon's House of Represent­
atives approved a bill in April, 1958$ which provided the legislative ma­
chinery, A year later, in April, the Prime Minister pledged a delay of 
at least ten years.
So far, the government has honored the late Prime Minister's word. 
But, the prevailing question is —  when will estate nationalization take 
place? It is a topic of conversation wherever British interests gather. 
There is fear and frustration that soon all British enterprises will be 
driven off the island. There remains considerable doubt that government 
— present or future —  will much longer abide by the Bandaranaike state-
^85por excerpts of this address see the Asian Recorder. V. Ill,
No. 15 (Apr. 6-12, 195?)$ p. 138$.
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meat of 19^. Skepticism runs high. The Ceylonization of trade has been
IfUtdiscussed elsewhere. British insurance companies are now prohibited 
from writing new policies, a move which has all but stopped an enterprise 
which had produced an annual revenue of roughly Rs. 1.4 billion (US$280 
million). Urging by Sir Michael Walker, the United Kingdom High Commis­
sioner in Ceylon, that the government pay compensation to the British 
firms has been rejected by Ceylon's finance Ministry, on the grounds that 
the Government has taken over only the business transactions not the prop­
erty nor other assets. Therefore, no compensation was necessary. Foreign 
banks have come under new restrictions. The substance of these permit 
fewer loans for private operations among foreign entrepeneurs while en­
couraging an increasing numiber of loans in larger amounts to the small 
businesses operated by Ceylonese.
This, then, is the summary of Britain-Ceylon relations daring 
the latter* s seventeen years since independence. No problems of serious 
proportions have arisen. There have been irritants which have called for 
an exchange of diplomatic notes, but the wording has been temperate and 
quite conciliatory. Minor differences have had to do with some phase of 
international trade and were so insignificant that there is no need to 
mention them. There is no foretelling; the future with respect to idiat 
attitude Britain will take lAen the day of estate nationalization arrives. 
Judging from the record, Her Majesty's Government will choose to be con­
ciliatory and adopt an attitude based largely upon the concept of the 
Commonwealth of Nations.
l % e e  Chp. IV, pp. I27-130.
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The Commonwealth gives the right to each member country to con* 
duct its own foreign affairs policy and choose its own systMi of govern­
ment# It does not impose a collective view upon its members by majority 
vote# The prevailing concq>t of the Commonwealth is one of free and in­
dependent action of its menibers#
Ceylon appears to be accepting less and less the values of this 
voluntary association of states# The government, from time to time, has 
rejected any strengthening of the institutional links# Ceylon continues 
to acknowledge, of course, the Queen as the Head of State# Other than 
this, hardly more than sentimental value, perhaps, attaches Ceylon to the 
idea of the Commonwealth# It, like the other associates, have a common 
ancestor in the late great British Empire# Sentimental attachment is, by 
and large, the only collective link which the members have in common#
There are several reasons for this seemingly withering away of 
the voluntary organization. Strategically, there is little protection 
afforded by the Commonwealth, that is not offset by the conflict of indi­
vidual members belonging to different military alliances or the nonalign­
ment community# Commonwealth trade is now less important than trade with 
Europe# The associated states have already formulated their own political 
systems and social disciplines# And there is little doubt that the Asian 
and African countries feel more at home in their own regional groupings, 
than in the Commonwealth. The prevention of a continuing dissolution of 
the organization was the major problem facing the Prime Ministers, or their 
deputies, at the 1964 meeting of the Commonwealth members# Sir Alec Douglas- 
Home said then, that Britain hoped for a new determination to give the 
Commonwealth new life and new meaning# Nothing of consequence evolved from
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this meeting, except that ways would be sought to marshal collective re­
sources toward bridging the gap between the developed and developing 
countries. Hopefully, something along the lines of the Colombo Plan 
could be set up with participation limited to the Commonwealth nations.
The success of such cooperative efforts would indeed be laudible. It 
would not only provide the Commonwealth with an incentive to hold itself 
together, but it would perhaps militate against the steady drift of sep­
aratism by the states. Obviously, there is no way of foretelling the 
future success or failure of the plan. The key is, of course, mutual 
agreement among the participating nations to subordinate their immediate 
national interests to the welfare of the association's most needy members.
The second stage in the evolution of Ceylon's foreign policy was 
the reorientation in 195^ toward the neutralism of India in preference to 
the United Kingdom. In the Twelfth Session of the U.N. General Assembly 
in 1956, Colon's delegation had standing instructions to follow the lead 
of Indian spokesmen on all matters providing there were no contrary orders 
from Colombo, None came. This rubber-stamping of India's policies gave 
the appearance that Ceylon was an appendage of her neighbor rather than an 
independent country. India was the acknowledged chieftain and spokesman 
for the nonaligned community. The sheer size of the country gave it an 
importance in international status. Its policy of neutralism served as a 
rallying point for nonaligned states. At the time, then, India represented 
not only India but the neutralism of the Asian states.
India's eminent place in the nonaligned sphere was destroyed 
later by China's incursion of the Northeast frontier area. The by-products 
of this event gave a new shading to India's position among the neutralists.
178
China's action had caused apprehension among the all Asian states, but 
India's loss of face among the nonaligned states came from its acceptance 
of military aid offered by the United Kingdom and United States. A later 
permissive Indian attitude toward the operation of the U.S. Seventh Fleet 
in the Indian Ocean seemed to confirm the suspicions of the nonaligned 
governments that India was unwilling to practice what it preached.
The acceptance of Western arms could hardly be called a tying of India to 
the Western caaç, or a commitment to a military alliance. Nearly all 
countries continued to view India as an uncommitted state, nevertheless 
her image as the leader of the nonaligned community had been tarnished in 
the eyes of the Afro-Asian countries. The policies which India had prop­
agated —  based upon the Panchshila^^  —  have failed through the lack of 
a collective mechanism for translating general policies to satisfy the 
indigenous needs of the variety of state styles. The individual states 
refuse to sacrifice nationalistic ideas for the larger benefit of creatF> 
ing a potent Third Force in international relations.
A major military engagement between Indian and Chinese forces on 
October 20, 1962 gave Ceylon the opportunity to display a truly assertive 
foreign policy. Its government sent out a call for an immediate confer^ 
ence^^ among all Asian states. Prime Minister Bandaranaike indicated
^®5lhe diversity of Indian and Ceylon attitudes toward thé U.S. 
Seventh Fleet appears below.
^̂ Panchshila are the five principles of peace first spelled out 
in a treaty between India and China regarding Tibet in the spring of 195^* 
The principles are mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovei> 
eignty, nonaggression, noninterference in internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
18?This was the Colombo Conference of 1962 which produced the 
Colombo Proposals. Both are fully examined below.
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that Ceylon would accept the role as mediator if urged to do so. The 
suggestion for the conference and the mediation role both received an 
enthusiastic reception from throughout the region. The exception was 
India idio was chagrined that Ceylon would choose to remain neutral in 
the dispute. The mediation efforts of Ceylon* s Prime Minister was an 
expression of personal diplomacy, and it east the foreign policy into 
an individuality all its own.
The great international issue between Ceylon and India is the 
one involving the people of Indian origin but resident in Ceylon, the 
"stateless" question. A legacy of the days of the British, it remains 
today essentially an external matter which requires solution through bi­
lateral negotiations. Yet, both governments have made little effort 
toward affecting settlement.
The diary of bilateral negotiations on the "stateless" issue 
opened in July, 1939 in consequence of a resolution passed by an ad hoc 
committee of the All-India National Congress. British and Indian repre- 
sentaüves met with Sinhalese nationalists in Colombo seeking just, honor­
able, and lasting solution. No progress was made. The matter was shelved 
during the war. Talks began anew in Delhi in December, 1949* The pro­
visions of Ceylon's Indian and Pakistani Residents Citizenship Act^^^ had 
furnished some optimism for a quick solution. However, in April, 1953» 
the High Commissioner for India in Ceylon, C.C. Desai, expressed his gov­
ernment's view that almost the entire estate labor population in Ceylon, 
though of Indian descent, were nevertheless Ceylon citizens and not Indian
ISSThe details of the Act have been discussed in Chp. III.
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citizens ishom India was morally or legally bound to take back. He said 
that if the Ceylon government did not consider these people Ceylon citi­
zens, then they could be called nothing else than "stateless”. It was 
Desai, than, vbo coined the term "stateless".
A new atten^t at finding some sort of solution was made in 195^ 
during two meetings by the former Coylon Prime Mnister, Sir John Kotele­
wala and Nehru of India. A January conference invited an exchange of 
viewpoints; the meeting produced the of 195̂ » signed October 10.
The main point of this agreement was that persons of Indian origin, not 
registered as Ceylon citizens under the Indian and Pakistani Registration 
Act, could register as Indian citizens with the Indian High Commissioner 
in Ceylon. Ceylon, in turn, agreed to formulate an inducement scheme to 
encourage registration. The agreement contained little else. A joint 
communique took note that there was an acceptance, in principle, by both 
sides that the earliest possible settlement was of the greatest urgency, 
and that India and Ceylon would lend every effort to a continuing study of 
the entire problem. But neither in the Pact nor the communique was there 
the slightest indication of a quick and final answer.
There was another five year hiatus. In 1959» both Prime Ministers 
made official announcements that talks soon would begin again. The late 
President of Inc&a, Rajendra Prasad, was invited to Ceylon to inaugurate 
the Vidvalankara University, an institution for higher Buddhist ecclesi­
astical studies at Kelaniya. The matter of the stateless was broached 
unofficially on this occasion, Ceylon's Prime Minister, S. W. R. D. 
Bandaranaike assured the Indian President that the problem of the people 
of Indian origin in Ceylon "would be resolved in a human and humane
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but he warned that it would take time.
Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike having succeeded her husband as Prime 
Minister made her first state visit to India in December-January, I96O- 
1961. Neither she nor Nehru pressed the subject. Upon returning to 
Colombo, Mrs. Bandaranaike indicated that an official delegation would 
leave for Delhi for a round of preliminary talks on the matter of Indian 
estate labor in Ceylon. These preliminaries were to be followed by a 
ministerial delegation at a later date. In^lementation of these plans 
failed to materialize.
Ceylon approached the Indian Government in July, 1962, with a 
rather unusual proposition. It requested a loan for financing a scheme^^^ 
whereby the Cqylon government would make an outright financial gift to 
all families of Indian origin who permanently left C%rlon and returned to 
India. Each family would receive the sum of Rs. 2,500 (approx. US$500).
No official estimate was made public as to the exact amount involved in 
the request. Unofficially, it was said to be in the neighborhood of 
Rs. 40 crores 9̂̂  (approx. US$80 million). The Weekly Review said 
that calculated "at the rate of Rs. 2,500 per family, Ceylon would need 
about Rs. 40 crores to repatriate the entire Indian population of Ceylon. 
New Delhi merely verified receipt of the proposal. It was said at the
Q̂9tfiKdu Weelflv Renriew. July 20, 1959» P* I6.
190]]l)is was the first of two payment plans which made gratuity 
payments. In the second of these, the maximum amount was reduced to 
Rs. 1,000. This one did not involve a loan request. The details of this 
one appears earlier here in Chapter III, pp. 88-89.
^9^0ne crore = 10 million rupees, approximately US$2 million.
July 23, 1962, p. 2.
182
time that "the proposal (wa^ so pr^osterous it mast have been returned 
without acknowledgment.
In Colombo) meanwhile, there was a crop of rumors that talks 
between the two governments had reached an advanced stage. New Delhi 
pron^tly denied it. peculations that a settlement was in the offing 
were rooted perhaps in Nehru* s acceptance of an invitation to visit Cey­
lon to dedicate the Asian Ayurvedic Research Institute, a memorial to 
the former Prime Minister S.W.E.D. Bandaranaike. During this official 
visit, Nehru invited the Ceylon Prime Iflnister to Delhi for more nego­
tiations. The invitation, said Nehru, had been based on the fact that
The Government of India feels that the stateless persons in Ceylon 
are basically the responsibility of the Ceylon government, but it 
[indi^ has always been willing to discuss the matter with the 
Government of Ceylon in order to help the latter reach a satisfac­
tory solution to the problem. 194
By the mid-1960s, the solution seemed as distant and transcen­
dental as a decade before. After Nehru's death in 1964, his successor 
Lai Bahadur Shastri reopened the files on the "stateless" question with 
an invitation to Sirimavo Bandaranaike for renewed negotiations. These 
were held the latter part of October, 1964, in New Delhi. Signatures 
were affixed to a new Indo-Ceylon agreement whereby Ceylon has agreed to 
give full citizenship rights to 300 thousand persons and their natural 
increase; India has agreed to absorb 5^5 thousand and their natural in­
crease. This is to take place over the next fifteen years but the details, 
it appears, have not as yet been decided upon. There will still remain
193j^.
194HindTi Weekly Review. December I6, 1963» p. 13»
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more than I50 thousand people whose fate is yet to be detemdned since,
for one reason or the other, they do not fall within specific categories.
M  exchange of letters between the two governments verified the agreement.
The relevant sections read as follows:
300,000 of these persons together with their natural increase in that 
number will be granted Ceylon citizenship the Govemmaat of Ceylon; 
the Government of India will accept repatriation to India of 525,000 
of these persons together with the natural increase in that number.
The Government of India will confer citizenship on these persons.
The status and future of the remaining 150,000 of these persons wiU 
be subject matter of a separate agreement between the two Governments. ̂95
In Ceylon, the pact was greeted with mixed emotions. The C^lon 
Prime Minister upon her return to Colombo was accorded a vote of thanks 
in Parliament by her government supporters, who declared that "all honour 
and praise must go to the Prime Minister for solving a problem which had 
baffled her predecessors, and her name should go down in history in let­
ters of gold".^^^ The Ceylon Weekly Times commented in rather biting 
fashion that
Judging from such outbursts of joy, somebody who did not know the 
sober facts might well come to the conclusion that the last unwanted 
Indian had been sent packing, and the population now consisted solely 
of Cei^onase citizens, without one stateless individual to mar their01 G yii 
joy.*oy.
The "outburst of joy" was perhaps a little premature. The Prime 
Minister cautioned the Senate that the signing did not mean that the prob­
lem had been solved, and that the closest cooperation and collaboration 
was essential for the successful implementation. Clause 10 of the Agree-
^95ceylon Weekly Times. Nov. 4, 1964, p. 1.
19^id.. Nov. 25, 1964, p. 7.
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ment outlines the machinery for izg)lementation of the Pact. Two regis­
ters are to be prepared, one containing the names of the persons to vdiom 
Ceylon citizenship will be granted, the other the names of persons to 
whom India will grant citizenship. The lists are to be exchanged period­
ically between the governments. Delegations from India and Ceylon met in 
Colombo December 15*19 to work out the details in preparing the registers.
There is a great deal of pessimism as to the procedure and, for 
that matter, as to the entire plan. It is grounded in the historical fact 
that no ïdioUy satisfactory solution has ever been offered. The 1954 
detente proved itself illusory because it became bogged down at the admin­
istrative level and the avoidance of this is essential in the present 
agreement. It is, of course, one thing to reach an accord at the polit­
ical level, quite a different matter to work out the details at the ad­
ministrative level in the spirit of goodwill and accommodation. Whether 
or not India and Ceylon will reach mutual accord on the basis of the kmnn 
aspect, or whether the two will argue over the legal points, is the unde­
termined quantum of the future isplementation of the 1964 Pact.
The Indian government has repeatedly stated that it is an inter­
nal affair of Ceylon, and that India has no intention of meddling in the 
internal affairs of her southern neighbor. The fact is that India does 
not want, nor can ill afford, the addition of hundreds of thousands of 
people to her population through immigration. The problem of rehabili­
tation would be staggering. Cqylon, on the other hand, knows well that 
the matter unsolved mainly through an emigration process, protends a con­
tinuing explosive social situation iMch again might produce the excesses 
of the Sinhalese verses Tamil brutalities of 1958. The aims of both
185
governments is to limit as far as possible the number to whom citizenship 
will be granted, figures made public in September, 1964, indicate that 
over a ten-year period some 134 thousand people of Indian origin had been 
granted Ceylon citizenship, lAile India had accepted thirty thousand, an 
infinitismaUy small portion of the approximate 975 thousand people in 
question. Certainly, a more mutual accommodation must be made if ever a 
sa'U.sfactory solution is to be realized, taking into account the human 
aspect. These people are victims of history and, throT%h no fault of 
their own, have become pawns in an international game. Pertinent to the 
present agreement, these questions must be answered: idiat criteria is to 
be used for deciding who is to belong to the 300,000 in Ceylon and the
525,000 in India? Who goes into the 150,000 whose status is still to be 
determined? What will happen if these people refuse to be pushed around? 
What happens if either Ceylon or India fail in its share of the obligations?
The "stateless" issue is the major friction area in Ceylon-India 
external relations. There have been other points of dispute, but none 
have ever reached a point of creating tension as that word is commonly 
used to denote a high degree of discord. Amity centers in the mutual sym­
pathies for common problems, historical, and cultural ties. It is common 
for delegations from Colombo and New Delhi representing trade, cultural, 
and religious interests to cross and recross the Falk Strait, and be ac­
corded the red-earpet treatment in the respective capitals. As an e:q>res- 
sion of goodwill, the Ceylon government appropriated Rs. 300 thousand for 
construction of a rest house for Buddhist pilgrims near the New Delhi rail­
way station. At its official opening in November, I96O, Nehru paid glowing 
tribute to the solidarity of peace, friendship, and cooperation between the
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two countries. To enlarge upon and make more manifest this spirit of 
harmony, the Indo-Ceylon Friendship Association was inaugurated the fol­
lowing October with words of delirious enthusiasum that together the two 
countries would always go forward arm-in-arm then and thereafter.
In Ceylon's relations with the U.S.S.R., there is nothing of 
particular interest. Between June, 1948, and December, 1955» the Soviet 
Union was responsible for preventing Colon's membership in the United 
Nations. The U.S.S.R, chose to veto in the Security Council the appli­
cation of a number of countries tAich included Ceylon. It was a matter 
of East-West parity in voting strength within the General Assembly. Some­
thing of a "bloc-balance" had materialized by 1955*
For the past decade, the economic cooperation between the U.S.S.R. 
and Ceylon has been gradually strengthened through economic aid and tech­
nical assistance; in the cultural field, exhibitions, literature, science, 
health and education programs have contributed to the friendship. Polit­
ically, there is a common outlook toward peaceful coexistence reaffirmed 
during the Prime Minister's twenty-two day state visit to Moscow in October, 
1963. Press coverage noted agreement on general disarmament and banning of 
testing of nuclear devices, and the
Strengthening of European security together with elimination of rem­
nants of World War II, the conclusion of nonagression pacts individ­
ually between the states and between the NATO countries and the Warsaw 
Treaty countries, and establishment of denuclearized zones in various 
parts of the world . . .198
The Soviet airline Aeroflot has been granted permission to use Ceylon air­
fields on its service between Moscow and Jakarta, and Buddhist monks make
^98ceylon Weekly Times. Nov. 6, 1953, P* 3*
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periodic visits to the Soviet Union and are always graciously received*
Panchshila has been the guiding spirit in international relations 
between Asian governments since Chou En-lai enunciated it at Bandung* The 
West has discounted it as pure propaganda —  still the in̂ >act of the Five 
Principles has been quite significant. Through Panchshila. Peking has 
attempted
To appeal to deep and widespread currents of feeling prevalent in 
much of Asia; anticolonialism and anti-Westemism; the desire to be 
left alone to concentrate on urgent domestic problems; a sense of 
weakness; a sincere desire for peace; a conviction that military 
alliances and bases increase rather than decrease the chances of 
conflict, a feeling that Asians have common bonds vblch they do not 
share with the West; and a belief in the desirability of nona]j.gn- 
ment and the possibility of avoiding involvement in struggles among 
the great powers* 9̂9
Supposedly, the Five Principles are the guidelines for Pekii^'s conduct 
in foreign affairs* Certainly they hold an extraordinary place for Cey­
lon as the basis for its diplomacy as emphasized at the time of the Chin­
ese incursion into Tibet in 1959* In this episode, there was no question 
that C^lon held natural concern for the suffering inflicted upon the 
lamas and the damage to monasteries in light of the religious ties with 
Tibetan Buddhism* But it was also the time of Indian influence over Cey­
lon diplomacy* Nehru took the position that the China-Tibet matter was 
an internal affair and instructed India's Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations that India accepted this premise* Ceylon adopted the same 
posture, instructing its mission accordingly* Prime Minister S.W.R.S* 
Bandaranaike told his House of Representatives that he "would not resist 
the conclusion that the Tibetan affair must be looked upon fundamentally
^̂ Â* Doak Barnett, Cappmmlst China and Asia (New York; Council 
on Foreign Relations, I960), p.lOl.
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as an internal question of C h i n a , A n d  by way of elaboration, he said:
Legalistically, I do not think it could be seriously contested that 
Tibet is an internal affair of China, It is difficult to contest 
that position, I do not know what has happened there. But it seems 
to me that in carrying out the provisions of the Sino-Tibetan agree­
ment of 195L, the Chinese pursued the objective of bringing Tibet 
into line with the rest of the area under Chinese influence and 
suzerainty and reducing Tibet to the same pattern as the rest ofChina,201
Ceylon's Ambassador to Moscow, G,P, Malalasekera, who was also 
President of the World Buddhist Fellowship, upon an invitation from Chou 
En-lai, paid personal calls upon the Chinese Premier in Peking and the 
Panchen Lama in Lhasa. He accepted the Chinese version lAile receiving 
solemn assurances that Buddhist rights would be protected. He was assured 
there was no intention of destroying the Buddhist regime in Tibet, and 
that the preaohix^s of the philosophy would not be replaced by the Com­
munist doctrine,
Ceylon's posture toward the China-India dispute followed almost 
exactly the same line as in the Sino-Tibetan matter. Whatever official 
criticism had been levelled at China was in no way a rebuke to that coun­
try, nor did it have a ring of synçathy for India, Rather, it was the 
premise that two major Asian countries were involved in something with 
the potential of a major military conflict. It was this possibility which 
was the basis for conference^^^ at Colombo and an invitation to the Chin­
ese Premier to visit Ceylon, which he accepted. Chou En-lai stopped in





Colombo on February 27-28, on the return journey from his tour of African 
countries, a sojourn which had created a great deal of interest in most 
world capitals. It was no secret that Peking was undertaking an ideolog­
ical offensive in Africa directed at both the West and the Soviet Union. 
The anticolonial Zeitgeist was regarded in many quarters as ideally suited 
to China's revolutionary line, and the instability of the African conti- 
nwt, idiere pro-Chinese elements were easily identifiable, indicated that 
China and Chinese ideas could have much political and emotional appeal.
From Colon's viewpoint however, Chou's visit to the island had 
a more parochial interest. It gave the government an opportunity to probe 
for a new approach in settling the India-China border problem. But it 
also offered the opportunity to discuss cultural and economic relations 
between Ceylon and The People's Republic of China. Chou had made his 
first state visit to Ceylon in 1957* Ceylon had recognized the Peking 
government in 195^» however, diplomatic relations were not established 
until 1956.^®^ In this interim, a fairly large number of trade arrange­
ments had been made involving, for the most part, the bartering of Ceylon 
rubber for China's rice.̂ ®** The volume of trade had grown over the years, 
economic assistance which Peking made hi\s increased, cultural exchanges 
have played a significant role, and international visits by Buddhist or­
ganizations have become commonplace.
203xhe first Ceylon Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
to China was %lmot Abraham Per era. He arrived in Peking April 3» 195?* 
Currently, the post is held by Stephen Frederick de Silva who arrived in 
Peking on September 10, 1964-.
^O^eylon's trade relations with China has been discussed in 
Chapter IV.
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The text of the joint communique issued at the conclusion of 
Chou's visit stated opposition to colonialism in all forms and manifes­
tations; that the newly independent countries should be aided in their 
endeavors to gain full economic independence as rapidly as possible; that 
the Premier and Prime Minister were of the view that aid should be given 
"without any political conditions or privileges, and on the basis of 
equality and mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty of the recipient 
countries, and non-interference in international a f f a i r s . " ^ ^ 5  M r s ,  
Bandaranaike pledged her government's continued support for the "restor­
ation of the People's Republic of China of its legitimate rights in the 
United Na t i ons,and together they supported the establishment of 
nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. On the matter of the 
Sino-Indian border dispute.
The two Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction that the situation 
along the Sino-Indian border had eased. The Chinese premier ex­
pressed thanks to Ceylon and the other Colombo Conference nations 
for their efforts of mediation between China and India, and expressed 
readiness to continue to seek direct negotiations with India on the 
basis of the Colombo Proposals for a peaceful settlement of the Sino- 
Indian boundary question. The Ceylon Prime Minister indicated that, 
together with the other Colombo Conference nations, Ceylon would 
continue her efforts to promote Sino-Indian reconciliation. 0̂?
The two state visits, 1957 and 1964, by Chou En-lai have been 
perhaps the outstanding feature of a decade of foreign relations between 
Ceylon and the People's Republic of China. Panchshils has been the base 
for mutual accommodati.on. Hardly would economic and cultural relations,
205ihe text of the communique may be found in the Cevlon Sunday 
Observer. March 1, 1964, p. 1.
^07lbid.. p. 11.
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which form the bulk of the relationship, be expected to create aiqr major
differences. However, aside from the official protocol idiioh welcomed
the Chinese Premier, unofficial sources noted a contrast between 1964 and
1957. The Ceylon Weekly Times said that
l&ich water has flowed since the Chinese Premier's last visit and the 
armed escort with lAich he is being provided for the duration of his 
stay . . .  is perhaps the grimmest reminder of the swift transition 
that has taken place in the interval. There was . . .  a touch of 
hero worship in the big welcome lAich the people of Ceylon accorded 
the Chinese Premier in 19571 a genuine warmth and spontaneity idiich 
may not be recaptured in the altered circumstances of the presenttime.208
What the future holds in the way of Sino-Ceylon foreign relations 
is a matter of conjecture. It seems unlikely that any great changes will 
come about, and nothing to the present time indicates that Peking has 
attempted to interfere with internal politics in Ceylon. (Die cultural 
ties, notably with Buddhism, have sustained the aura of friendship and 
cooperation. Nevertheless, the breach between Ceylon's Leftist organiza­
tions, respectively oriented toward Moscow and Peking, have created some 
tremors within the political structure and these, coupled with China's 
incursion of India's border, has put China in a different and rather un> 
complimentary view.
HX9«S9lsM3S.l£9SaSàlS.
The attitude of the average Ceylonese to the October, 1962 cross­
ing of Chinese troops into Indian territory was one of dismay. Ceylon 
found itself in a dilemma. The episode was viewed with alarm as it had 
the making of a cataclysm in Asia. Officially, Ceylon made immediate
208ceyion Weekly Times. Feb. 26, 1964, p. 6.
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overtures to both China and India offering itself as mediator in the dis­
pute, Unofficially, it adopted the view that Peking was guilty of oppor­
tunist policies, of marching first and agreeing to talk afterwards. "Talk 
afterward" materialized in the Colombo Proposals in lAich Ceylon's Prime 
Mnister, played a significant role, adding stature to Ceylon's declared 
policy of nonalignment.
By way of historical recapitulation, on October 20, 1962, Chinese
troops commenced a relatively large scale attack on Indian border defense
posts in the eastern and western sectors of India, ühe official statement
regarding the attack as released by New Delhi read as follows:
The Chinese on October 19 night fired heavily on one of our posts in 
NEFA for about one hour. At about five in the morning (October 20) 
they opened with heavy mortars and machine gun fire and attacked in 
large numbers all our forward posts in Khigzemane and Dhola post area. 
Very heavy fighting is going on. The Chinese have concentrated very 
large forces in that area and they are being thrown into the attack.
Simultaneously on the western side on October 20 morning, the Chinese 
have launched attacks on our posts in the northern sector of Ladakh, 
Heavy fighting is also going on in this area. Supply dropping planes 
have on October 20 morning been attacked both in Ladakh and NEFA, but 
they have successfully returned to base, Chinese attacks in NEFA and 
Ladakh were premediated and concerted,
This incident was the most serious in a long series of border 
crossings the Chinese into Indian-held territory. In June, 1955» India 
had protested the unauthorized canning of a scouting party at Barahoti; in 
September of the same year, Chinese troops had moved into the area of 
Damzan, Both sites are in the northern reaches of the state of Uttar 
Pradesh, Since then, according to Indian sources, some forty different 
incursions had been made. Each occasion drew the usual diplomatic note
209Emba8sy of India, Twdi agrmn. No, 199» October 22, 1962,
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of protest from New Delhi to Peking, the latter responding with denials 
and countercharges. The core of the issue is interpretation of bounda­
ries on a series of maps, the lines of demarcations of which bring into 
dispute territorial claims. India relies upon maps of British origin 
with the distinctly drawn McMahon Line. China denies the validity of 
these, basing its claims on those maps held as legal by the Ghiang Kai-shek 
government prior to 1950* China has never accepted the McMahon line^^O ŝ 
demarcation. Be that as it may, there is no reason to suppose that the 
border incidents were part of a purely territorial claim by China. In the 
larger context, it was an episode to give awareness to India of the exis­
tence of a major power on her borders. In world strategy, it was a remind­
er of the existence of that power, as well as a process, for influencing 
those countries along China's long frimtiers.
Ceylon sent an immediate plea to Peking to desist from any further 
incidents. There is no way to determine what influence this may have had, 
but Peking declared a unilateral ceasefire on November 20, and followed 
with a withdrawal of troops. Ceylon, in turn, had followed its ceasefire 
appeal with the calling of an Asian "little Summit" of nonaligned countries.
The Colombo Conference of 1962 opened on December 10, with dele­
gations from Burma, Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic
^^^The McMahon line delimits the traditional northeast boundary 
of India with Tibet. It derives its name from Sir Henry McMahon, the 
British Plenipotentiary to the tripartite Simla Convention in 1913-1914, 
formalized the Indo-Tibetan Agreements of March 2Ih 25, 1914 and the 
Indo-Tibetan Convention of July, 1914. There is also a Burmese section 
of the line however which to the present time at least the Chinese have 
accepted without the slightest modification. Thqy have branded the India- 
China section as illegal and make claim to roughly 33»000 square miles of 
Indian territory south of the traditional line.
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211and) of course, Ceylon. The purpose was not to consider the right or 
wrong of the problem, the merits or demerits. The Conference was held 
to provide a meeting ground for the exchange of views lAich, hopefully, 
would result in direct negotiations between the antagonists and lead to 
a peaceful settlement, fùrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike summed up the inten­
tions of the Conference in these words:
We offer our good offices as friends to both sides in this conflict 
because we consider that any dispute however serious it may be and 
vital to the countries concerned is still not serious enough to 
justify a resort to war and the abandonment of our principles.
Subandrio of Indonesia noted that the conflict ‘’may well affect one thou­
sand million people . . . affect African and Asian . . . and affect the 
entire Afro-Asian political structure. jje of Burma cautioned
that the Conference must
Refrain from making any attempt to pass judgment in any way on the 
rights or wrongs, merits or demerits of the positions, being adhered 
to by the two parties to the dispute because if we tried to do that 
we should not only be con^romising our positions as friendly and imr 
partial neutrals and should therefore be doing a grievous disservice 
not only to ourselves and the cause of our endeavors, but, in the 
large sense, to India as w e l l . 214
An ad hoc committee was made up cf delegates from Burma, Indonesia, 
and the U.A.R. to draft a set of proposals. These were transmitted to New 
Delhi and Peking for study prior to the arrival of the conference’s
211leading the delegations were: Ne Win, Pres, of the Revolution­
ary Council of Burma; Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, Dr. Subandrio, 
for Minister of Indonesia; Ghana's Minister of Justice, Kofi Asante Ofori- 
Atta; All Sabri, Pres, of the Council, BAR, and Prime Minister Bandaranaike 
of C^rlon.
21^Hindii Weekly Review. Dec. 1?, 1962, p. 2. 
213ïtâià.
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emissary, the Ceylon Prime Minister, These offered no final solution.
They were to serve merely as a guide for direct negotiations. The sub­
stance of the proposals was roughly this: Chinese forces were to with­
draw to those positions which had been held prior to the October 20 in­
cursion, India* s troops would remain at the line to \diich they had been 
pushed in the Ladakh area. This would create a demilitarized buffer zone 
of twelve-and-a-half miles, to be administered by civilian posts on both 
sides. The McMahon line, in the eastern sector, would serve as a cease­
fire boundary. In the northern, or middle, sector, with its string of 
buffer states, the border problem would be solved through peaceful means. 
Compliance with these points would amount, in effect, to the status quo 
antibellum. Negotiations between India and China could then proceed in 
an atmosphere as if nothing had happened.
New Delhi found the Proposals to be generally acceptable. It 
agreed in principal in the interest of peace but reminded the Colombo 
endssary^^^ that China's failure to accept the proposals in toto would 
negate any possibility of discussing settlement. The suggestions made tgr 
the Colombo Conference were largely identical with those which Chou En-lai 
had made earlier to Nehru in a diplomatic note, Madame Bandaranaike pre­
sented the plan to Peking in early January, I963, China found the propos­
als unacceptable. Vice-premier Po-I-Po termed them inequitable, inconsis­
tent, unreasonable, and in^ractical. He claimed there were differing
215%he Prime Minister of Ceylon as the official emissary was 
accompanied on her missions by her Minister without Portfolio and Parlia­
mentary Secretary to the Minister of Defense and External Affairs, Felix 
R, Dias Bandaranaike, the Aznbassador of Ceylon in China, Â, B. Perera, 
and the Ambassador of Ceylon in Burma, G,8, Peiris. Felix Dias Bandaranaike 
is the nephew of the Prime Minister, Also among the official party was 
Mr, Ali Sabri (UAR) and Mr, Ofori-Atta (Ghana),
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interpretations; but said these could be reconciled at the conference 
table* China suggested also that the conference reconvene and work to­
ward a new formula for direct Sino-Indian talks. This idea found little 
favor among the participants. India flatly rejected this on the basis 
that China must first accept the old set of proposals before India would 
accept any new ones.
Over a two year period, to the end of 1964, nothing has been 
added to or subtracted from the dispute. Periodically, India accuses 
China of sporadic border violations. Peking flatly denies this. India 
has also made the charge that Chinese troops are concentrating in the 
Himalayan border of the small Indian protectorate state of Sikkim. Peking 
had replied "rubbish" —  or words to that effect. KeaniMle, the Colombo 
Conference participants, individually and collectively, continue to seek 
new avenues toward solution, having been given some encouragement in their 
efforts l̂ y a pledge from both antagonists that nothing would be done to 
further a deterioration of their relations. It need hardly be said that 
the situation remains far from stable.
An indictment of China by Ceylon would have served little purpose. 
It was forced to weigh its action in the context of the political and ec­
onomic influence to lAich Ceylon is subject on the basis of power struc­
tures. The government did not try to hide the fact that in its opinion 
perhaps the wiser course for China would have been negotiations rather 
than military means; but once the deed had been done, there was nothing 
to be gained by condemnation. Nevertheless, from a variety of quarters 
in Ceylon had come expressions that the burden of proof to justify the 
incursions of Indian territory rested squarely with Peking. There were
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public pleas to China not to take farther st^s lAiioh would drive India 
to the point of triggering an Asian war, Ceylon's press said that the 
disputed McMahon line had been in existence for a long time, and that if 
China had aiqr reason to demand a revision, the proper course would have 
been friendly negotiations. The Trotskyist party viewed the whole affair 
as a major disaster for the cause of Asian solidarity and the loss by 
China of much goodwill throughout Asia, The United National Party held 
that China was con^letely wrong in the matter and that the UN? would lend 
moral support to India, and accusing China's leaders of having trampled 
the letter and spirit of Panehahna.
The Colombo Conference, and Ceylon's attenpt at mediation, had 
both positive and negative aspects. On the positive side, the proposals 
and mediation efforts were instrumental in maintaining a ceasefire in the 
NEFA and Ladakh areas. And, for the first time ever, a group of nonaligned 
countries took the lead in international mediation efforts to deal with 
major questions in the absence of India and idierein major Asian powers 
were involved. This could indicate a strikingly new role for the non- 
aligned community to future international quarrels. The conference was 
a manifestation of unity of mimasa.
But, negatively, there was a lack of unity of approach. To be 
sure, the six-nation participants directed their efforts toward peace 
and, hopefully, a renewal of friendship between China and India, But the 
approach was hardly more than cautious compromise between the differing 
interests of those countries at the conference table. They could not 
divorce the problem from their own national interests; nor could they 
overlook the real comparative strengths, economic and military, of the
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disputants. The United Arab Republic was alone among the conferees in 
openly defending India's position. It held out for a body of principles 
which would enable the disputing parties to meet face-to-face, at the 
same time drawing from both China and India some pledge that no further 
conquest would be made for territorial gains. Indonesia's primary inter­
est was the maintaining of Afro-Asian solidarity; its large Chinese popu­
lation has its share of Chinese Communist party members and these, working 
closely with the Communist Party of Indonesia, have become a rather power­
ful factor in Indonesia politics. Cambodia and Burma were conscious, and 
obviously so, of their powerful neighbor; neither could afford to risk 
military or economic pressures from Peking. Ghana viewed the conference 
in the context of the intact it could have on its own internal political 
situation. And the internal position was also of primary interest to Cey­
lon added, of course, to that ever inqportant consideration of saving the 
philosopî r of nonalignment. These varying points of view, each based upon 
a parochial interest, explain the failure of the Colombo countries to de­
liver individual and collective judgments openly.
OH.
Until 1962, for most Americans, Ceylon had been sirçly one of 
those far away places to which armchair adventurers roamed by way of pic­
torial magazine articles, a tiny speck on the world map, of little conse­
quence in the American scheme of things. Personnel of America's armed 
forces had visited the island briefly during the war, bringing back de­
scriptions of the land and people. The United States news media occasion­
ally has brought to its publics sketchy coverage of miscellany events.
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Politically, the United States established diplomatic relations 
with Ceylon cœacurrent with the latter*s independence, appointing as its 
first ambassador
The hapless Maxwell H. Gluck of Manhattan, lAo, shortly before his 
departure for Ceylon, won nationwide jeers —  and new U.S. fame for 
Bandaranaike —  by admitting to the Senate that he could not 'call 
off* the Ceylonese Prime Minister's n a m e .216
Since the early 1920s, American interests have poured relatively large 
amounts of capital into Ceylon for petroleum processing and distribution 
installations, and retail outlets. In I96I, notification of an iapending 
takeover by the Ceylon government of these petroleum facilities was given 
Caltex (Ceylon) Ltd., Esso Standard Eastern, and British Shell Inter­
national Petroleum. ̂^7 three companies had shared between them all
i#ort and distribution of the island's petroleum products for roughly 
forty years, "Before the takeover of assets, the markets in oil products 
was shared by the oil conqpanies in proportion of approximately sixty per­
cent by Shell, twenty percent by Caltex, and twenty percent by Esso".^^® 
The volume of Ceylon business was put at approximately five million bar­
rels of petroleum products annually for Shell, I.5 million barrels for 
Caltex and Esso respectively. It was an argument over oil which set Cey­
lon on a collision course with the United States.
The expropriation of the petroleum facilities was a part of the
^^ T̂ime. Oct. 5, 1959, p. 32n.
2^7caltex (C^lon) Ltd., is a subsidiary of the California Texas 
Oil Corporation, owned jointly by Texaco, Inc., and Standard Oil Con^ary 
of California; Esso Eastern is an affiliate of the Standard Oil Company 
of New Jersey; the Shell Company of Ceylon is owned jointly by the Royal 
Dutch Shell Group and British Petroleum Company.
218»ceylon's Dilemma", Ear Eastern Economic Review, p. 211.
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Ceylonization process* The political swing to democratic socialism in 
1956 had left little doubt as to the possibility that foreign concerns in 
Ceylon would be nationalized* There was no reason to suppose that Amer­
ican assets would be bypassed* There was, then, at least some forewarn­
ing that American private investments would eventually become targets*
% e  notification of takeover intent was followed by the formation of the 
Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC), a government owned and operated enter­
prise with the powers of expropriation* On April 28, 1962, the government 
announced that it was assuming ownership of 108 petrol service stations 
(58 Shell, 29 Caltex, 21 Esso), and followed this on May 11, by expropri­
ating an additional thirty-five stations* The CPC eventually acquired 
262 of the 525 service stations, formerly the properties of the oil comr 
panies, and arranged with the People's Bank and the Bank of Ceylon to give 
financial assistance to service station operators who wished to acquire 
the remainder, or 263, thereby making them quasi-independent owners* On 
May 15, pipelines, bunkering equipment, and distribution centers became 
the property of the CPC* The government said that since the oil ccsq̂ anies 
would be losing approximately thirty percent of their business to the CPC, 
they no longer would require their full establishments, and that it would 
be a waste of money for the state corporation to organize conqpletely new 
physical plants* Caltex with $1 million worth of property in and near 
Colombo, said in London that the takeover had been carried out "to put
2l9perhaps the story of the nationalizing of foreign assets 
should be related in the chapter on "Resources", however, because of the 
international political ing)lications between the U*S* and Ceylon, it 
seemed more appropriate to incorporate it in this chapter.
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the government-owned Ceylon Petroleum Corporation in business,This 
brought a retort from a spokesman at Ceylon*s Ehbassy in London to the 
effect that only a small portion of the facilities were involved "and 
there was nothing to stop the coiq)any from carrying on,"^^^
The con^anies could continue to sell oil in C^lon, however, the 
insert price had to be fixed upon cost, insurance, and freight (C.I.F.) 
plus five percent. Later, this "plus five percent" provision was can­
celled leaving the alternatives of supplyii^ more oil at cheaper rates 
or less oil at higher prices. The cong)anies argued that they were al­
ready supplying products from the least ê qiensive source, the Arabian 
Gulf,
Concurrent with the formation of the State Corporation, Ceylon 
entered a long-term barter plan with the Soviet Union, Rumania, and the 
United Arab Republic; oil for Ceylon exports. The new suppliers agreed 
upon a price of thirty-eight cents a gallon in selling to the Ceylon Pe­
troleum Corporation; Caltex and Esso had set their cost alone at forty- 
eight cents per gallon. The Ceylon government estimated that at the price 
the Corporation would pay, there would be an annual saving of Rs. 22 mil­
lion (approximately $4,6 million) in foreign exchange.
The seizure of the properties produced an international storm 
between the United States and Ceylon, Economic facts were largely glossed 
over by the American news media in preference to what was generally termed
220London Daily Exprese. May 15, 1962, p, 1,
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the Soviet oil offensive outside Europe, The New York Joumal American 
accused Ceylon of taking «0.3. $ and property to help Russia.«^23 ihe New 
York Times said that "Ceylon furnishes a good exan^le of how easily and 
cheaply the Soviet Onion may take over an established oil market from the
00]tbig international petroleum conqpanies. The Los Angeles Herald Examiner 
editcralized that the affair "was not only an outrage against the conpan- 
ies but also against the American taxpayer."^^ An Associated Press dis­
patch of May 15» 1962 termed it a Ceylon-Russia plot. And in Congress, 
the line was taken that the seizure was an outrage, that the Government of 
the Onited States ought to take whatever steps were necessary to return 
the oil conpanies to the rightful owners.
British assets were involved also. But Whitehall, having far 
more experience in matters such as this, adopted a more moderate attitude. 
The British press took a low-key approach. Said the London Times.
The fears expressed by the oil cospanies locally regarding oil sup­
pliers from Russia were not subscribed to by their parent conpanies. 
The Corporation has signed an agreement with the Soviet export organ­
ization for supply of vdxatever oil Ceylon required until January, I967 
by which time Ceylon would have established its own re:Onery.227
The question of continued economic assistance to Ceylon was tied
popSee Congressional Record. 8?th Cong., 2nd Sess, May I5, 1962,
p. 7731.
^2!%ew York Journal American. May 23, 1962, p. 47.
2 % e w  York Times. June 17, 1962, p. 11.
225Los Angeles F^minar. June 29, 1962, p. 17.
226gQĝ  for exanple, the speech by the Hon. John H. Rousselot 
(Calif.) in tho Ifouse of Representatives on July 9, 1962, in the 
Congressional Record. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 10, 1962, p. A5211.
^^^London Times. Feb. 27, I963, p. 7c.
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to oil daring Congressional debate on the 1962 Foreign Aid K.11. Congress 
attached the ffiLckenlooper Amendment requiring the President to halt U.S. 
assistance to those countries which e3q>ropriate American property outright 
without adequate condensation, or through creeping expropriation tactics 
such as discriminatory taxation or operating restrictions.^^ The U.S. 
Ambassador in Ceylon, Miss Francis WLUis, warned that American aid might 
be halted unless condensation was speedily given. The Prime Mnister in­
formed the Ambassador that the best form of aid the United States could 
give to small nations like Ceylon was «to abstain from interfering in 
their internal affairs.«^^^
Aid and assistance was officially suspended as of midnight Febru­
ary 7» 1963» after a seven day extension of the original cutoff date, 
February 1. During that week, negotiations had looked rather promising 
but finally collapsed. Washington's decision was conveyed to Government 
House in Ceylon. The note said that the steps taken toward settlement 
were not regarded by the United States as sufficient, that the United 
States was required ty law to suspend aid, but that it was prepared to 
consider negotiated settlement or submission to arbitration providing 
there was adequate assurance compensation would be in accordance with in­
ternational l a w . 3̂0
^ ^ h e  Admendment gives considerable discretion to the President 
but in general provides that no foreign aid shall be given those countries 
Tdiich have expropriated American properties after Jan. 1, I962 without 
adequate payments or without arrangement for proapt payment.
^^^Hindu Weekly Review. July 23, 1962, p. I5.
230gee ««United States Suspends Aid to Ceylon", Dent, of State 
•Bulletin. March 4, 1963, p. 328. Also “Suspended Aid to Ceylon", Far 
Eastern Economic Review. Feb. 21, I963, p. 409.
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% e  Prime Minister said that "Ceylon would not barter its free­
dom for United States aid,”̂ ^̂  and that the Government of Ceylon had
No option but to call off the negotiations with the oil companies 
and to proceed in strict accordance with the provisions of the Ceylon 
Petroleum Corporation Act. The Government of Ceylon must show as 
much respect for the laws of its Parliament as the United States Gov­
ernment feels obliged to accord its own laws.
If there is a lesson that the people of [th^ country must draw from 
this ezperiaice, it is that they must rely on their own endeavors and 
on their own resources in the main to promote the economic development 
of their country. The loss of United States aid would necessitate 
curtailment of [the] programme of economic development unless the 
people of this country [were] prepared to make the necessary sacrifice 
to continue with that programme in undiminished measure. ̂32
Ceylon's Washington Charge d*Affaires, Jan 0. N. Paulusz, denied 
that his country was trying to dodge settlement. Pointing out that the 
conpanies had not submitted their claims until January 24, he said it was 
"insufficient time for mutually satisfactory arrangements". He added 
that there would have been criticism of the government if it "had been 
stasg)eded into a settlement. Indeed there would have been. In March, 
political opposition accused the government of succumbing to blackmail by 
permitting the companies to continue any type of operations. There were 
demonstrations against the United States; and placards read "Yankee no, 
Ceylon yes", "Peace Cojt)s, Leave us in peace", and "Willis ain't willing 
and we don't want Aunty VBillis."
One obstacle toward compensation agreement was the interpretation
231ceylon Sunday Observer. Feb. 3» 1963» p. 2,
232wguspended Aid to Ceylon", Far Eastern Economic Review, 
pp. 409-410.
^3%ew York Times. February 9» 1963» p. 2.
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of the word "adequate**, AID Director Bell said the Govemmeut of Ceylon 
"had failed to offer adequate condensation.But what exactly was 
meant by adequate compensation? It was the question of differences in 
property value estimates made by the companies and the Ceylon government. 
Caltex said its property was worth Bs. 9.25 million (US$1,942 million), 
Esso claimed Bs. 7.05 million (US$1.48 million) while British Shell set 
its figure at Bs. 24 million (US$5 million),for a total of Bs. 40.3 
million (US$8.5 million). The CPC placed a total value of Bs. 12 million 
(US$2.52 million) on the three, thus a difference of approximately US$6 
million.
In early I96I, the Ceylon Parliament had passed a law under which 
all property evaluations were to be made on the worth of physical assets 
only, without regard to goodwill or other considerations. Where there 
were disagreements, the parties could submit the dispute to a tribunal 
appointed by the Governor-General. The decision of the tribunal is final; 
there is no recourse to higher courts. The American companies refhsed to 
accept the compensation figures offered by Ceylon, nor would they submit 
the matter to the tribunal.They insisted upon a settlement according 
to standards dictated by international law. Late in 1964, the matter of
235j^ .
236xhe figures on the property value estimate vary in different 
sources. Those lAich appear here were taken from the Far Eastern Economic 
Beview of February 14, 1963, p. 325. Bs. 1 equals US 21ĵ .
^37The companies* attorneys challenged the legality of the com?* 
pensation tribunal arguing that any tribunal wielding judicial powers must 
be appointed by the Judicial Service Commission tdiereas the ten man Oil 
Compensation Tribunal appointed by the government in September, I963 was 
composed of members nominated by the then Minister of Commerce, Trade, and 
Industry, Mr. Maitbripal* Senanayake.
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compensation had yet to be resolved. The CPC had offered to pay advances 
pending settlement. This had been rejected Caltex and Esso because 
acceptance of partial payments might have jeopardized their case.
Major projects underway at the time of U.S. aid suspension in­
cluded improvement of the Katunayake airport for use by jet aircraft, a 
malaria eradication program, construction of a science teachers* training 
college, building and equipping of a vocational training and trade test­
ing center, and a traffic survey. Aid technicians were withdrawn during 
February, 1963, and on June I5 Washington ordered its Colombo assistance 
administrative offices closed.
The Voice of America and the Seventh Fleet have also been centers 
of controversy between Cqylon and the United States. The VGA has operated 
a transmitter on the island under an agreement idiich pre-dates 1956» Since 
i960, arguments have increased against permitting the operation to contin­
u e . ^38 "gie government has been urged to reconsider the present arrange­
ments. The leader of the Marxist Lanka Sama Samaja Party, N.M. Perera, 
wants all "foreign reactionary organizations ejected from Ceylon”,
Pieter Keuneman, the Communist Party spokesman maintains the VGA operation 
is "a clear breach of the declared nonaligned policy of the Government”.
The United National Party has said the same facilities should be "granted
^^The VGA has also been a center of political controversy in 
India. Negotiations were curried on between Washington and New Delhi from 
March to June, I963, an agreement initialed. But details were unsatis­
factory to New Delhi and in August, I963, permission was refused by the 
Government of India. See the Hindu Weekly Review. August 19, 1963» p. 4.
^39geyion observer. Oct. 13, 1963» P« 1.
240ibid.
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to any foreign broadcasting organization, including Radio Moscow,
The future of the VGA in Ceylon is in doubt.
Further irritations were created by the U.S. Seventh Fleet in 
the Indian Ocean. The United States disclosed in December, 1963, the 
proposed cruise by certain ships, and requested of Ceylon the use of some 
port facilities. Specifically, the United States had requested clearance 
for the entry of the "Greenwich Bay" into the Port of Colombo. Ceylon 
queried the U.S. Department of State as to whether or not the Greenwich 
Bay carried nuclear weapons. Obviously, no answer was forthcoming since 
the declaration of a vessel's con^lement of armaments to a foreign country 
could conceivably be regarded as the disclosure of defense secrets. Cey­
lon rejected the clearance request.
In the foreign policy statement of January 24, 1964, in the 
Ceylon Senate, the Prime Minister ê gilained her government's position.
"In pursuance of the policy of the Government of Cqylon," said Mrs. 
Bandaranaike,
To oppose the further spread of nuclear weapons and to aid in the 
establishment of atom-free zones, iqy Government will, in the fnture 
dexQr entry into our seaports, airports and territorial waters of 
naval vessels and aircraft, carrying nuclear weapons as well as 
those equiped for nuclear warfare. . . .  We appeal to the United 
States not to give effect to her intention to send naval vessels 
with nuclear capability to the Indian O c e a n .
The Ceylon Weekly Times said that
No nation in this area has sought the doubtful comfort of the pres­
ence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, or of any foreign fleet, and none is 
likely to do so. If the Seventh Fleet must undertake a cruise or two, 
let these powerful ships with nuclear armaments use more familiar
242ceyion Weekly Times. Jan. 29, 1964, p. 3.
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waters where the U.S. Government has treaty obligations.
In view of the recent history and the ardent desire of nations in 
the area to be left completely out of the cold war, it would be 
tactless to try to show the U.S. flag in these regions. A U.S. fleet 
cruise would be as unwelcome as, say, a Red Fleet cruise, and we 
earnestly hope that, however peaceful the intention of the U.S. 
Government, it will not proceed with a plan which could only antag­
onize the nations of the region.243
The appeals were rejected by the United States. In April, 1964, 
a U.S. Navy carrier squadron quietly entered the Indian Ocean, marking 
the beginning of idiat was e2q>ected to be regular cruises by U.S. fleet 
units. The rejection of the appeals created a good deal of apprehension 
in Cgylon. Those vbo are, by political conviction, inclined to read sin­
ister signs and motives into the least sign of American activities abroad 
saw the cruise as highly provocative leading to con^lications of one sort 
or the other, a threat to the independence of South-Southeast Asia coun­
tries, and an attempt to subvert the nonaligned and peaceful policies of 
those nations. In diplomatic circles, the question had arisen as to 
idiether the policy in respect to the Greenwich Bay was applicable with 
regard to anv nuclear powered or armed naval vessel or aircraft. The 
question was answered by the Prime Minister during the foreign policy de­
bate of January 24.^^
The controversy leaves little doubt that Ceylon will take the 
initiative in attempting the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Indian 
Ocean area, an attempt lAich would be endorsed by the nonaligned states.
p. 6.
August, 1964, Ceylon’s government decided against the use 
of its airports and seaports to American and British planes and ships 
going to Malaysia on military missions against Indonesia. Although 
Malaysia is a member of the Commonwealth, the decision resulted from the 
government's determination to preserve its policy of nonalignment.
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Ceylon realized one of its fondest ambitions on December 1$, 1955 
xdth its admission to the United Nations. It has always regarded the U.N. 
as a positive factor for world peace and progress. Placing engphasis as 
it does on the value of moral force, Ceylon views this attribute as suf- 
ficimtly strong today to be of considerable importance. Yet, at times 
C^lon has questioned tdiether or not some governments have not diverted 
moral force —  both outside and within the organization —  into the self­
ish interest channels constantly condemning other countries before the 
eyes of the world. These two premises —  recognition of the value of 
moral force and criticism of diverting this force —  have added additional 
strength to the nonalignment philosophy, and have set the guidlines for 
Ceylon's diplomatic relations within the United Nations. Ceylon predi­
cates its position primarily on matters of colonialism, freedom of the 
individual, and movements lAich will safeguard international peace.
Ceylon has abstained from voting on issues where the term "aggres­
sor” is stated or implied and will do so until such time as teams such as 
aggressor or aggression are defined by the international organization. To 
date, all attempts at definition have proven unsuccessful despite the ef­
forts of the special 21-memiber committee established by the General Assent* 
bly on November 29, 1957»^^ In May, 1958, it was a sponsor and signatory 
of a resolution urging all governments to transmit reports to the General 
Assembly on steps taken by the individual governments to assure the pro-
^^hronicle of the__United_Nations_Aotaaitia&. April 17, 1959, 
p. 1901. Ceylon was a member of the committee.
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tection of human rights in their respective countries,and a resolu­
tion uhich would assist in the "free flow of accurate and undistorted 
news and information”,^7 among the developing countries.
On October 12, 1959» Ceylon together with twenty-four other 
countries abstained from voting on the procedural question as to xdiether 
the Sino-Tibetan matter should be made an agenda item in the General 
Assembly. Nine days later, it abstained again on the Malaya-Ireland Res­
olution which called for respect for the fundamental human rights of the 
Tibetan people and preservation of their distinctive cultural and relig­
ious life. Thus, the Government of Ceylon held strictly to a middle-of- 
the-road attitude. Whatever feelings it might have had in official cii~- 
des, there was no expression of condemnation for the Chinese.
Ceylon has long chang)ioned the admission of the Chinese People's 
Republic to the U.N. It first became vocal on this subject at Bandung by 
suggesting a trusteeship for Formosa, either under the United Nations or 
the Colombo Powers, until such time as the Formosans were in a position 
to determine the type of government they desired. Ceylon brought before 
the General Assembly, in September, 1957» & proposal that the question of 
Formosa be placed in the hands of an ad hoc committee but that» in any 
case, a settlement carry with it the seating of the Chinese delegation.
It urged direct United States-Chinese negotiations with a third party as 
mediator. In every session since 1956» Ceylon has favored China's member­
ship. The government's attitude was succintly set forth in the Weekly 
Times;
^̂ nited Nations Review. V. 4, No. 11 (May, 1958)» p. 29.
^ 266.» p. 6o.
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It is nonsense to try to pretend that Communist China does not exist. 
The People's Republic occupies an area of 3,768,100 square miles and 
has a population of about 700 million. By contrast, the "China" 
vblch. the United States recognizes on the island of Taiwan has 13,890 
square miles and a population under 12 million. It may for a time be 
inevitable that both "Chinas" should for a time be recognized by some 
powers, but it is surely the height of absurdity to try to ignore the 
most populous nation in the world whatever its ideology. % 8
In rebuttal to the United States' assertion that admission of China could
only enhance Peking's ability to promote its announced goal of imposing
communism through any means at hand, Ceylon takes the position that force
and violence have been used also by non-communist countries throughout
history, and that the U.S. policy of treating the world's largest nation
as an outcast can only further irritate Peking.
During the discussions of the U.S.S.R.-Hungary episode, Ceylon 
served as a member of the special committee, along with Australia, Denmark, 
Tunisia, and Uruguay. The committee's report was made public in June of 
1957* It declared that the uprising was spontaneous and that the U.S.S.R. 
had forcibly overthrown the legitimate government of Imre Nagy. Ceylon's 
representative, Ratnakirti S. S. Gunewardene^^ affixed his signature to 
the report. Immediately he faced severe criticism in Colombo. On July 2, 
the Ceylon Parliament moved a resolution of "No Confidence" in the Ambas­
sador but the resolution was later withdrawn at the request of S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike. Gunewardene defended his actions by saying that he had done 
his level best to be in^artial during the committee's work, but that no 
sane man could have reached any other conclusion in face of the facts 
vibloh obviated an overwAielming indictment of the U.S.S.R.
^Ceylon Weekly Times. Feb. 5, 1964, p. 6.
^^Gunewardene was also Ambassador to the United States at this
time.
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Ceylon has been consistent in its efforts to bring about a de­
gree of stability in Korea, an easing of tensions, and freer connnunica- 
tions between the governments of the divided country. It recognizes that 
a de facto government exists above the 38th Parallel, It wants the U.N, 
to find some acceptable method which will enable all Koreans to meet as 
"kinsmen and as equals,Ceylon seeks the withdrawal of all foreign 
military forces from Korea, and direct negotiations between the North and 
the South without the presence or help of any foreign country.
In the %yptian-Israeli crisis, Ceylon*s Ambassador Gunewardene 
in the General Assembly paid tribute to those meniber states idiich, in re­
sponse to a resolution, ceased hostilities and withdrew their military 
force from Egyptian soil. He noted that the U,N, Emergency Force had 
been a significant factor in maintaining peace i that region. Yet, 
Gunewardene stressed that one of the major causes of tension in the l&ddle 
East was the rivalry between the two power blocs, and that alignment of 
countries through military pacts in azqr part of the world creates a cli­
mate of suspicion and distrust with consequent increase in international 
tension, When the question of Algeria arose, Ceylon refused to accept 
the French argument that Algeria was an integral part of France, It denied 
the right of any colonial power to declare any of its colonies an integral 
part of its metropolitan territory.
Obviously, Ceylon supported India in Goa in I96I, When seven 
countries sought to condemn India for aggression, Ceylon reiterated its 
abhorrence of violence and deprecated the use of arms. Nevertheless,
^%nited Nations, United Nations Review, January, 1958, p, 51.
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there was the overriding issue of Portugal’s assertion of sovereign right 
over Goa lAioh Ceylon would not accept based upon the fundamental propo­
sition of human rights, India's action was seen as a liberation movement, 
freeing a part of Indian territory from domination by the last vestiges 
of Portuguese colonialism, G, P, Malalasekera, Ceylon's representative 
to the U,N, at the time, said in the Security Council on Deceoiber 18, 19Ô1, 
that "Goa, Daman, and Diu are colonial territories which had no raison 
d'etre for a single day after the Indian Union took its place in the in­
ternational community of states as a sovereign and free S t a t e ,  ”^52 Excor­
iating the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in 
their calls for a ceasefire, the Waassador said:
There is a basic identity of views between colonial powers and their 
views and attitude cohere in a natural and inescapable pattern. We 
are not therefore suzprised that one group of powers are today de­
manding a ceasefire in Goa and that the same group are demanding a 
ceasefire in Katanga, It would appear that 'cdien military action 
undertaken for legitimate purposes seems to have a chance for success, 
ceasefire is called for in the name of international morality and a 
tdiole host of generous principles. But these same powers see no in­
consistency between this attitude and the attitude of mind which 
creates military alliancesincreases armaments, weapons and stock­
piles of«■«T e rt* mass destruction,253
Ceylon took the initiative in bringing before the General Assembly 
the alleged violations of the rights of South Vietnam Buddhists under the 
Diem regime, and was instrumental in the formation of the fact-finding
^̂ D̂r, G, P. Malalasekera was at one time Ambassador to Moscow, 
and was for years the President of the AH-Ceylon Buddhist Congress, He 
was later the Ceylon High Commissioner in London,
^^Bnbassy of India, Didiaeram. Dec, 20, I96I,
253jüâ,
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United Nations mission^^ lAich went to Saigon» The mission and its 
presence in South Vietnam ended, of course, with the overthrow of Diem.
In reference to that overthrow, Gunewardene refused to say that the 
United States was directly responsible for the coup. He did state in 
Colombo, however, that the "coup d*etat was led by 14 generals idio, be­
fore they moved, were certain that the Americans would back them."^55 
During the Congo crisis, Ceylon sponsored a resolution lAich 
sought to authorize the U.N. Secretary General to use force if necessary 
to apprehend all foreign mercenaries and hostile elements in the Congo,
As to Indonesia's quarrel with the Netherlands over West Irian, Ceylon 
sided with Indonesia,
It was said earlier here that Ceylon regards the United Nations 
as a positive factor for world peace and progress, and ei^hasizes the 
value of moral force. Still, there has been a strain of ̂ ssatisfaction 
with the international organization. Mainly, it is due to the inequality 
of Afro-Asian r^resentation on the Security Council and the Economic and 
Social Council. The influx of the newly independent states began in 1955 
but their voting strength was minimal in impact until 19̂ 3, the 18th Ses­
sion. The election of Kenya and Zanzibar raised African membership to 35» 
bringing Afro-Asian representation to 58 excluding South Africa, National­
ist China, and Israel, In 1945 there had been thirteen Afro-Asian members
Carlos Sosu Rodriguez, of Venezuela, president of the 
General Assembly named the following members to the mission: Abdul Rahman 
Pazhwak (Afghanistan), Cyrio Da Costa (Brazil), Fernando Volio Jimenez 
(Costa Rica), Louis Ignacio-Pinto (Dahomey), Ahmed Taibi Baahima (Morocco), 
l^trikea Prasad Koirala (Nepal), and Gunewardene of Ceylon,
^^%ew York Times. Nov. 6, 1963, p. 8.
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out of a total of 51 U*N. member states* Throughout the 18th Session, 
Afro-Asian members made strong and consistent attempts to set aside the 
allocation of seats on the Security Council and other United Nations 
organs, seats idiich had been proportioned in 1946 when the European and 
Latin-American states held the majority. The increasing influence of 
Africa and Asia had made itself felt in I96I lAen the Secretary General's 
post passed from Scandinavians into the hands of a Burmese, U Thant, and 
an Indian, Chakravarthi V* Narasimhan, became Thant's executive assistant 
replacing an American* Further, two Africans were made under-secretaries* 
The trend continued in the Session of 1962, with a considerable increase 
in secretariat posts filled by African and Asian staff members*
The fight for more places on United Nations organs has continued 
unabated* Three additional vice-presidencies were created by the Assembly 
so that in the 19th Session seven of the sixteen offices were reserved for 
members of the Afro-Asian contingents along with the chairmanships of three 
of the seven Assembly committees* Under a compromise in the 18th Session, 
the Latin American members agreed to support Afro-Asian prodding s for four 
additional seats on the Economic and Social Council, Based upon these 
changes within the United Nations, there is little doubt that Ceylon is 
destined to play an increasingly important role in the world organization* 
It will have an increased voice in international affairs though, of course, 
that voice may be limited perhaps to the Eastern part of the world* Be 
that as it may, the fhture portends a significant role at least among 
Afro-Asian states*
4oL.jp£r,̂ Al
Nonalignment as a code of international behavior is the charac­
teristic of Ceylon's foreign policy. The expression nonalignment has a 
number of connotations. It denotes factual objectivity: a state real­
izing its own weakness among the powerful states of the world therefore 
desires to remain aloof from international intrigue. Nonalignment can 
also be a mark of approbrium: a small state is a target of criticism 
for its failure to concur in an international political ideology.
The English authoress Caroline Comer once noted that "The Orien­
tal and Occidental may meet, but never mingle. Their minds view things 
from different angles. To the European, the way is the way of topsey- 
turvydom; probably ours is to them."^^ This viewpoint has been expressed 
in any number of ways since East-West contact was first made centuries 
ago. Political independence in the mid-twentieth century has done noth­
ing to change the assessment. The anti-colonial attitude engenders an 
opposition to many Western policies, especially military alliances. There 
is no objection to Western ideas per se. Countries recognize that no 
state can exist in isolation. They have never denied that the West has 
much to offer. Yet guns, bombs, and bayonets are reminiscent of old-style 
colonialism. Military alignments nevertheless represent an undesirable 
type of Western influence despite the solemn declarations of Western 
statesmen that the weapons are for the protection of a state's freedom.
There is little reason to suppose that Ceylon should be anything 
else other than sympathetic toward the policies and aims of the developing
5̂6caroline Comer, Cevlon: Paradise of Adam, p. 320.
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countries and Socialist states. It is quite understandable too that the 
West —  the United States in particular —* with stable social and polit­
ical structures, and an econOmic-industrial-inilitary coordinate second 
to none, should consider itself the earth* s fixed center; that if other 
peoples hold contrary viewpoints then indeed there is something wrong 
with them. Perhaps the peoples of Asia and Africa have valid reasons for 
looking upon this attitude as one of gross presunQ>tion. It is an unreal­
istic assun^tion to suggest that there can be grounds for total harmony 
of interests between the West and the Afro-Asians. It is fallacious to 
think that the Sinhalese, Indians, Burmese, Cambodians, or Pakistanis or 
Thais should aspire to recreate themselves in another's image.
Ceylon* s nonalignment philosophy has proved particularly irrita­
ting to the American government. The United States is apparently at a 
loss to explain why Ceylon should have decided on a course of action which 
jeapordized the economic interests of American-owned installations. There 
can be no question that U.S. foreign aid and assistance contributed great­
ly to the economic stability of Ceylon; therefore, the proper course —  
according to the United States —  should have been one of gratefulness.
The lack of this gratefulness was punished by the withdrawal of economic 
aid.
There is an antithesis of this premise. The United States, de­
spite its measured success in the world leadership role, still must over­
come the appearance of the "come lately** intruder in South-Southeast Asia. 
It disclaims, of course, any intention of influencing internal affairs 
through economic aid yet how does one logically expla).n the stoppage of 
the aid under circumstances pertinent in the case of Ceylon. The humani-
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tarian factor has a way of receding rapidly into the background and being 
replaced by a "strings attached", pure self-interest manifestation.
The failure to adequately explain the intent of patrolling the 
Indian Ocean is another case in point. In Ceylon, there is a patholog­
ical fear of foreign bogeys. Thus, the entry of the U.S. Seventh Fleet 
into the Indian Ocean created much speculation, some bordering close to 
hysteria. There was the lack of dispassionate, factual approach by the 
Ceylon Government and people to the situation. There was no reason for 
panic; nor was there any reason for extending a welcome. Time and dis­
tance have lost their meanings in the present-day war calculations given 
the speed, range, and accuracy of missiles, and supersonic aircraft oper­
ating from both fixed and moving bases. The day of Gunboat Diplomacy is 
in limbo. If the United States had any intentions in the Indian Ocean, 
it would make little difference idxether the Seventh Fleet was operating 
in the Indian Ocean or anywhere else on earth. The oceans and seaways of 
the world are international, open to a U  ships of whatever flags as long 
as these vessels are not engaged in piracy.
In answer to Ceylon's inquiry as to the intent of the Seventh 
Fleet, the Government of the United States would say only that it was a 
six-weeks exercise to prove that an extended operation could take place 
even in the absence of any naval base in the area upon lAich the fleet 
could rely. Such exercise is insurance against the day idien, perhaps, 
Singapore and the Maldives might fall into China's hands, or be neutral­
ized; and Pakistan's turning face toward China places in some doubt the 
guaranty of such bases as Karachi and Chitagong.
Gunboat Diplomacy died ̂ en Britain granted political independ-
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ence to the island. Still, fear is a beguiling force in most quarters 
of Ceylon. The mere presence of a huge nuclear-armed fleet in the waters 
which surround or touch South-Southeast Asian countries make for vivid 
recall of by-gone days. The lessons of history have produced a close 
corollary between naval vessels and political changes, that those idio 
hold the sea will eventually hold the land. In international waters, and 
in ports to lAioh the vessels of foreign countries are invited, the "show­
ing of the flag" is a worthy and courteous nautical tradition. Neverthe­
less, long will remain the memories of the infamous role in lAich the 
flag was shown, then planted upon the soil.
In conclusion, a philosophy of nonalignment differs only in that 
the approach to international relations is a means toward an end rather 
than an end in itself. The end, in the case of Ceylon, is being let alone 
in order that all efforts of government and people might be channeled to 
solving the island's internal problems. This does not mean isolation as 
isolation is izqiossible in the modem world. What it does mean, however, 
is no interference in the internal affairs of Ceylon, a condition virtually 
ingiossible if there is close affinity with a power bloc. &nce indepen­
dence, Ceylon's national mind has been one of deeply set beliefs for a 
woi4dng hypotheses about the kind of society the people of the island hope 
to build for themselves. Domestically, this requires the concentration 
on economic restoration and a solution to the enormous problems in a plu­
ralistic society. Internationally, it means the refraining by Ceylon of 
interfering in the internal affairs of other states, and the plea that 
this be reciprocal by other governments in their attitudes toward Ceylon.
As needs change, ideas change. As realities take new shapes, concepts
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broaden to accommodate the changing realities* There is nothing absolute, 
nor sacred, nor mystical about nonalignment, peaceful coexistence, free 
world, or socialist solidarity* Each is an eijqiression of naked interest, 
and vdien that interest changes the expressions must change also* Non- 
alignment is a manifestation of a progressive trend in international re­
lations chaagpioned by new emerging forces; a manifestation of the con­
frontation between the old established and new nationalist forces*
CHAPTER VI
THE POLITICS OF POLITICS
Since 1956» Ceylon has been dedicated to democratic socialism*
The ultimate goal is a welfare state. The general election of 1956 was 
a revolution for social justice. It was a summit which converged advo­
cates of every shade of political philosophy into a powerful left-of- 
center electorate. The result was a high point in achievement for the 
lower middleclass Sinhala-speaking Ceylonese. It was more than an elec­
toral episode; it was a political explosion ignited by a coalition of 
political parties, the Mahaiftwa Rksath Peramuna (MEP), the People's United 
Front, Still, there was none of the violence commonly associated with a 
revolution. The forces employed were campaign oratory, canpaign promises, 
and voters treking to the polls to cast secret ballots in the best demo­
cratic manners. The enfranchised electorate went to the voting places in 
May, 1956, to make known their preferences within the political fabric of 
a Parliamentary system. This fitting and proper procedure has a long 
history in Ceylon,
The people know well the power of the ballot and their rights to 
accept or reject government policies. Long contact with British Parlia­
mentarism has given the island more of a political sophistication than 
any other country in the region. The people are articulate and con^etent
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to judge, based upon a fairly long e3q>erience with elective forms for 
choosing leaders. Whatever criticism is aimed at the British for their 
myopia in the economic and social fields, they deserve plaudits for in­
stilling in the Ceylonese a deep reverence for the sacrsdness of the 
ballot box.
Constitutional Law in Ceylon dates back to 1833* Eleven years 
earlier, the British Parliament had established an investigative body 
under Major (later Sir) William Colebrooke to examine the problem of the 
continuing financial deficits in the operations of British colonies, 
Ceylon, of course, fell under the probing efforts although not until 1829 
did the Colebrooke Commission get around to the island, Meantddle, in 
London, an increasing number of influential persons had begun taking in­
terest in colonial affairs. Parliament was pressured to allow active 
participation by the colonial peoples in running their countries. The 
Constitution of 1833 was a direct result of British public opinion. While 
the Colebrooke Commission's recommendations may have had little affect 
upon relieving the budget strain, notable advances were made in constitu­
tional government for Ceylon, Briefly, the whole island was brought under 
a unified administrative system where before distinctions had been made 
between Kandy and the coastal provinces. The Colonial Governor was pro­
vided with an Executive Council, an administrative assistance group of 
senior British officials. In addition, there was a Legislative Council 
of ten official and six nonofficial —  all governor appointees, who acted 
only in an advisory capacity. “Of the nonofficials three were Europeans,
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one Sinhalese, one Tamil and one Burgher.
For administrative purposes, the island was di^ded into five 
provinces { Northern, Southern, Eastern, Western, and Central. The su­
pervisor of each province was a British government agent assisted by 
minor British officials and headmen of the villages. Later subdivisions 
created the Northwestern Province in 1844-, the North-Central and Uva in 
1886, and Sabaraganaiwa in 1889. These nine provinces with district sub­
divisions still form the present day administrative units. The map on 
page 224 shows the geographical boundaries, the population of each, and 
the district subdivisions.
The years between 1833 and 1909 were largely ones of trial and
error in Ceylon's political structure. A few changes were made in the
Constitution. None of these were of any consequence, and were mostly for
expediency due to growth of an estate economy. A nationalist movement
began in Ceylon toward the end of the nineteenth century and during the
first decade of the 1900s.
The coffee and tea plantations had been mainly due to the pioneering 
efforts of the European, but the development of the coconut estates 
and the exploitation of the plumbago mines were undertaken mainly by 
Ceylonese. This produced a new middle class, idiose members had re­
ceived Ehglish education for two or three generations and tdiose sons 
were achieving high positions in the public service and the profes­
sions. All this produced a % w  constitutional agitation, led by 
Sinhalese and Tamils. . . . ^
This agitation produced a new Constitution in 1910 with only mild reforms,
mainly an increase in the number of members of the Legislative Council.
The nationalist movement gathered steam during World War I. The
25?Weerawardana, Cevlon and Her Citizens, p. 105.
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Ceylon National Congress, a semi-political organization, was formed and 
led the way for further changes which were embodied in the Constitution 
of 1920, and again in another in 1924. The Governor still retained ef­
fective control of all legislation in 1924. His Executive Council con­
sisted of the Colonial Secretary, Attorney-General, the Government Agent 
for the Western Province and other such members as the Governor appointed, 
thus giving him a clear majority in the Executive Council. In addition, 
he held broad powers over the Legislative Council. Under the 1924 Con­
stitution, as previously.
There was the usual provision that no law, vote, or resolution ia^os- 
ing any tax or disposing of or charging any part of the public revenue 
could be passed unless proposed by the Governor. Further, if the 
Governor was of the opinion that the passing of any bill, resolution 
or vote was of paramount in^ortanee to the public interest, he could 
declare it to be of paramount izq)ortance in which case only the votes 
of the ex-officio members and nominated official members could be 
taken into consideration. The (kvernor was ex-officio President of 
the Legislative Council. . . . ™
Heamdiile, early in the twentieth century, communal unrest had 
already begun to divide Ceylon's people. As tens of thousands of Tamil 
immigrants continued to pour onto the island from India, the Sinhalese 
demanded of the British restrictive measures to limit the flow. The 
Tamils and other minority groups presented some demands of their own, 
principally separate voting lists and a guaranteed number of representa­
tives in the Legislative Council. The Tamils withdrew from the Ceylon 
National Congress in 1921 to form a separate society, Tamil Maha.iana Sabha. 
Tamil National Congress, headquartered in Jaffna. The Ceylon National 
Congress became almost a totally Sinhalese organization. The division
259jÈ4si., p. 25.
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was mainly due to fears and frustrations among both communities. The 
political rift between Sinhalese and Tamils familiar today in Ceylon 
dates back, then, some forty-five years.
The British Parliament in I927 appointed a special commission 
under Lord Donoughmore to visit Ceylon for the purpose of determining 
the success or failure of the 1924 Constitution, The Donoughmore Com­
mission, as the investigating body was called, condemned the instrument 
as an unqualified failure. It had proven unsatisfactory both to the 
Ceylonese and the British because it had divorced power and responsibil­
ity in a number of areas. The Commission drew up a lengthy document 
which incoz^orated sweeping changes in the political fortunes of the 
Ceylonese, This was the Donoughmore Constitution of 1931,
The Donoughmore Constitution^^® was accepted by the Legislative 
Council by the narrow margin of two votes after long and bitter debate.
By it, the people of Ceylon received a greater measure of self-government 
than existed anywhere in Asia at the time. The Constitution of 1931 made 
Ceylon the first Asian country with universal suffrage. Franchise was 
granted to all persons over twenty-one years of age. Certain eligibility 
requirements were retained for Englishmen and especially Tamil immigrants, 
mainly some indication of desire for permanent residency. In other words, 
intent to remain in Ceylon was a guiding factor. The Legislative Council 
was replaced with a State Council of fifty elected and eight nominated 
members. Prior to 1931 some 200 thousand people were eligible to vote for
For fuller details on the Donoughmore Commission and Consti­
tution, see Jennings and Tambiah, The .Dominion of Cevlon. pp, 26-43, also 
Sir Charles Jeffries, Cevloni. The_Path__to Independence (Hew York: 
Frederick Praeger, I963), pp, 47-65,
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candidates to the Legislative Council; that year the electorate numbered 
more than two million in electing candidates to the State Council, lit­
eracy for the Sinhalese and Tamils was not a requirement for voting eli­
gibility. Ballot boxes were colored to coincide with like colors assigned 
the candidates. Regarding the Donoughmore Constitution, Jennings and 
Tambiah in The Dominion of Cevlon point out that
It covered the atdcward gap betweaa representative government and re­
sponsible government. It enabled the Ceylonese Ministers to take 
some steps . . .  which they thought necessary. It gave them a broad 
expeirience of the problems of government. It taught them the neces­
sity for coordination and common action. There may be argument 
whether they could have taken complete responsibility in 1931; there 
was no doubt at all in 19^5»^^
The Donoughmore Constitution was operative between 1931 and 19̂ 7. 
In the interim, a number of changes were affected. A set of proposals 
dealing with autonomy was presented to Whitehall in 1938. No conclusion 
was forthcoming largely because of the irreconcilable demands of the Sin­
halese with those of minority groups. World War II set aside any further 
negotiations, however, in 1941, Britain promised extensive reforms at the 
end of the war. But the Ceylonese continued agitation for self-government. 
As a result, London dispatched the Soulbury Commission to Ceylon in late 
1944. Recommendations relating to the Ceylonese handling their internal 
affairs were published the following September, modified by a White Paper 
in October, and accepted by the Ceylon State Council in November, 1945.
The recommendations were put into a form of a Constitution to become ef­
fective in 1947. This Constitution was short lived. The promise of the 
Dominion Status for February 4, 1948 gave Ceylon full political indepen­
dence.
Jennings and Tambiah, The Dominion ofL Oevlon. p. 43.
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Independencet The Early Years
The Ceylon Const!tution^^^ is modeled upon British parliamentary 
democracy. The fact that the independence of Ceylon and the coo^etence 
of its Parliament are based upon the British structure in no way is a 
limiting device on its sovereign status. Legally and constitutionally, 
Ceylon may put an end to its British connection by proclaiming itself a 
Republic at any time it chooses. Much time has been spent in debate by 
Ceylon officials over this very question. As it now stands the Ceylon 
Prime Minister is the chief-of-govemment lAile the Head of the Ceylon 
State is Queen Elizabeth II of England. Her Majesty is represented in 
Ceylon by the Governor-General vho receives his appointment from the 
Queen on the advice of her Ceylon Mnisters. According to tradition, 
then, all power is in the hands of the Queen and her Parliament, i.e. 
the Parliament of Ceylon. The status of a Republic would remove this 
connection and would create the of:K.ce of a President idiere now it is 
the Govemoz^General.
The Constitution of 1948 provided for a bicameral Parliament 
conçrised of the British Monarch, represented by the Governor-General, a 
Senate of fifteen members, and a House of Representatives of 101 members.
Of the latter, 95 were elected from territorial constituencies and six 
nominated by the Governor to represent those interests not adequately 
represented by elections. By 1959 the Senators numbered 30, half appointed
^^^Two current sources on the current Constitution of C^lon are 
Sir Ivor Jennings, The Constitution of Cevlon (London: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1949), and S. Namasiviyam, Parliamentary Government in Cevlon. 
1946^19^ (Colombo: K.V.G. de Silva & Sons, 1959).
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by the Governor-General and half elected by the House of Representatives. 
One-third of the Senators retire every second year. The House has grown 
too. It has presently 157 members of whom only six are appointed by the 
Governor-General to insure representation of minority groups, the balance 
of 151 are elected for five-year terms. The Constitution restricts the 
Parliament from making any law which discriminates against any community 
or religious group. Either chamber may introduce bills except the money 
bill idiich mast originate in the Lower House.
The control and general direction of the Government is almost 
solidly along the lines of the British pattern. The Cabinet is The Gov­
ernment. The leader of the largest party in the House is appointed by 
the Governor-General as the Prime ̂ nister, and the Cabinet members must 
be or become mezibers of either chamber of Parliament within four months 
after appointment as Cabinet personnel. At least two of these, including 
the Minister of Justice, mast be members of the Senate. The Prime Minister 
is also the Minister of Defense and External Affairs.
In the United Kingdom with its tradition of Cabinet collective 
responsibility and secrecy of proceedings, such certainly is not the case 
in Ceylon. Disagreements among individual Cabinet members are openly dis­
cussed in public and in the press. In some cases. Cabinet members have 
publicly rebuked the Government while still holding Cabinet posts.
The first parliamentary elections in Ceylon were held in Septem­
ber, 1947. The United National Party captured 42 seats, the remaining 53 
divided between all shades of political philosophy. Although not in the 
majority, the UNP was able to control Parliament mainly through some of 
the Independents, of which there were 21, and the Tamil Congress repre­
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sentatives idio had won northern constituency seats. The first Prime Min­
ister of Ceylon was Don Stephen Senanayake, deeply loved by the people 
because of his leadership in the independence movement. Senanayake was 
an aristocrat and a landowner, a Sinhalese and Buddhist. He drew support 
from all quarters since largely he was considered to have been the Father 
of his Country in C^lon on a par, perhaps, with Washington in the United 
States. Sir Henry Monck Mason-Moore, the colonial Governor of Ceylon 
since 1944, became its first Governor-General. Senanayake formed a 
Cabinet of 14 members, eleven from his own party, two independents, and 
one from the now defunct Labour Party.
The feature of the election was the large number of 'independents* 
of whom there were 182, nearly twice as many as the number of United 
National Party candidates. In a sense, though, every candidate was 
an 'independent', for he depended more on his race, his religion, his 
caste, his family and his 'influence' than upon his party label.^5
The UNP had in its ranks nearly all the members of the Old State 
Council. Its political program incorporated the following policies:
1) the country's wealth should be developed through the free- 
enterprise system;
2) the government should help private individuals in every way 
possible;
3) it invited foreign individuals and con^anies to invest in 
Ceylon's resources;
^^3sir Henry was succeeded by Lord Soulbury in 1949 who, in turn, 
was succeeded by Sir Oliver GoonetiUeke, Ceylon's first Ceylonese 
Governor-General, in 1954.
^̂ 4ueinbers of the Labour Party were gradually absorbed by other 
political parties. It had been, however, the first organized political 
party in Ceylon having been formed in 1931*
^̂ 5jennings, The Constitution of Cevlon. p. 29.
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4) social services were limited to the extent that Ceylon*s 
resources would allow;
5) relations with Communist countries should be limited to 
trade alone.
The UNP rode out the first five years of political independence 
in good fashion. In the 1952 general elections, out of the 95 elective 
seats the UNP garnered 52« WLth the added strength of the independents 
and members of other parties, it was sure of 75 votes out of the total of 
101 in Parliament. Part of this majority was due to the circumstances of 
the time. 1952 was still within the era of prosperity for the island. A 
Constitutional Amendment in 1949 had limted the franchise to Ceylon cit­
izens, thereby removing large blocs of Tamil Indian votes because citizen­
ship could not be proved. But of even greater consequence had been two 
other factors, totally unrelated. Don Stephen Senanayake had died on 
March 22, 1952, as a result of injuries sustained in a fall from his horse. 
Eds son, Dudl^ Senanayake, had been prevailed upon by the UNP to take his 
father* s place as Prime Minister, which he reluctantly accepted. The peo­
ple, remembering the senior*s contributd-on to the country, gathered behind 
the younger man. The syn^athy vote did much to aid the UNP*s cause in the 
May general election. The other factor was the withdrawal from the Govern­
ment of one Soloman West Ridgeway Bandaranaike, the leader of the Opposi­
tion forces in the House. Bandaranaike disbanded his Sinhala Maha Sabha 
group to reconstitute it with additional Sinhalese parliament members un­
der the banner of the SH Tanka Freedom Party. This move actually aided 
the UNP. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party was socialist, but moderately so.
Its formation attracted some members of the Trotskyist Lanka Sama SamaJa
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Party weakaning the party as opposition to the UNP»
Dudley Senanayake resigned the Prime Ministership in 1953» He 
had little taste for polities to begin with, and his tenure in office 
had done nothing to stimulate his interest. His successor was Sir John 
Kotelewala. Sir John was a veteran of the State Council, a former Minis­
ter of Communications, and a cousin of Dudley. Kotelewala was generally 
well liked by the people, although he is given less than his due for some 
of his accon^lishments. He brought Ceylon into the United Nasons. He 
set the stage for renewal of negotiations of the Indo-Ceylon Pact, and 
liad made his presence felt at Bandung as spokesman for his country.
But Sir John had the unfortunate habit of saying the wror^ thing at the 
right time, of being unmindful of all of the implications of a statement 
idiich might make headlines in the press. In other words, he had the habit 
of often speaking first and thinking afterwards. Criticism aimed at this 
lack of forethought built gradually against him.
The United National Party was subjected to mounting criticism 
beginning about 1955» The party* s parliamentary majority were doggedly 
obedient to the wishes of the Western countries. This earned for the UNP 
the accusation of too much respect for the former colonial master and its 
allies. Individual party members were preoccupied with preserving social 
positions and political prestige while setting aside io^ortant economic 
matters; the latter seemingly were of less ingiortance than those of polit­
ical nature. The party lost sight of the fire of nationalism which had
^^For Sir John's own assessment of his life and his adminis­
tration see Sir John Kotelewala, An Asian Prime McLnister's Story (London: 
G. G. Harrap, 1936).
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been consuming the people for decades* There was little, if any, cultural 
pride in the heritage of the Sinhalese people among the UNP upper echelon. 
And it lacked the capacity of self-sacrifice, and a sureness of its mis­
sion, in not marshaling all sectors of the society for a concerted attack 
upon the deteriorating economic front. What the UNP did in fact carry out 
during its administration was the spirit and letter of the colonial regime 
•(Mch it had succeeded. In retrospect, this might have been predicted in 
1948 although few people in Ceylon at the time cared to say so openly.
The UNP lost the confidence of the minorities without winning over the 
large mass of Sinhalese. Sir John and the UNP miscalculated in calling 
for general elections in 195 »̂ and went down to a crushing defeat.
The Social Justice "Revolution"
Great changes in history need the support of masses of people 
driven and propelled to free themselves from the shackles of want and in­
security. Unrest and discontent of the common man explodes under such 
goading slogans as "liberty. Fraternity, Equality”, or "Bread and Peace".
In Ceylon, the slogan was Anne Auduwa. The Government Is OursI The clarion 
call here, as elsewhere at other times in history, was social justice. On 
the island in 1956» it was sounded by the quick-witted, oxford educated, 
brilliant Sinhalese-Buddhist orator, Soloman West Ridgeway Bandaranaike.
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was no newcomer to the ranks of reformists 
nor to Ceylon* s political scene. He had been active for more than thirty 
years in chaupioning the cause of the ordinary peonle. as he frequently 
referred to the lower middleclass. He had been bom to an aristocratic 
family in 1899* He had served in the State Council since 1931, as a
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Minister in that body since 1936, and had been the leader of the nation­
alist movement, Sinhala Maha Sabha. since 1937. He carried his organiza­
tion into the UNF at the time of independence, and was chosen as a leader 
of Ceylon's first House of Representatives. He was Minister of Health 
and Local Government in the D.8. Senanayake Cabinet, and withdrew to form 
his Sri_Lanka Freedom Party.
Banda^^? had rallied around him those forces generally described 
as progressives which had coalesced to do political battle with the UNP*
There were in the coalition differences in ideologies, outlooks, and em­
phases upon ways and means. Yet, this alliance of political parties and 
personalities were welded together by a common denominator: general oppo­
sition to a government which had ruled since 1948; a dissatisfaction with 
the pace of economic development; and a discontent with lip-service to 
democracy while, in practice, the fruits of democracy had been reserved 
for a small privileged class. The theme of social justice contained prom­
ises of social and economic changes through democratic socialism, a revi­
val of the traditions of Sinhalese culture, Sinhala as the official lan­
guage, and the return of Buddhism to its rightful and respected place.
The Sri Lanka Freedom Party was the core of Maha.iana Eksath Peramuna 
(MEP), The People's United Front. The latter adopted the SLFP's Manifesto 
which was dedicated to the ultimate goal of a socialist state. The Mani­
festo proclaimed that on the economic front, in a country where a large 
majority of people were living in poverty and unemployment was growing in­
creasingly grave, the only effective remedy was along the lines of socialist
^^?He was affectionately known by this term.
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principles. It said that politically the preservation and fostering of 
democratic ideals and freedoms were essential for true progress in the 
country, and for happiness of the people idiose initiative and self-respect 
had been undermined by centuries of servitude. And that, culturally, the 
stature of a free people could be achieved only if there was a revival of 
Sinhalese pride. This revival included Sinhala as the national language, 
and stimulation of Buddhism so that it might again become a vital force 
in the life of the people. Bandaranaike lashed out at the wealtlqr land­
owners and foreign entrepeneurs who had amassed riches at the e:g*ense of 
the poor. He committed his party to the eventual takeover of all foreign 
owned estates, banking, insurance, and transport operations. Further, he 
declared that the HEP would give a respectable place to the workers through 
a series of welfare measures, a minimum wage, and an eight-hour working 
day.
The 1956 elections were held over a three day period, April 5» 7» 
and 10. Some 76 percent of the enfranchised electorate trooped to the 
polls and manifested their weariness with the long rule of the ÜKP. The 
United National Party managed to save only eight of the 95 elective seats 
being contested in the House. The MEP gathered up 5̂ . Fourteen seats 
went to the Marxists; the Tamil party, the FederaLPartv took 10. The re­
maining eleven seats went to other minority parties and independents. 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike assumed the office of the Prime Minister on April 12. 
The third Parliament of Ceylon was opened eight days later.
There is little reason here to spend time on the events occurring 
during the Bandaranaike premiership. These have been taken up in appro­
priate places in preceding chapters. There was the passage of the Sinhala
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Only Act, the assung>tion of control over the former British bases of 
Trincomalee and Katunayake, the civil unrest between Sinhalese and Tamil, 
the threats of expropriation of estates and other foreign investments, 
and the avowed policy of nonalignment.
The Coalition fell apart on May 18, 1959» creating the gravest 
crisis in the life of the three-year government. It was the result of a 
rift between the moderate socialist wing, the SLFP, and the aman but 
aggressive Marxist group, the Yiolavakari Lanka. Sama Sama.ia Partv (VLSSP), 
the Revolutionary Socialist Party. As part of the alliance forged during 
the 1956 campaign, the leader of the VLSSP, Philip Gunawardena, had se­
cured the important portfolio of Minister of Food, Agriculture, and Coop­
eratives. IÜ.S chief lieutenant, P.S. V&Hiam de Silva, a someidiat lesser 
revolutionary but convinced Marxist nevertheless, became Minister of 
Industries. Largely through Gunawardena* s forceful determination, the 
VLSSP was able to play a role in government out of proportion to the par­
ty's size.
The VLSSP had been the first of three Marxist oriented groups to 
gain a place in the government. It is a splinter group of the main Trot­
skyist Lanka Sama Samaia Partv (LSSP) and is also independent of the Com­
munist Party of Ceylon (CCP). Pressures within the Government forced the 
resignation from the Cabinet in 1959 of both Gunawardena and de Silva. 
Three other Marxist party members joined the exodus as did seven members 
of Bandaranaike* s own SLFP. Dissension within the Cabinet had been grow^ 
ing for months. Gunawardena had successfully launched a major expansion 
in the Cooperative program. He had been instrumental in the expropriation 
of the public bus transportation system and cargo handling in the Colombo
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port, and had continued to demand the immediate nationalization of estates. 
The latter was resisted by the Prime Minister and his party. The conflict 
ïdiich produced the Cabinet crisis was Gunawardena*s proposal for a giant 
Cooperative Development Bank whose dictatorial powers would have infiltra­
ted into the commercial banking system.
On previous occasions xdxen tempers had flared over other Gunawardena 
proposals, the Prime Minister had managed to hold the Cabinet together with 
assuring words, pointing out that "in a coalition Government differences of 
opinion were natural and in fact bound to occur. It was up to the Q&niste:^ 
to resolve the differences as and when they occurred and work them out,"^^^ 
But this approach was of no avail in the May incident. Ten ministers of 
the 15-member Cabinet conveyed to Bandaranaike their refusal to attend fu­
ture Cabinet meetings unless and until Gunawardena was forced to resign.
The latter was accused of using his position to push the country toward 
Communism vihloh the other Mnisters, as Social Democrats, found intolerable, 
Banda reallocated ministerial duties leaving Gunawardena with only the De­
partment of Agriculture, There was nothing that could conceal the fact that 
Gunawardena was being demoted. The Minister protested and argned for a rev­
ocation of the order which Bandaranaike refused, Gunawardena was out I The 
Prime Minister set to work reshuffling his Cabinet,then went to the 
people to assure them of his sincerity for their welfare, and to ask for
^^^Hindu Weekly Review, Apr, 27, 1959, p. 3.
Acting Ministers were sworn in on May 20, J.C, Munasinha, 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Industries, took the oath as 
acting head of the Ministry, and C,P, de Silva took over the Ministry of 
Agriculture in addition to the Ministry of Land and Land Development ishich 
he already held.
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their continued confidence, Banda said
P o l i t i c a l l y  we a r e  d e m o c r a t ic ,  a s  we b e l i e v e  t h e  d e m o c r a t ic  w ay o f  
l i f e  i s  m o st s u i t a b l e  f o r  human p r o g r e s s .  E c o n o m ic a lly , we b e l i e v e  
i n  t h e  s o c i a l i s t  a p p ro a c h ,  a s  we a r e  o f  t h e  o p in io n  t h a t  i t  i s  o n ly
i n  t h i s  way t h a t  j u s t i c e  can  b e  d o n e  t o  t h e  m ass o f  p e o p le .  The
t h i r d  f a c t o r  i n  o u r  p o l i c y  i s  o u r  b e l i e f  t h a t  c u l t u r a l  a n d  r e l i g i o u s  
v a lu e s  m u st b e  p r e s e r v e d  an d  f o s t e r e d .  I t  w i l l  t h u s  b e  s e e n  t h a t  we 
a r e  o p p o sed  t o  b o th  Communism an d  F a s c is m , t o  c a p i t a l i s m  an d  m a te r ­
i a l i s m .  O ur p a r t y  i s  a g a i n s t  a n y  a t t e m p t  t o  im p o se  a n y  o f  t h e s e  on 
t h e  p e o p le  o f  t h i s  c o u n t r y ,  ̂ 70
Had Bandaranaike not possessed the leadership qualities of a tried-and-
proven statesman and politician, his Government might have toppled. As
it was, the Cabinet crisis was just another passing event in the history
o f  a  c o u n t r y  t r y i n g  t o  f i n d  i t s e l f .
M ourning  a n d  I n t e r im  
The o f f i c i a l  r e s id e n c e  o f  P rim e  M i n i s t e r  B a n d a ra n a ik e ,  a  ra m b lin g  
b u n g a lo w  on  C o lo m b o 's  Rosem ead P la c e ,  becam e a  h o u se  o f  d e a th  on  S ep tem b er 
2 6 , 1959» T w e n ty - fo u r  h o u rs  b e f o r e ,  on  a  F r id a y  m o rn in g , B anda h a d  s to o d  
o n  h i s  t r e e  sh a d e d  v e ra n d a  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  a  d a i l y  u n o f f i c i a l  ce rem ony  
a n  e a r l y  m o rn in g  a u d ie n c e  w i th  an y o n e  who w ish e d  t o  c a l l  u pon  h im  t o  r e g ­
i s t e r  c o n ^ l a in t s  o r  r e q u e s t  f a v o r s .  T h a t m o rn in g  a t  R osem ead P la c e ,  t h i n g s  
w ere  a  l i t t l e  b u s i e r  th a n  u s u a l .  The P rim e  M i n i s t e r  w as p r e p a r in g  f o r  h i s  
d e p a r tu r e  t o  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  t o  a t t e n d  a  m e e tin g  o f  t h e  U n i te d  N a tio n s  
G e n e ra l  A ssem b ly , an d  f o r  c o n f e r e n c e s  w i th  P r e s i d e n t  E ise n h o w e r an d  S e c re ­
t a r y  o f  S t a t e ,  C h r i s t i a n  A. H e r t e r ,  He h a d  c o n c lu d e d  t h e  f i n a l i z i n g  o f  
p l a n s  w i th  t h e  U .S . A m bassador B e rn a rd  G u f l e r ,
On the veranda, Bandaranaike had finished a brief conversation 
with a man dressed in the saffron robe of a Buddhist monk. Another visitor.
^ y ^H indu W eekly  Revj,;ey. May 2 5 , 1959» P» 6 ,
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similarly attired, came forward to address him. As the Prime Minister 
bowed to greet the man in the familiar Buddhist salutation, the caller 
fired four shots from a .45 calibre pistol. A panel of surgeons worked 
over the bullet-riddled Bandaranaike for more than five hours. He gained 
consciousness long enough to request his countrymen to remain calm and 
show compassion for his attacker. The 60-year-old Prime Minister of Cey­
lon died the following morning in Colombo General Hospital about 8 a.m., 
some 22 hours after the shooting. He was laid to rest on Thursday,
October 1, at his country home in Horagolla, after lying in state for 
three days.
The assassin was a 43-y©ar-old medical practioner of Avurvedic 
healing, Talduwe Somarama There. Ayurvedic medicine en^loys an ancient 
and secret process of herb compounds, hot compresses, and body massage. 
There himself was brought down with a bullet in his thigh by a residence 
sentry. He was removed to a hospital where some thirty police safeguarded 
the assassin against the rising hatreds of a shocked people. He was later 
brought to trial and he paid for his act by hanging in 1962.
The murder of the Prime Minister was pointless and avoidable. It 
could be traced to the deeply rooted conflict between the Eastern and West­
ern concepts of economics, government, and even science. It was the result 
of a personal grudge, which There later admitted, between himself and the 
Prime Minister. On the evening of the day he was shot, Bandaranaike was 
scheduled to review some recommendations which had been made by Colombo 
Plan consultants relative to medical practices in Ceylon. The Eastern 
Ayurvedic practioners feared the Western-educated Prime Minister might give 
precedence to Western medical procedures.
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T oday , i n  C e y lo n , p e r h a p s  a s  much a s  75 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  p o p u la ­
t i o n  r e s o r t  t o  A y u rv e d ic  t r e a t m e n t .  Long b e f o r e  t h e  ad v a n c e  o f  W e s te rn  
m e d ic a l  s c i e n c e .  A y u rv e d ic  p r a c t i o n e r s  h a d  t a k e n  c a r e  o f  t h e  h e a l t h  o f  
t h e  C e y lo n e s e ,  The p r o g r e s s  w as s t a g n a t e d  d u r in g  t h e  p e r io d  o f  f o r e i g n  
d o m in a t io n ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s  i t  h a s  s to o d  t h e  t e s t  o f  t im e .  T h e re  a r e  p e r ­
h a p s  a s  m any a s  I 5 th o u s a n d  A y u rv e d ic  p h y s i c i a n s  i n  C e y lo n , Few h av e  
m o d e rn iz e d  t h e i r  p r o c e d u r e s  t o  a n y  e x t e n t  e x c e p t  i n s o f a r  a s  u s in g  m odem  
e q u ip m e n t f o r  t h e  m a n u fa c tu re  o f  t h e  d ru g s  a n d  o i l s .  The p h y s i c i a n s  h a v e  
o r g a n iz e d  th e m s e lv e s  t o  make dem ands u p o n  t h e  g o v ern m en t f o r  m ore an d  
m ore f a c i l i t i e s  b y  w h ich  t o  d e v e lo p  t h e i r  h e a l i n g  a r t .
The s h o t s  w h ic h  f e l l e d  t h e  P rim e  M i n i s t e r  w e re  t o  h av e  p o l i t i c a l  
e c h o e s  th ro u g h o u t  t h e  i s l a n d  f o r  t h e  n e x t  s i x  m o n th s , G o v e rn o r-G e n e ra l  
O l i v e r  G o o n e t i l l e k e  d e c la r e d  a  s t a t e  o f  em erg en cy . He nam ed a s  t h e  new 
P rim e  M i n i s t e r  W ija y a n a n d a  D ah an ay ak e , t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  E d u c a t io n  i n  t h e  
B a n d a ra n a ik e  C a b in e t ,  l i k e  h i s  p r e d e c e s s o r ,  D ahanayake h a d  b e h in d  him  a  
lo n g  c a r e e r  i n  p o l i t i c s .  E a r l i e r  i n  h i s  l i f e  h e  h a d  a t te m p te d  t o  com bine 
t e a c h i n g  w i th  p o l i t i c s .  F in d in g  h e  c o u ld  n o t  en g ag e  i n  b o th  a t  one an d  
t h e  sam e t i m e ,  h e  g av e  u p  t e a c h i n g .  He h a d  b e e n  a  member o f  t h e  S t a t e  
C o u n c i l ,  an d  i n  1 94? h a d  c o n t e s t e d  t h e  P a r l i a m e n ta r y  e l e c t i o n s  a s  a  mem­
b e r  o f  t h e  T r o t s k y i s t  P a r t y ,  D ahanayake becam e d i s e n c h a n te d  w i th  t h e  
M a r x is t  c a u s e ,  th r e w  o f f  t h e  l a b e l ,  an d  fo rm e d  a  s h o r t - l i v e d  o r g a n iz a t i o n  
c a l l e d  a  "L an g u ag e  F r o n t " ,  He jo in e d  h a n d s  w i th  t h e  B a n d a ra n a ik e  c o a l i ­
t i o n  i n  1956 an d  a s  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  E d u c a t io n  s c o r e d  some n o ta b l e  a c h ie v e ­
m e n ts  i n  t h e  f i e l d .  He h a i l s  fro m  a  m id d le c l a s s  f a m i ly  u n l i k e  h i s  p re d e ­
c e s s o r s  who h a d  a r i s t o c r a t i c  b a c k g ro u n d s . H is  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  w a lk in g  
b a r e f o o t e d  an d  w e a r in g  home sp u n  c l o t h  g a rm e n ts  h a d  e n d e a re d  h im  t o  t h e
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p e o p le  lo n g  b e f o r e  Daha becam e t h e  P rim e  M i n i s t e r ,  W ith in  a  few  h o u rs  
a f t e r  h e  to o k  o f f i c e ,  D ahanayake w en t t o  t h e  p e o p le  a s s u r i n g  th em  t h e r e  
w o u ld  b e  no  a l t e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  p o l i c i e s  p u r s u e d  b y  B a n d a ra n a ik e ,  an d  t h a t  
t h e  em erg en cy  w o u ld  b e  l i f t e d  a s  so o n  a s  t h i n g s  r e t u r n e d  t o  n o rm a lc y .
The G overnm ent r e q u e s t e d  n e w sp a p e rs  an d  r a d io  t o  em p h asiz e  t h a t  B an d ara ­
n a i k e ,  who t u r n e d  fro m  C h r i s t i a n i t y  t o  B uddhism  many y e a r s  a g o , h a d  b e e n  
s l a i n  b y  a  B u d d h is t  monk. The new P rim e  M in i s t e r  u rg e d  h i s  p e o p le  t o  s e t  
t h e i r  m in d s an d  h e a r t s  t o  w ork t o  m a in ta in  t h e  p o l i c i e s  an d  p ro g ram s o f  
t h e  p r e v io u s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
E n d e a r in g  o n e s e l f  t o  t h e  p e o p le  f o r  s i n c e r i t y  an d  s i m p l i c i t y  was 
o n e  t h i n g ;  t h e  im ag e  o f  a  l e a d e r  o f  p e o p le  w as q u i t e  so m e th in g  e l s e .
W ith in  tw o m o n ths o f  t h e  d a y  h e  to o k  o f f i c e ,  D ahanayake was t o  co n c eed  
t h a t  h i s  d i s s e n s i o n  r id d e n  G overnm ent m ig h t b e  f o r c e d  o u t  i n  t h e  n e a r  f u ­
t u r e .  I t  w as t o  come q u ic k e r  t h a n  ev en  h e  e x p e c te d .  The P rim e  M i n i s t e r  
w as su p p o se d  t o  k e e p  t h e  c a r e t a k e r  g o v ern m en t g o in g  u n t i l  May o f  I 96I  w hen, 
n o rm a l ly ,  a n o th e r  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  was d u e .  B u t W ijay an an d a  D ahanayake 
c o u ld  n o t  c la im  a  p e r s o n a l  a f f e c t i o n  i n  t h e  h e a r t s  an d  m inds o f  t h e  p e o p le  
w h ic h  an yw here  e q u a le d  t h a t  w h ich  t h e y  h a d  f e l t  f o r  B an d a . The c o u n try  
w as e d g in g  to w a rd  c h a o s .  The T e n - I e a r  P la n  p r e s e n te d  b y  t h e  p r e c e d in g  
G overnm ent h a d  f a i l e d  t o  im p re s s  t h e  p e o p le  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  v a g u e n e ss  an d  
s lo w  r a t e  o f  im p le m e n ta t io n .  A c c e n tu a t in g  t h e  econom ic d i f f i c u l t i e s  w ere  
t h e  communal f r u s t r a t i o n s  an d  b i t t e r n e s s  w h ich  s t i l l  c la im e d  C ey lo n ’ s  so ­
c i e t y  a f t e r  t h e  1958  r i o t s .  And p o l i t i c a l l y ,  t h e r e  was a  d i v i s i o n  b e tw een  
t h e  m o d e ra te s ,  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e s ,  an d  t h e  M a r x is t s .
E a r ly  i n  O c to b e r ,  t h e  P rim e  M i n i s t e r  was m et w i th  v o c i f e r o u s  d e­
m ands f o r  a  f u l l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  B a n d a ra n a ik e  m u rd e r .  I n  t h e  S e n a te ,
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t h e  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  O p p o s i t io n  UNP, E .B . l& k ram an ay ak e , dem anded t h e  f o r ­
m a tio n  o f  a  s p e c i a l  co m m issio n  w i th  w id e  p o w ers  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e te rm in e  
w h e th e r  t h e  a s s a s s i n a t i o n  was p o l i t i c a l l y  i n s p i r e d  o r  t h e  s e n s e l e s s  a c t  
o f  a  madman. I n  t h e  f a c e  o f  a  r i s i n g  wave o f  p u b l i c  o p in io n  a g a i n s t  t h e  
B u d d h is t  c l e r g y ,  t h e  G overnm ent o r d e r e d  a  r i g o r o u s  p r e s s  c e n s o r s h ip .  The 
r e g u l a t i o n s  p r o h i b i t e d  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  a n y  m a t t e r  i n v o lv in g  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t, 
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  p r o c e e d in g s  o f  C a b in e t  m e e t in g s ,  t h e  a s s a s s i n a t i o n  i n v e s t i ­
g a t i o n ,  o r  a n y th in g  w h ich  m ig h t c a u s e  co n te m p t o r  d i s a f f e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  
G o v ern m en t, The c e n s o r s h ip  e x te n d e d  t o  a  new s b la c k o u t  f o r  a l l  d i s p a t c h e s  
fro m  C ey lo n  t o  new s m ed ia  a b r o a d .  A l l  t h i s  w as d o n e , i t  w as e x p la in e d ,  
t o  c h e c k  t h e  s p r e a d  o f  l o o s e  an d  in t e m p e r a te  t a l k .  The n e w sp a p e rs  a d o p te d  
a  sy m b o lic  p r o t e s t  b y  l e a v in g  e d i t o r i a l  co lum ns b la n k  an d  w i th h o ld in g  p u b ­
l i c a t i o n  o f  t h o s e  s e m i - o f f i c i a l  an d  o f f i c i a l  r e p o r t s  w h ich  w o u ld  n o t  h a v e  
v i o l a t e d  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s .
M ean w h ile , t h e  p o l i c e  n e t  h a d  s p r e a d  t o  s u s p e c te d  a c c o m p lic e s  o f  
t h e  a s s a s s i n .  By t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  N ovem ber, se v e n  p e r s o n s  h a d  b e e n  t a k e n  
i n t o  c u s to d y  in c lu d in g  T alduw e Somarama T hero  an d  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  L o c a l  
G overnm ent an d  H o u s in g , M rs, V im ala  M ijew ad e n e , The l a t t e r  h a d  b e e n  d i s ­
m is s e d  f ro m  t h e  G overnm ent a  few  d a y s  e a r l i e r  o n  t h e  a l l e g a t i o n s  t h a t  sh e  
h a d  c l o s e  c o n t a c t  w i th  t h e  a s s a i l a n t ,  M rs, M ijew ad en e  h a d  b e e n  t h e  f i r s t  
woman M i n i s t e r  i n  a n y  C ^ l o n  C a b in e t ,  F i f t y - o n e  y e a r s  o f  a g e ,  s h e  came 
fro m  a  f a m i l y  w h ich  h a d  p io n e e r e d  e f f o r t s  t o  r e s t o r e  t o  p r i s t i n e  g l o r y  
t h e  h i s t o r i c  B u d d h is t  te m p le  a t  K e la n iy a ,  a  s h o r t  d i s t a n c e  fro m  C olom bo,
She w as c o n n e c te d  w i th  t h e  p o l i t i c s  o f  t h e  C o l le g e  o f  A y u rv e d ic  a s  w as 
a n o th e r  s u s p e c t ,  t h e  c h i e f  in c u m b e n t B u d d h is t  p r i e s t  o f  t h e  K e la n iy a  tem ­
p l e ,  M ap itig am a  B u d d h a ra k h ita  T h e ro ,
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A ls o  c a u g h t  i n  t h e  web o f  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  w as C ey lo n ’ s  F in a n c e  
M i n i s t e r ,  S ta n l e y  d e  Z o y sa . He r e s ig n e d  on  Novem ber 2 2 , i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  
m o u n tin g  c r i t i c i s m  a g a i n s t  h i s  c o n t in u a n c e  a s  M i n i s t e r  a f t e r  t h e  a r r e s t  
o f  h i s  e l d e r  b r o t h e r  f o r  a l l e g e d  c o m p l i c i t y  i n  t h e  m u rd e r .  The b r o t h e r  
w as l a t e r  r e l e a s e d  a f t e r  i t  w as e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  h e  h a d  h a d  n o  c o n n e c t io n  
w i th  t h e  c a s e .  A n o th e r  b r o t h e r ,  S id n e y  d e  Z o y sa , D ep u ty  I n s p e c to r - G e n e r a l  
o f  P o l i c e ,  w as f o r c e d  t o  r e s i g n  u n d e r  p r e s s u r e  o f  t h e  O p p o s i t io n  p a r t y  f o r  
w h a t was c o n s id e r e d  t o  b e  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  c o n c e rn in g  t h e  a s s a s s i ­
n a t i o n  i n q u i r y .  W h ile  t h i s  w as g o in g  o n , t h e  C a b in e t  moved t o  r e p e a l  t h e  
s u s p e n s io n  o f  t h e  d e a th  p e n a l t y  ^ d iich  h a d  b e e n  i n  e f f e c t  th r o u g h  a n  adm in­
i s t r a t i v e  o r d e r  o f  A p r i l ,  1956*
I n  t h e  m e an tim e , C ey lo n ’ s  p o l i t i c a l  p i c t u r e  h a d  becom e c o m p le te  
c o n f u s io n .  P a r l i a m e n ta r y  p r i v i l e g e  h a d  e n a b le d  t h e  O p p o s i t io n  t o  make 
u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d  c h a rg e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  G overnm ent an d  t h e  P rim e M i n i s t e r .
N.M. P e r e r a ,  t h e  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  MaradLst O p p o s i t io n ,  s a i d  i n  t h e  H ouse o f  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  t h a t  D ahanayake h i m s e l f  was s u s p e c t .  I n  r e p l y ,  D ahanayake 
s t a t e d  h e  w as p r e p a r e d  t o  su b m it h i m s e l f  t o  a n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  b y  a n  u n o f ­
f i c i a l  c o m m itte e , an d  t h a t  i f  t h e  c o m m itte e  fo u n d  h im  in v o lv e d  i n  an y  way 
t h e n ,  b u t  o n ly  t h e n ,  w o u ld  h e  r e s i g n .  The P rim e  M i n i s t e r  f u r t h e r  s a i d  h e  
was d e te rm in e d  t o  h o ld  t h e  G overnm ent t o g e t h e r  u n t i l  t h e  en d  o f  t h e  te rm  
an d  c a l l  f o r  a  new  e l e c t i o n  a t  i t s  n o rm a l t im e ,  A p r i l ,  1 9 6 1 . P e r e r a  r e ­
p l i e d  t h a t  " w h e th e r  M r. D ah an ay ak e  w is h e d  i t  o r  n o t ,  h e  w o u ld  b e  c o m p e lle d  
b y  f o r c e  o f  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  t o  go b e f o r e  t h e  c o u n t r y  e a r l y  n e x t  y e a r  [ I960]  
a t  t h e  l a t e s t .
^7 Ĥindu Weekly Review. Nov. 9» 1959, P* 4.
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The G o v e n m e n t s u r v iv e d  i t s  f i r s t  c r u c i a l  t r i a l  o f  s t r e n g t h  i n  
Novem ber b y  a  m a rg in  o f  f i v e  v o t e s  a f t e r  a  s to rm y  d e b a te  o v e r  a  c e n s u re  
m o tio n  w h ich  in v o lv e d  t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  c o m p l i c i t y .  The v o te  c o u n t  w as 
4 8 -4 3 .  The s i x  n o m in a te d  m em bers i n  t h e  H ouse v o t in g  w i th  t h e  G overnm en t. 
T h ese  s i x  to o k  t h e  v ie w  t h a t  a  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  P a r l i a m e n t  s h o u ld  b e  p r e ­
v e n te d  s i n c e  a  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  h e l d  i n  t h e  a tm o s p h e re  p r e v a i l i n g  a t  t h e  
t im e  w o u ld  o n ly  p ro d u c e  u n c o n t r o l l a b l e  s i t u a t i o n s .
The debate on the censure vote intensified the crisis. Dahanayake 
stayed in office by a slim margin yet the figures were rather misleading.
I t  i n d i c a t e d  to o  t h a t  a b o u t  o n e - h a l f  o f  t h e  m em bers o f  P a r l i a m e n t  w a n te d  
a  c l e a n  sw eep o f  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t. The M a r x is t  O p p o s i t io n  an d  t h e  C o n se rv ­
a t i v e  O p p o s i t io n ,  t h e  ÜNP l e d  b y  D u d ley  S en an y a k e , k e p t  ham m ering u p o n  
t h e  th em e  o f  t h e  G o v e rn m e n t's  c o m p l i c i t y  i n  B a n d a r a n a ik e 's  d e a th .  The
q u e s t i o n  w as n o t  w h e th e r  D ahanayake c o u ld  re m a in  i n  o f f i c e  —  b u t  r a t h e r
how lo n g .  I n  l e s s  t h a n  a  m o n th , o p p o s i t io n  f o r c e s  m an eu v e red  a n o th e r  v o te  
on  a  c e n s u r e  m o tio n .  T h is  t im e  t h e  G overnm ent r e c e i v e d  46  v o te s  i n c l u d i n g  
t h e  s i x  o f  t h e  n o m in a te d  m em bers.
The "how lo n g "  w as an sw e re d  on  D ecem ber 1 ,  1959* The G o v e rn o r-
G e n e ra l  i s s u e d  a  p r o c la m a t io n  d i s s o l v i n g  P a r l i a m e n t  on  t h e  a d v ic e  o f  t h e
P rim e  M i n i s t e r ,  f i x i n g  M arch 1 9 , I9 6 0  a s  e l e c t i o n  d a y  f o r  t h e  new  P a r l i ­
a m e n t .^^2  D ahanayake r e s ig n e d  fro m  t h e  SLEP t o  s e t  u p  h i s  own p o l i t i c a l  
g ro u p , t h e  D e m o c ra tic  P a r t y .  He re m a in e d ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  n o m in a l c h i e f  
o f  t h e  c a r e t a k e r  g o v e rn m e n t. Daha h a d  b e e n  i n  o f f i c e  j u s t  70  d a y s .  One 
r e a s o n  h e  g a v e  f o r  r e q u e s t in g  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  h i s  G overnm ent w as t h a t  h e
^ 7 % n d e r  new  l e g i s l a t i o n  t h e  H ouse m em bersh ip  w as i n c r e a s e d  t o  
157 e f f e c t i v e  w i th  t h e  M arch c o n v e n in g .
245
" d id  n o t  w an t h i s  t h r o a t  c u t  i n  b ro a d  d a y l i g h t . "^7 3  I n  q u ic k  s u c c e s s io n  
t h e  G o v e rn o r-G e n e ra l f i r e d  t h e  M i n i s t e r s  o f  Home A f f a i r s ,  H e a l th ,  T ra n s ­
p o r t ,  L a b o u r , C u l tu r a l  A f f a i r s ,  an d  t h e  p a r l i a m e n ta r y  s e c r e t a r y  t o  t h e  
T r a n s p o r t  M i n i s t r y ,  S ta n le y  d e  Z oysa w as b ro u g h t  b a c k  i n t o  t h e  la m e -d u c k  
C a b in e t  a s  M i n i s t e r  o f  H e a l th  a n d  Commerce. F iv e  m ore M i n i s t e r s  w e re  d i s ­
m is s e d  i n  J a n u a ry .  No r e a s o n  h a s  e v e r  b e e n  g iv e n  f o r  t h i s  w h o le s a le  d i s ­
m i s s a l .
VB-th t h e  an n o u n ced  d a t e  o f  M arch 19 f o r  new e l e c t i o n s ,  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s  b e g a n  fo rm in g  a l l  o v e r  C e y lo n . By t h e  t im e  e l e c t i o n  d ay  r o l l e d  
a ro u n d , v o t e r s  c o u ld  t a k e  t h e i r  c h o ic e  o f  23 d i f f e r e n t  p a r t y  l a b e l s  an d  
898 c a n d id a t e s .  The p o l i c i e s  an d  p la t f o r m s  o f  m o st p a r t i e s  w ere  v a g u e ; 
t h e  s u p p o r t e r s  w e re  few  i n  n u m b er. B u t one o f  t h e s e  n ew ly  fo rm e d  g ro u p s  
was t o  h a v e  an  i n d e l i b l e  i n f l u e n c e  up o n  t h e  f u t u r e .  S in c e  t h e  d e a th  o f  
S .W .R .D . B a n d a ra n a ik e , t h e  p r e s id e n c y  o f  t h e  S r i  L anka F reedom  P a r t y  h ad  
re m a in e d  v a c a n t .  P a r t y  members c o u ld  n e v e r  a g r e e  on  a c c e p t in g  D ahanayake 
a s  i t s  h e a d .  SLFP l e a d e r s  p r e v a i l e d  upon  M rs. S ir im a v o  B a n d a ra n a ik e ,  t h e  
w ife  o f  t h e  l a t e  P rim e  M i n i s t e r ,  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  p r e s id e n c y .  She r e f u s e d .  
The p o s t  was g iv e n  t o  C .P . d e  S i l v a ,  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  a n d  L ands 
i n  t h e  D ahanayake C a b in e t .  M ean w h ile , a  new p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  —  S am aei 
L anka B a n d a ra n a ik e  P a r t y  —  h a d  b e e n  fo rm e d . A t t h e  i n a u g u r a l  m e e tin g  
M rs . B a n d a ra n a ik e  was i n v i t e d  t o  c o n t e s t  f o r  t h e  s e a t  i n  h e r  h u s b a n d 's  
c o n s t i t u e n c y  l e f t  v a c a n t  s in c e  h i s  d e a th .  M rs. B a n d a ra n a ik e  a c c e p te d .
The ou tcom e w as a  f o r e g o n e  c o n c lu s io n .  A lso  on th e  p o l i t i c a l  s p e c tru m , 
D u d ley  S en an ay ak e  r e a p p e a r e d  t o  l e a d  t h e  U n ite d  N a t io n a l  P a r t y ,  h a v in g  
becom e i t s  h e a d  a f t e r  t h e  d e f e a t  i n  1956*
^73uew York Times. Dec. 8, 1959, p. 6.
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W hat t h e  I 96O e l e c t i o n s  m ean t w as t h a t  i t  w ou ld  b e  a  c o n t e s t  
f i r s t  b e tw e e n  f i v e  o f  t h e  23 p a r t i e s  o f f e r i n g  c a n d id a te s  a n d ,  s e c o n d , a  
r a t h e r  c r u c i a l  t e s t  a s  t o  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r s h i p  b y  way o f  
t h e  b a l l o t  b o x  c o u ld  l a s t  g iv e n  t h e  p h i lo s o p h ie s  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  con ­
t e s t a n t s .  The f i v e  p a r t i e s  w e re  t h e  SLFP, UNP, an d  t h r e e  M a r x is t  g ro u p s :  
L an k a  Sama Sama.ia P a r t y ,  t h e  Com m unist P a r t y ,  an d  M aha.iana E k s a th  P eram u n a. 
now v e r y  f a r  t o  t h e  l e f t .  The l a t t e r ,  i t  w i l l  b e  r e c a l l e d  h a d  b ro k e n  aw ay 
fro m  t h e  LSSP an d  h a d  jo in e d  t h e  B a n d a ra n a ik e  U n i te d  F r o n t  i n  1 9 5 6 . Then 
t h e y  b ro k e  aw ay fro m  i t  i n  1959* I t  now r e a p p e a r e d  a s  a n  in d e p e n d e n t  
g ro u p  u n d e r  t h e  o ld  l a b e l ,  MBP. I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  c a n d id a te s  w h ich  b o re  
p a r t y  t a g s ,  t h e r e  w e re  I 75 c o n t e s t a n t s  who c la im e d  t o  b e  I n d e p a u d e n ts .
A p p ro x im a te ly  3*2  m i l l i o n  v o t e r s  c h o se  t h e  UKP o v e r  t h e  SLPT* b y  
r o u g h ly  1 3 5  th o u s a n d  b a l l o t s .  I n  t h e  H o u se , i t  g av e  t h e  UNP a  s l im  4 - s e a t  
e d g e , 3 0 -4 6 .  The t h r e e  M a r x is t s  p a r t i e s  g o t  23  s e a t s .  The num ber o f  c a n ­
d i d a t e s  fro m  e a c h  p a r t y  an d  t h e  num ber o f  s e a t s  won w i l l  b e  fo u n d  i n  T a b le  
1 1 ,  p a g e  2 4 8 .
D u d ley  S en an ay ak e  w as sw orn  i n  a s  P re m ie r  o f  C ey lo n  on  M arch 2 1 ,
He w as p ro m is e d  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  31 m em bers o u t s i d e  h i s  UNP, i n c l u d i n g  t h e  
A l l - T a m i l  F e d e r a l  P a r t y  w h ich  h a d  won 1 5  s e a t s .  L a t e r ,  h o w e v e r, t h e  Fed­
e r a l  P a r t y  c h i e f ,  S .J .V ,  C helvanayakam  w ith d re w  t h e  b a c k in g  when S en an ay ak e  
w o u ld  n o t  come t o  a n  a g re e m e n t w i th  t h e  F e d e r a l i s t s  i n  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  d e ­
m ands a n d  g e n e r a l  a im s .  The s t r e n g t h  i n  t h e  UNP a t  t h i s  t im e  w as i t s  mod­
e r a t e  c o n s e r v a t i s m  a s  o p p o se d  t o  t h e  e x tre m e  c o n s e rv a t is m  o f  D ah an ay ak e* s 
L anka P r a i a t a n t a r a  P a r t y  (L anka D e m o c ra tic  P a r t y ) .  P e rh a p s  t h e  m o s t t e l l ­
i n g  d e c i s i o n  made a t  t h e  p o l l s  w as t h e  p e o p l e 's  d e t e r m in a t io n  t h a t  t h e  
c o u n t r y  s h o u ld  s t e e r  a  m o d e ra te  c o u r s e ,  p ro v e n  b y  t h e  p r e p o n d e r a n t  num ber
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o f  v o t e s  c a s t  f o r  t h e  m o d e ra te  p a r t i e s ,  UNP an d  SLFP, an d  w i th h e ld  fro m  
t h e  e x t r e m i s t s .  B u t t h e  r e a l  t e s t  o f  s t r e n g t h  was y e t  t o  com e. The 
G o v e rn o r -G e n e ra l  co n v e n ed  C e y lo n ’ s  F o u r th  P a r l ia m e n t  on  M arch 3 0 , The 
T h ro n e  S p eec h  s e t  f o r t h  t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  S e n a n a y a k e ’ s  UNP a s  t o  a d m in is ­
t r a t i o n  p o l i c i e s  d u r in g  t h e  e n s u in g  :K.ve y e a r s .  I t  r e i t e r a t e d  g e n e r a l l y  
t h e  p l a n k s  i n  t h e  cam p a ig n  p l a t f o r m :  p ro -W e s t a t t i t u d e s ,  f r e e  e n t e r p r i s e ,
an d  t h e  l i k e .  And i t  p ro m is e d  some r e l i e f  th ro u g h  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e ,
S en an a y ak e  b y  w ay o f  t h e  T h ro n e  S p eech  a t te m p te d  t o  p l e a s e  a l l .  He p l e a s e d  
n o  o n e .  On A p r i l  2 2 , t h e  H ouse p a s s e d  a  No C o n fid e n c e  v o t e ,  8 6 -6 1 ,  The 
G o v e rn o r -G e n e ra l  d i s s o lv e d  P a r l i a m e n t  a n d  s e t  new  e l e c t i o n s  f o r  J u l y  2 0 ,
Madame P rim e  M i n i s t e r  
M rs, S ir im a v o  B a n d a ra n a ik e  w as t h e  widow o f  t h e  l a t e  P rim e  M i n i s t e r ,  
S he w as 4 4 - y e a r s - o l d  a t  t h e  t im e  h e r  h u sb a n d  w as s t r u c k  down. She i s  a  Bud­
d h i s t ,  a n d  t h e  m o th e r  o f  t h r e e  c h i l d r e n ,  W h ile  h e r  h u sb a n d  l i v e d ,  h e r  
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  p o l i t i c s  h a d  b e e n  l i m i t e d  e n t i r e l y  t o  w i f e l y  i n t e r e s t s  i n  h i s  
p o l i t i c a l  f o r t u n e s ,  h i s  s u c c e s s e s  a n d  f a i l u r e s .  A f t e r  h i s  d e a th ,  S ir im a v o  
B a n d a ra n a ik e  h a d  r e f u s e d  t h e  p r e s id e n c y  o f  t h e  S r i  L anka F reedom  P a r t y  b u t  
d i d  a c c e p t ,  som ew hat r e l u c t a n t l y ,  t h e  i n v i t a t i o n  t o  c o n t e s t  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y  
s e a t  h e r  h u s b a n d  h a d  h e l d .  She h a d  won h a n d e d ly  i n  t h e  M arch , I9 6 0 ,  e l e c t i o n .  
A f t e r  t h e  d e b a c le  o f  t h a t  P a r l i a m e n t ,  M rs, B a n d a ra n a ik e  was p r e v a i l e d  up o n  
a g a in  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  p r e s id e n c y  o f  t h e  SLFP, T h is  t im e  sh e  a c c e p te d .  She 
w as r e v e r e n c e d  b y  a  l a r g e  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p e o p le ;  p a r t i c a l l y  w o rs h ip p e d  b y  
t h e  p e a s a n t s ,
M rs, B a n d a ra n a ik e  l e d  h e r  p a r t y ’ s  b i d  f o r  p o w er i n  t h e  J u l y  e l e c t i o n s  
^^^S h e  h a s  one  s o n , A n u ra , an d  tw o d a u g h te r s ,  S u n e th ra  a n d  C h a n d r ik a ,
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b a s e d  on t h e  p o l i c i e s  an d  p ro g ram s o f  h e r  l a t e  h u s b a n d . The e x e c u t iv e  
co m m itte e  o f  t h e  SLFP e n t e r e d  i n t o  a  n o - c o n te s t  a g re e m e n t "with t h e  
T r o t s k y i s t s ,  l e d  b y  D r. N.M. P e r e r a ,  an d  t h e  Com m unists l e d  b y  one P i e t e r  
Keunem an. The e l e c t i o n  e v o lv e d  i n t o  a  s t r a i g h t  f i g h t  b e tw e en  t h e  U n ite d  
N a t io n a l  P a r t y  o n  o n e  s i d e ,  t h e  SLFP, T r o t s k y i s t s ,  an d  C om m unists on t h e  
o t h e r .  I t  w as "n o  c o n t e s t "  i n  a n o th e r  w ay. The SLFP won 75  s e a t s ,  a  n e a r  
m a j o r i t y  o f  I 5I  e l e c t i v e  s e a t s  a t  s t a k e .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e r e  w ere  g u a ra n ­
t e e s  o f  s u p p o r t  b y  t h e  s i x  SLFP a p p o in te d  m em bers, an d  a  s i z a b l e  num ber o f  
in d e p e n d e n t s .  S ir im a v o  B a n d a ra n a ik e  becam e Madame P rim e  M in i s t e r  —  t h e  
f i r s t  woman i n  h i s t o r y  t o  h o ld  a  P rim e  M i n i s t e r s h i p .
The po w er a t  t h e  p o l l s  w h ich  t h e  SLFP commanded, b a s e d  l a r g e l y  
u p o n  t h e  m ag ic  o f  t h e  B a n d a ra n a ik e  nam e, i s  a n ç ly  d e m o n s tra te d  i n  t h e  
f o l lo w in g  t a b l e  w h ich  c o n ç a re s  t h e  M arch an d  J u l y  e l e c t i o n s .
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TABLE 11 
i 960 GENERAL ELECTIONS RESULTS*
ÜPt.. S e a t s  Won
M arch Aiz M arch M z
UNP 127 128 50 30
SLFP 108 98 46 75
F e d e r a l 19 21 15 16
LSSP 101 21 10 12
Com munist 53 7 3 4
MBP 89 55 10 3
T am il C o n g re ss 8 10 1 1
In d e p e n d e n ts 175 39 7 6
O th e r 219 8 9 4
T o ta l s 898 387 151 151
T o ta l  Number o f  V o te s  P o l l e d :  M arch -  3 ,1 8 9 ,2 4 6 ,  J u l y  -  3 ,0 3 1 ,7 8 ?
♦ S o u rc e : D .K . P a n g n e k a r , "The N a t i o n a l i s t  R e v o lu t io n  i n  C ey lo n ” , 
P a c i f i c  A f f a i r s .  X X X III, No. 4  (D ec . I 96O ), p .  3 7 2 .
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The Prime Minister formed her Cabinet solely from members of her 
own party unlike previously where some representation had been given to a 
partial cross-section. The Government pledged itself to carry out the 
policies of democratic socialism in internal affairs and an international 
program of nonalignment; in both substance and procedure, the Bandaranaike 
ways and means of administrating Ceylon.
The events which have talcen place during Madame Bandaranaike*s 
administration appear in appropriate places throughout this work. In 
summary, the SLFP followed a course of democratic socialism: national­
ization of schools, banking, insurance, and petroleum importation and 
distribution; the fostering of state corporations and the public sector; 
and programs to quicken the pace of economic development. On the inter­
national front, the SLFP has held steadily to nonalignment and played an 
instrumental role in the India-China border disputes. Some of Ceylon* s 
problems have been settled; many have not. jhid those which have defied 
solution have reached into the very political structure of Ceylon.
The Federal Party is the common foe of all other Ceylon political 
parties. It has an all-Tamil meanership. Its representatives in Parli­
ament are elected entirely from constituencies in the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces, for decades the stronghold of the Tamil speaking people. The 
battle cry is parity for the Tamil language with Sinhala, and regional 
autonomy which would transform the island into a federal state. During 
the years of the two Bandaranaike administrations, the Federal Party has 
staged civil disobedience campaigns lAich have centered around the lan­
guage issue. This controversy had been marked with blood and violence in 
1953 and had subsided only under a state of emergency which had ended in
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M arch , 1959* A p p ro x im a te ly  tw o y e a r s  l a t e r ,  o n  A p r i l  1 7 , 1 9 6 1 , a  new 
s t a t e  o f  em erg en cy  w as p ro c la im e d ,  t h e  r e a s o n  f o r  w h ic h  w a s , a g a in ,  t h e  
la n g u a g e  i s s u e .  The im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  t h e  O f f i c i a l  L anguage A c t a t  m ost 
l e v e l s  i n  g o v e rn m e n ta l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  becam e e f f e c t i v e  J a n u a ry  1 ,  I 96I .
The T a m ils  r e s p o n d e d  b y  s c a t t e r e d  a c t s  o f  v io l e n c e  am id  i n c r e a s i n g  t e n ­
s i o n s  i s l a n d - w i d e .  The I96I s t a t e  o f  em erg en cy  b r o u g h t  i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y  
t o  m a in ta in  la w  an d  o r d e r  an d  c u r fe w s  w e re  im p o sed  u p o n  s e v e r a l  to w n s .
T h is  t im e  t h e  em ergency  l a s t e d  u n t i l  May 1 ,  I 963 —  a  t o t a l  o f  7 ^3  d a y s .
S a tv a e r a h a  ( n o n - v io l e n t  cam p a ig n ) h a s  b e e n  a  p o t e n t  an d  d a n g e r ­
o u s  w eapon i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h e  T a m ils .  I t  h a s  b e e n  a  d i s r u p t i v e  f o r c e  i n  
t h e  d a y - to - d a y  econom ic o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s t a t e  an d  a  h in d ra n c e  t o  econom ic  
d e v e lo p m e n t. B u t i t  w as p r e c i s e l y  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  dangerous e le m e n t t h a t  
c o o l e r  h e a d s  among F e d e r a l  P a r t y  m em bers p r e s e n t e d  o p p o s i t io n  'vdien, a f t e r  
t h e  l i f t i n g  o f  t h e  em erg en cy , m ore r a d i c a l  e le m e n ts  c a l l e d  f o r  a n o th e r  
s a t v a e r a h a .  P a s t  e x p e r ie n c e  h a d  t a u g h t  t h a t  n o n - v io le n c e  d e t e r i o r a t e s  i n ­
t o  v i o l e n c e .  Communal cam p a ig n s  so  f a r  h av e  f a i l e d  t o  p ro d u c e  a n y  b e n e f i t s .  
A t t h e  p r e s e n t  t im e ,  t h e r e  i s  no  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  c i v i l  d is o b e d ie n c e  a c t i o n s  
w i l l  a g a in  b e  u n d e r ta k e n .  B u t t h e  F e d e r a l  P a r t y  h a s  now s te p p e d  u p  i t s  
c a n p a ig n  f o r  an  au tonom ous T am il s t a t e .  W ith in  t h e  p a r t y  i t s e l f  t h e r e  i s  
o p p o s i t io n  t o  t h i s  i d e a .  Some m em bers a c c e p t  t h e  m i n o r i ty  s t a t u s  a s  a  
f a i t  a c c o m p li  an d  u r g e  c o o p e r a t io n  w i th  t h e  S in h a le s e  i n  w o rk in g  to w a rd  a  
u n i t e d  c o u n t r y .  B u t t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r s  who c la im  t h a t  t h e  s u p p r e s s io n  an d  
p e r s e c u t i o n  t a c t i c s  o f  t h e  S in h a le s e  l e a d e r s  a n d  p e o p le  d e t e r  an y  e f f o r t  
f o r  a  u n i t e d  C e y lo n ; t h a t  t h e  o n ly  c o u r s e  o p en  i s  s a f e g u a r d in g  t h e  i n t e r ­
e s t s  o f  t h e  T am il m i n o r i t y ,  t h e i r  la n g u a g e  an d  c u l t u r e ,  th ro u g h  a  F e d e r a l  
R e p u b l ic .  The en d  o f  t h i s  u n f o r tu n a t e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  n ow here  i n  s i g h t .
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E ig h te e n  m on ths a f t e r  M rs . B a n d a ra n a ik e  to o k  o v e r  t h e  P re m ie r ­
s h i p ,  t h e r e  w as a  t h r e a t  o f  a  coup t o  o v e r th ro w  t h e  g o v ern m en t an d  s e t  
up  a n  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  re g im e . The p l o t  w as u n c o v e re d  b y  g o v ern m en t o f f i ­
c i a l s  on  J a n u a ry  2 7 . I t  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  a r r e s t  o f  s e v e r a l  s e n i o r  p o l i c e  
an d  a r n y  o f f i c e r s .  W ith in  a  few  w eek s , a  t o t a l  o f  29 p e r s o n s  h a d  b e e n  
t a k e n  i n t o  c u s to d y .  I t  w as d i s c l o s e d  l a t e r  t h a t  a u t h o r i t i e s  d i s c o v e r e d  
a  c a c h e  o f  a rm s an d  some 65 th o u s a n d  ro u n d s  o f  am m u n itio n . The G overn  -  
m en t i n t r o d u c e d  an d  P a r l i a m e n t  p a s s e d  new l e g i s l a t i o n  —  th e  C r im in a l  Law 
■ (S p ec ia l P r o v i s io n s )  B i l l  —  w h ich  p ro v id e d  f o r  t h e  d e t e n t i o n  an d  t r i a l  
o f  t h e  a l l e g e d  p l o t t e r s .  I n  s u b s ta n c e ,  t h e  A c t s o u g h t  t o  r e d e f i n e  an d  
e n la r g e  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  c o n s p i r a c y  i n  C ey lo n  C r im in a l  Law, made t h e  p r o ­
v i s i o n s  r e t r o a c t i v e  t o  J a n u a ry  1 ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  c o v e r  t h e  a l l e g e d  c ou p, an d  
g ave  t o  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  J u s t i c e  t h e  pow er t o  n o m in a te  t h r e e  ju d g e s  fro m  
among t h e  Suprem e C o u r t 's  j u d i c i a r y  t o  t r y  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  o f f e n s e .
The s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  A c t w h ich  g r a n te d  t h e  n o m in a tin g  pow er t o  t h e  
M i n i s t e r  o f  J u s t i c e  r a n  i n t o  c o n s id e r a b l e  d i f f i c u l t y .  The t r i a l  i t s e l f  
b e g a n  on  J u l y  1 8 ,  I 962.  I n  o p e n in g  a rg u m e n t, t h e  d e f e n s e  c o u n s e l  m ain ­
t a i n e d  t h a t  t h e  b en c h  w as n o t  c o m p e te n t t o  h e a r  t h e  c a s e s  s i n c e  t h e  nom i­
n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  ju d g e s  w as a  j u d i c i a l  f u n c t i o n ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  c o n f e r r i n g  o f  
su c h  a  pow er u p o n  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  J u s t i c e  w as ta n ta m o u n t  t o  i n t e r f e r e n c e  
w i th  t h e  j u d i c i a l  f u n c t i o n  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .  The q u e s t i o n  
a s  t o  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h e  d e f e n d e n ts  c o u ld  r e c e i v e  a  f a i r  t r i a l  was n o t  an  
i s s u e ;  t h e  e n t i r e  m a t t e r  w as one  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y .  I n  O c to b e r ,  t h e  
t h r e e  Suprem e C o u r t  ju d g e s  r u l e d  o n  th e  d e f e n s e  a rg u m e n ts .  The p r e s id i n g  
ju d g e ,  T .S . F ern an d o  who r e a d  t h e  d e c i s i o n ,  o v e r r u l e d  s e v e r a l  o b j e c t i o n s  
r a i s e d  b y  t h e  d e f e n s e ,  b u t  u p h e ld  t h e  d e f e n s e  i n  t h a t  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  A c t
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by which the judges were nominated by the Minister of Justice*
The Government thereupon instituted new legislation which enabled 
the Chief Justice to nominate the trial judges. It became law in December 
and preliminary hearings got underway in January, I963, The trial has 
been a long drawn-out affair not yet concluded at the end of 1964. Some 
of the accused were released for lack of evidence, a few were found to 
have had no part in the attempted coup. Seventeen of the original 29 sus­
pects were still being detained roughly three years after they had been 
taken into custody.
Perhaps a few words here about the Judiciary of Ceylon would be 
in order. The Supreme Court is composed of the Chief Justice and nine 
other justices who have appellate and review juvdiction in civil cases 
for which it is the highest court. It has original jurisdiction in some 
criminal cases; exclusive jurisdiction in more serious criminal offenses. 
Its decisions in criminal matters may be appealed to the Criminal Court 
of Appeals. In addition, there are the Commissioners of Assize who are 
judicial officers appointed by the Governor-General lAo, at his discretion, 
may hold any session, or part thereof, of the Supreme Court. The final 
judicial authority for Ceylon as for some of the other Commonwealth memr 
bers is the Privy Council, however, this is hardly anything more than a 
structural formality. Nearly all judicial matters are now handled by 
Ceylon's judiciary system.
The interrogation connected with the 1962 coup ^isode reached 
into several high places including the office of the Governor-General. 
However innocent he may have been of any participation. Sir Oliver Goone­
tilleke resigned on February 26, I962. The Ceylon Cabinet advised London
zÿi-
t o  a c c e p t  t h e  r e s i g n a t i o n .  A c c o rd in g  t o  some u n c o n f irm e d  r e p o r t s ,  S i r  
O l i v e r ' s  name i s  a l l e g e d  t o  h a v e  b e e n  b ro u g h t  u p  b y  t h e  s u s p e c t s  d u r in g  
q u e s t i o n i n g .  The G o v e rn o r-G e n e ra l  v o l u n t a r i l y  s u b m it te d  t o  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  
The d o m in a n t M i n i s t e r  i n  t h e  C a b in e t  a t  t h a t  t im e ,  F e l i x  D a is  B a n d a ra n a ik e ,  
■who i s  a  nephew  o f  t h e  P rim e  M i n i s t e r ,  s t a t e d  t h a t  i t  w as n o t  t h e  c o n te n ­
t i o n  o f  t h e  G overnm ent t h a t  S i r  O l i v e r  w as g u i l t y  o f  anything. N e v e r th e ­
l e s s ,  C e y lo n ’ s  o f f i c i a l s  made n o  o v e r tu r e s  t o  h a v e  t h e  G o v e rn o r-G e n e ra l  
ch a n g e  h i s  m ind  a b o u t  r e s i g n i n g .  F o r  one t h i n g ,  h e  c o u ld  h av e  n o  lo n g e r  
f u n c t io n e d  p r o p e r l y  i n  h i s  c a p a c i t y  a s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  H ead o f  S 'ta te  
b e in g  a s  h e  w as i n  t h e  c e n t e r  o f  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o v e r s y .  And p o l i t i c a l l y ,  
h e  b e lo n g e d  t o  t h e  " o ld  g u a r d " .  H is  a p p o in tm e n t a s  G o v e rn o r-G e n e ra l  h a d  
b e e n  made i n  1 9 5 ^  when t h e  i s l a n d ' s  g o v e rn m en t w as s t i l l  d o m in a te d  b y  men 
o f  h i s  t y p e .  S i r  O l iv e r  w as a  fo rm e r  member o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  C i v i l  S e r v i c e ,  
a  C h r i s t i a n ,  E n g l i s h - e d u c a t e d .  B e c a u se  h i s  d u t i e s  w e re  m o s t ly  c e r e m o n ia l ,  
h e  w as a l lo w e d  t o  s t a y  o n  a s  G o v e rn o r* G e n e ra l a l th o u g h  h e  h a d  b e e n  s i n c e  
1956 som ew hat o u t  o f  p l a c e  i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t ,  S in h a l e s e ,  B u d d h is t  e n v i ro n ­
m e n t.  G o o n e t i l l e k e ,  j u s t  a s  h i s  p r e d e c e s s o r  S i r  Jo h n  K o te le w a la  h a d  d o n e , 
l e f t  C ey lo n  t o  s e t t l e  i n  B r i t a i n .
The p r e s e n t  G o v e rn o r-  G e n e ra l  o f  C e y lo n , W il l ia m  G o p a lla w a , w as 
a p p o in te d  on  M arch 2 ,  1962. He i s  o f  t h e  n ew er s c h o o l  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p h i l ­
o so p h y  w h ich  d o m in a te s  C e y lo n , D e m o c ra tic  S o c ia l i s m .  G o p a llaw a  i s  a  Bud­
d h i s t ,  a  f o r m e r  A m b assad o r t o  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  a n d  C h in a , an d  t h e  f a t h e r -  
i n - l a w  o f  o n e  o f  t h e  b r o t h e r s  o f  S ir im a v o  B a n d a ra n a ik e .
The B a n d a ra n a ik e  re g im e  h a s  h a d  some u n e a s y  t im e s  d e s p i t e  i t s  
h e a v y  m a j o r i t y  i n  P a r l i a m e n t  a n d  i t s  g e n e r a l  a c c e p ta n c e  b y  t h e  p e o p le .
A t t h r e e  b y - e l e c t i o n s  h e l d  on  Ju n e  2 8 , 1 9 6 2 , t h e r e  w e re  n o  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e
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p a r l i a m e n ta r y  s t r e n g t h .  B u t i n  A u g u s t t h e  G overnm ent was o n  t h e  v e rg e  o f  
t o p p l in g  w hen t h e  t h e n  F in a n c e  M i n i s t e r  F e l i x  D ia s  B a n d a ra n a ik e  in c lu d e d  
i n  h i s  B u d g e t p r o p o s a ls  a  c u t  o f  o n e  pound  p e r  p e r s o n  i n  t h e  w e ek ly  sub­
s i d i z e d  r i c e  r a t i o n .  The g r e a t e s t  o p p o s i t io n  a r o s e  fro m  w i t h i n  t h e  SLFP 
m em bersh ip  o f  P a r l i a m e n t ,  an d  p a s s a g e  o f  t h e  B u d g et w as o n ly  e n s u re d  a f ­
t e r  w i th d ra w a l  o f  t h e  p r o p o s a l .  M r. B a n d a ra n a ik e  r e s ig n e d  h i s  p o s t  a s  
F in a n c e  M i n i s t e r  a n d , l a t e r ,  a l s o  r e s ig n e d  a s  t h e  P a r l i a m e n ta r y  S e c r e t a r y  
t o  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  D e fe n se  an d  E x t e r n a l  Affairs.  ̂ 75
The t a s k  o f  b e in g  F in a n c e  M i n i s t e r  i n  C ey lo n  i s  b y  no m eans an  
e a s y  o n e .  As a  m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  C ^ l o n  h a s  h a d ,  fro m  t im e  t o  t im e ,  some 
d i f f i c u l t y  i n  k e e p in g  a  F in a n c e  M i n i s t e r .  F e l i x  B a n d a ra n a ik e  r e s ig n e d  i n  
A u g u s t,  1962.  The p o r t f o l i o  w as g iv e n  t o  C h a r le s  P e r c i v a l  d e  S i l v a  who 
a l r e a d y  h a d  i n  h i s  c a r e  A g r i c u l t u r e ,  L ands an d  P o w er. De S i l v a  g av e  up  
t h e  F in a n c e  M i n i s t r y  an d  was s u c c e e d e d  b y  P .B .G . K a lu g a l l a ,  who was a l s o  
t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  T r a n s p o r t  an d  W orks. K a lu g a l l a  f i n a l l y  h a d  c o n s e n te d  o n ly  
a f t e r  t h r e e  o t h e r  s e n i o r  M i n i s t e r s  h a d  e a r l i e r  d e c l in e d  t h e  p o r t f o l i o .  He 
m anaged t o  w e a th e r  h i s  c r i t i c s  u n t i l  t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  May, I 963,  when a  
C a b in e t  r e s h u f f l e  made h im  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  E d u c a t io n  an d  C u l t u r a l  A f f a i r s .  
T i k i r i  B anda I l a n g a r a t n e  becam e t h e  F in a n c e  M i n i s t e r .  F e l i x  B a n d a ra n a ik e  
was back as M i n i s t e r  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e ,  F o o d , an d  C o o p e ra t iv e  D ev e lo p m en t, 
an d  C h a r le s  P . d e  S i l v a  becam e o n ce  a g a in  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  L an d s , I r r i g a t i o n ,  
an d  P o w er.
^75% t i s  p e r h a p s  h e l p f u l  t o  n o te  a g a in  t h a t  t h e  P rim e  M i n i s t e r  o f  
C ey lo n  i s  a l s o  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  D e fe n se  an d  E x t e r n a l  A f f a i r s ,  an d  t h a t  F e l i x  
B a n d a ra n a ik e  w as t h e  nephew  o f  t h e  P rim e  M i n i s t e r .  I n  h i s  c a p a c i t y  a s  
P a r l i a m e n ta r y  S e c r e t a r y  h e  s e r v e d  f o r  25 m o n th s . I t  i s  o f t e n  s t a t e d  t h a t  
ev en  th o u g h  M rs. B a n d a ra n a ik e  h a s  a  m ind  o f  h e r  own i n  s h a p in g  p o l i c i e s ,  
n e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e  pow er b e h in d  t h e  P rim e  M i n i s t e r  i s  h e r  nephew .
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W h ile  a l l  o f  t h e s e  t h i n g s  —  t h e  T am il p ro b le m , t h e  co u p , an d  
C a b in e t  i n s t a b i l i t y  —  h a d  b e e n  g o in g  o n , t h e r e  w as m o u n tin g  c r i t i c i s m  
a g a i n s t  t h e  g o v ern m en t fro m  a n o th e r  q u a r t e r  o u t s i d e  o f f i c i a l  c i r c l e s ,  t h e  
F o u r th  E s t a t e ,  L e g i s l a t i o n ,  commonly r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  t h e  P r e s s  B i l l ,  h a d  
b e e n  in t r o d u c e d  i n  P a r l i a m e n t .  I t  w as d e s ig n e d  t o  ^ v e  t h e  G overnm ent 
e x t e n s iv e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  i s l a n d ’ s  n e w sp a p e rs .  The g o v e rn m e n t 's  c h a rg e s  
o f  p r e s s  i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  d a t e  b a c k  t o  a n o th e r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  u n d e r  an ­
o t h e r  B a n d a ra n a ik e , I n  May, 1959» d u r in g  a  s p e e c h ,  t h e  l a t e  P rim e  M in is ­
t e r  h a d  p ro p o s e d  t h e  a p p o in tm e n t o f  a  co m m issio n  o f  i n q u i r y  t o  lo o k  i n t o  
t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e s s  i n  C ey lo n , He s a i d  t h a t  h e  d is a p p ro v e d  o f  w h a t 
c o u ld  c o n c e iv a b ly  b e  c a l l e d  m o n o p o l is t ic  p r a c t i c e s ,  an d  t h a t
I n  v a r io u s  w ays t h i s  P r e s s  m onopo ly , i f  i t  d o e s  n o t  a p p ro v e  o f  a  Gov­
ern m en t e l e c t e d  t o  pow er b y  t h e  p e o p le ,  c a n  b y  v a r io u s  e x a g g e r a t io n s ,  
d i s t o r t i o n s ,  an d  m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ,  c r e a t e  an  a lm o s t  im p o s s ib le  
p o s i t i o n  f o r  su c h  a  G overnm ent,
A lth o u g h  S .W .R .D , B a n d a ra n a ik e  h a d  t a k e n  i s s u e  w i th  n e w sp a p e r  p r a c t i c e s ,  
h e  w as n e v e r t h e l e s s  a  s ta u n c h  d e f e n d e r  o f  t h e  fre e d o m  o f  t h e  p r e s s .  H is  
s o l u t i o n  t o  b r e a k in g  t h e  "m onopoly" w as n o t  g o v ern m en t c o n t r o l ,  b u t  en ­
c o u ra g in g  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  in d e p e n d e n t  n e w sp a p e rs  t o  o f f e r  c o m p e t i t io n  t o  
t h e  se v e n  d a i l y  p a p e r s  p u b l i s h e d  b y  tw o g ro u p s ,
The p r e s s  v s .  g o v ern m en t b a t t l e  b e g a n  anew  when t h e  SLFP r e t u r n e d  
t o  pow er i n  J u l y ,  I 9 6 0 ,  D u rin g  t h e  T hro n e  S p eech  o p e n in g  t h e  F i f t h  P a r l i ­
am en t, r e f e r e n c e  w as made t o  l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  b r e a k  t h e  m onopo ly . T h e r e a f t e r
Zy^H indu W eek ly  R ev iew . May 2 5 , 1959» p .  1 0 .
27?The Lake House group publishes Ceylon Daily News and Ceylon 
Observer in English, Dinamina. Janata in Sinhala, JMnakaran in Tamil.
The T iË ës  g ro u p  p u b l i s h e s  t h e  T im es o f  C ey lo n  i n  E n g l i s h ,  an d  L a n k a d in a  
i n  S in h a l e s e ,  The com bined  d a i l y  c i r c u l a t i o n  i s  a p p r o x im a te ly  26? 
th o u s a n d ,  t h e  co m b in ed  Sunday c i r c u l a t i o n  i s  a p p r o x im a te ly  239 th o u s a n d .
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on three occasions i&en bills were introduced, wiser counsels within the 
SLFP prevailed and authoritarian interference with the press was stalled.
The fourth time such legislation was tabled, in May, 1962, it was accep­
ted in principle. In brief, it proposed a Press Council and set forth 
conditions under which the newspaper business in Ceylon could be carried 
on. The Council would have wide discretionary powers over what could or 
could not appear in print, could force disclosure of news sources by jour- 
nalists, could license or withhold such license for the practice of journal­
ism, and had the power to stipulate and impose penalities in case of vio­
lation of any part of the Bill, The Council was to be con^osed of eleven 
members; a Minister and four others appointed by the Governor-General, 
two each appointed by the House of Representatives and Journalists Asso­
ciation of Ceylon, and one each by the Senate and the University.
The fourth version while accepted in principle ran into delaying 
tactics by the UNP, the Federal Party, some independents, and some moder­
ates of the SLFP. This fourth draft was finally withdrawn. The Government 
created a three-member Press Commission to investigate every facet of news­
paper publishing in Ceylon and recommend appropriate controls. In the 
meantime, forces opposing such legislation were joined by the powerful 
Buddhist National Front in a concerted drive to defeat, on thirteen dif­
ferent occasions, any type of government interference. In June, 1964,
Prime Minister Bandaranaike stated that the Press would have to be taken 
over by the government as there could be no toleration of reactionary 
elements obstructing the ingplementation of the socialist policies. She 
then added.
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The G overnm ent h a d  t o  f i g h t  a g a i n s t  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  o f  f o r e i g n  an d  
l o c a l  r e a c t i o n a r y  f o r c e s  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  p r e s s ,  w h ich  
w as d i s s e m in a t in g  f a l s e  p ro p a g a n d a  a g a i n s t  t h e  G overnm ent an d  m is ­
l e a d i n g  t h e  m a s s e s ,  .  .  ,2 7 8
I n  S e p te m b e r , 1 9 6 4 , t h e  G overnm ent d e c id e d  t o  t r y  a g a in .  T h is
w as t h e  f o u r t e e n t h  a t t e n ç t  t o  p u s h  th r o u g h  t h e  H ouse a  b i l l  t o  c o n t r o l
t h e  p r e s s .  I n  sum m ary, t h i s  d r a f t  p r o v id e d  f o r  b o th  a  f iv e - m a n  P r e s s
Council and seven-man Press Tribunal; one to set the standards of the
p u b l i s h i n g  b u s i n e s s ,  t h e  o t h e r  t o  a c t  a s  a  c o u r t  w h ere  b r e a c h e s  i n  t h e
la w  w o u ld  b e  t r i e d  an d  p e n a l i t i e s  in ç o s e d .  The p e n a l i t i e s  w e re  r a t h e r
stiff. Section 9 of the draft stated.
P u n ish m e n ts  u p  t o  a  maximum o f  R s , 1 0 ,0 0 0  f o r  d e f a m a t io n ,  an d  R s ,
5,000 and/or two years' imprisonment for other breaches of the law 
would be inçosed by the tribunal. Final appeal will be allowed to 
the Supreme Court, Every editor and every director to be held 
culpable for a breach of the law. Any editor or member of the 
editorial staff will not be entitled to retain counsel, but a 
litigant may retain counseLwith. the approval of the council or 
the tribunal,279 (fiaphasis mine)
But there was an earlier section of the draft tdiich demanded even more
a t t e n t i o n .  S e c t i o n  5 s t a t e d .
W e e k lie s  t o  b e  e x c lu d e d  f ro m  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  new  l e g i s l a t i o n .
T h is  i n c l u d e s  w e e k ly  p u b l i c a t i o n s  o r  d a i l i e s  p u b l i s h e d  b y  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s ,  o r  a n y  p a r t y  o r g a n iz a t i o n s  r e c o g n iz e d  a s  a  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y ,  
p a p e r s  b y  r e l i g i o u s  o r g a n iz a t i o n s  an d  t r a d e  u n io n s ,  S unday  p a p e r s  o f  
t h e  n a t i o n a l  n e w sp a p e rs  w i l l  come w i t h i n  t h e  p u rv ie w  o f  t h e  council,280
In effect, the combination of the Press Council and the Tribunal 
would have been a creature created by the Government which only it, and 
more specifically the Prime Minister, could control. The Council would be
278ceylon Weekly T im es . Ju n e  I7, 1 9 6 4 , p, 2 ,
Sept, 2, 1964, p. 3.
280lb id .
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g iv e n  t h e  pow er t o  d e c id e  w h a t was o r  w as n o t  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t .
The L e a d e r  o f  t h e  UNP O p p o s i t io n ,  D u d ley  S en a n a y a k e , s a i d  on  t h e  f l o o r  
o f  t h e  H o u se , t h a t  i t  was " a n  e n d e a v o r  t o  s h i e l d  w ro n g -d o e rs ,  g u i l t y  o f  
b r i b e r y ,  c o r r u p t io n  an d  n e p o t is m , an d  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  know ledge o f  t h e s e  
sh a m e fu l a c t s  f ro m  s e e p in g  th ro u g h  t o  t h e  p e o p le ’®. The com bined  oppo­
s i t i o n  a rg u e d  t h a t  t h i s  P r e s s  B i l l  —  a n y  P r e s s  B i l l  —  w as n o th in g  l e s s  
th a n  an  i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  t h e  s u p p r e s s io n  o f  c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  g o v ern m en t.
T h is  c h a rg e  was c a r r i e d  t o  m u n ic ip a l ,  u rb a n  a n d  tow n c o u n c i l s  th ro u g h  
v i l l a g e  c o m m itte e s .  The B a n d a ra n a ik e  G overnm ent d u r in g  i t s  f o u r  y e a r s  
i n  o f f i c e ,  m oving fro m  c r i s i s  t o  c r i s i s ,  h ad  h a d  p u b l i c  o p in io n  on  i t s  
s i d e .  P e o p le  a n d  t h e  p r e s s  w e re  c r i t i c a l  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  y e t  a c ­
c e p te d  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  Madame P rim e  M i n i s t e r  an d  h e r  S r i  L anka Freedom  
P a r t y .  B u t b y  J u n e ,  1 9 6 4 , t h e  G overnm ent h a d  shown a  f l a g r a n t  d i s r e g a r d  
f o r  t h i s  p u b l i c  o p in io n  r e g a r d in g  b o th  t h e  new s m ed ia  an d  a n o th e r  e le m e n t 
—  t h e  M a r x is t  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  The f a i l u r e  t o  h e e d  t h e  v o ic e s  o f  t h e  
p e o p le  who h ad  d u ly  e l e c t e d  t h a t  g o v e rn m en t s t a r t e d  i t  w e l l  on i t s  way t o  
a n  a p p o in te d  e n d .
T h e re  i s  t h e  o l d  t r i t e  e x p r e s s io n  a b o u t  " h a n d w r i t in g  on t h e  w a l l "  
d e c r e e in g  a n  i n t e n d i n g  e v e n t .  I f  e v e r  t h e  c l i c h e  w as a p p l i c a b l e  t o  p o l i t ­
i c a l  e v e n t s ,  i t  h a d  b e e n  ap ro p o  t o  C ey lo n  i n  1956 an d  a g a in  i n  1 9 6 4 . 
P a r l i a m e n ta r y  d e b a te s  i n  t h e  H ouse h a d  b e e n  p ro v in g  l e s s  o f  a  m eth o d  f o r  
com prom ise t h a n  m e r c i l e s s  a s s u l t s  u p o n  t h e  m a j o r i t y  p a r t y .  O p p o s i t io n  
p a r t i e s  h a d  u s e d  t h e  f l o o r  a s  a  p ro p a g a n d a  p l a t f o r m  d e n o u n c in g  t h e  G ovem -
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ment for what it called xmdemocratic methods, dictatorial policies, and 
sinister means to still the voice of the people. The Opposition had man­
aged to slow down business to the extent that by mid-March the House had 
before it 38 Bills and 108 Regulations, Some of these dealt with -üie 
Press Commission, debate over which might have brought about a No-Confidence 
vote.
Without any warning, the Government prorogued Parliament on 
March 13, 1964, until July 10, The step caught offguard the MPs and peo­
ple alike; it dismayed the former and shocked the latter. The Government 
explained the action as necessary in order that Parliament and government 
agencies would have “a breathing space to concentrate on inqplementation 
of certain urgent measures for the benefit of the community".Much 
more likely however it was to avoid the No-Confidence vote and thus pre­
vent the fall of the Government. Appeals from Parliament members to the 
Governor-General for summoning Parliament immediately brought no response.
At the time of prorogation, there was speculation as to what eventually 
would happen in the political structure, lAether a dictatorship, coalition, 
national government, or dissolution would follow. The SLFP chose the sec­
ond —  coalition.
Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike on May 10 went before the 213-member
SLFP Executive Committee to ask approval of a merger with the Marxists,
Said the Prime Minister,
In accordance with the responsibility entrusted to me by the Cabinet 
to explore the possibilities of setting up a national government or 
a coalition government for the purpose of safeguarding the social, 
cultural, political and economic victories achieved in 1956 with the
282"Ibid.. Mar. 18, 1964, p. 1.
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imity and cooperation of the progressive and socialist parties and 
groups under the leadership of the late Mr. S.W.R.D, Bandaranaike, 
and for the purpose of further consolidating and strengthening those 
victories, and to defeat the power of the capitalist and colonialist 
forces and strengthen the forces of democratic socialism in this 
country, it being realized that the setting up of a national govern­
ment is against the policies of our party, I therefore seek the man­
date of this meeting to give the necessary powers to the Prime Min­
ister and the Cabinet to set up a coalition government with those 
progressive forces willing to accept the basic policies of our party 
and enter into an electoral agreement with those parties for the next 
election.283
The Prime Minister received the green light from the Executive Committee 
for a coalition with the United Left Front, itself a coalition of the 
three Marxists parties. The spokesman for the ÜLF was N.M. Perera who 
came into the Government as Minister of Finance. Two minor figures in 
the LSSP took over the Ministeries of Communications and Public Works.
Dr. Perera is a popular and respected leader among Ceylon's or­
ganized labor. He has sound knowledge of finance and international trade, 
is a distinguished graduate in economics of the London School of Economics, 
and holds two doctorates —  Philosophy and Science —  conferred by London 
University. Dr. Perera entered politics in 1936 in a successful bid for 
the State Council. In the First Parliament and again in the MBP coalition 
he was influential as a leader of the Opposition. As the new Finance 
Mnister, Perera promised legislation which would help create a progressive 
society and lay the foundation for a truly socialist state.
Parliament reconvened on July 3» 1964, after a four-month suspen­
sion, the longest prorogation period in the history of Ceylon's Parliaments.^^
May 13, 1964, p= 1.
28%nder the Ceylon Constitution, no Parliament may be prorogued 
for longer than four months.
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In the Throne Speech, the Government presented broad economic measures, 
as suggested by Perera, to inclement the program of socialist development.
A summary of the measures were as follows;
1) The Government would utilize more intensively national and 
foreign banking services in order to assist national devel­
opment.
2) The proposed State Trade Organization would continue the im­
portation of all essential goods and ejçorts. The importation 
of goods other than those handled by this organization will 
be progressively limited to Ceylonese nationals.
3) The state-owned Cooperative Mholesale Establishment would have 
a monopoly over the wholesale distribution of goods under a 
decentralization scheme. Every article will have a fixed price.
4) The Government would set up workers* advisory committees with 
powers to investigate corruption in government institutions, 
including state corporations.
5) Vigilance committees, with powers to advise on the organization 
of work to the needs of the people and on the elimination of 
bureaucracy and inefficiency, were to be established in govern­
ment, loa&l garnement, and semi-governmental institutions.
6) People's committees were to be set up with legal powers to in­
vestigate corrupt practices in the distribution of commodities.
7) Legislation would be introduced to replace the monopolistic 
owners of daily newspapers by a broad-based ownership.
8) As a step to inçrove the efficiency, and to coordinate the 
functions, of the Port Commission and the Port (Cargo)
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Corporation, the possibility of creating a single Port 
Authority was being examined.
9) There would be a new rehabilitation scheme to subsidize 
replanting of ê diausted cocoa lands.
10) A bill would be introduced to control the acquisition of 
land by non-Ceylonese.
11) A bill would ensure priority of Ceylonese in employment.
The Throne Speech contained the following words of the Prime Minister:
In 1956, under the leadership of the late Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, 
the foundation was laid for the progress of this country along social­
ist lines. To carry forward this victory of the common people in the 
social, cultural, political and economic spheres and to develop and 
strengthen the struggle against reactionaries and colonial elements by 
securing the fullest support of the working people, I have braodened 
the base of My Government by the formation of a coalition government 
on the nth of June, 1964. This step has evoked widespread and uni­
versal acceptance and enthusiasm of the wide mass of people.285
The “widespread and universal acceptance and enthusiasm" was a bit of wish­
ful thinking on the part of Madame Prime Minister.
During the formation stage of the coalition, Ceylon’s press was 
noncommittal as to predicting the outcome. While not condemning the mer­
ger, the press did remind its readers of the result of the MSP coalition 
in 1956-1959» In other words, it was a wait-and-see attitude. No one had 
long to wait. In November, the Government introduced two Press Bills —  
the Ceylon Press Bill and the Newspaper Corporation of Ceylon Bill. The 
first contained much the same material as earlier drafts: the appointment 
of a Press Council to tender advice on matters relating to the press, and 
the setting up of a Press Tribunal to investigate violations and to conduct
^^^Ceylon Weekly %mes. July 8, 1964, p. 1.
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the trials of offenders. The Newspaper Corporation of C^lon Bill was to 
establish a state corporation, enqpowered to carry on the business of pub­
lishing newspapers.
The Second Readings of the Bills were scheduled for December 9*
The Opposition led by the ÜKP, and joined by the SLFP moderate wing and 
some independents, forestalled action and forced a rescheduling for 
Februaiy 2, I965* The power structure was building against the SLFP-ULF 
Bandaranaike coalition.
At the Colombo Town Hall on Saturday, November 29, a Buddhist 
rally was held to protest against the press takeover by the Government.
To add color, Buddhist flags and the lion Flags were prominently displayed. 
The largest gathering of bhikkhus in recent years crowded into the audi­
torium. The gist of the protest can be summed up in the opening statement.
The Maha Sangha of this country must boycott the Prime Minister and 
all her ministers. They should not be invited to any of the temples 
in the country and should not be helped by the Sangha in any of their 
moves.
At the next general election the Sangha should mobilize public opinion 
against the nominees of the government. These measures should be 
taken if the government persists in its move to take over the Press 
and continues the insults to the Sangha.
The Sangha feared threats and intimidation by the Trotskyists if the latter 
gained the power of government, and from all appearances it seemed entirely 
likely that such would be the case. Perera and the LSSP had tangled ver­
bally with the Buddhist priests on past occasions. Even though promises 
had been made that under the Coalition Government the "proper place" of 
the Maha Saneha and Buddhism would be rejected, the Saneha had character­
ized these as nebulous quantities. The Saneha had noted the perils in the
Dec. 2, 1964, p. 1.
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Press Bills and on more than one occasion had implored the Prime Minister 
to withdraw them. There had been a mounting crisis within the SLFP ranks 
since the time overtures were first made to the LSSP, Although the par­
ty's Executive Committee had endorsed the move, there was a large segment 
of the SLFP T«dio disagreed. These as a group joined with other dissenters. 
The anti-Coalition drive gathered together all those forces of democratic 
values which have been deeply rooted in the traditions of Ceylon,
On the night of December 3» the debate on the Address of Thanks 
to the sixth Throne Speech was concluding. The Minister of Land, Irriga­
tion and Power —  Charles P, de Silva —  rose from his seat of Government 
benches and crossed the aisle to join the Opposition, Thirteen others 
followed him. An Admendment amounting to a rejection of a motion of Thanks 
to the Throne Speech was offered by the UNP, The Admendment was adopted 
74-73* It was a vote of Mo Confidence in the Government, The regime of 
Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike was ended.
Parliament was dissolved on December 17, The Governor-General 
set new elections for March 22, I965» and summoned a new Parliament to meet 
on April 5,
Appraisal
It would seem superfluous to dwell at length upon an appraisal 
of the politics of Ceylon in light of the events as set forth in this 
chapter, A question arising here is whether or not the Parliamentary 
system in Ceylon has been successful. The answer is a qualified "No" —  
in the sense that it has not proven to be all that has been hoped for 
when measured against its prototype, the British standard. The fault
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lies not with the structure per se. but with the actors within that struc­
ture» If the term underdeveloped is applied to Ceylon in the economic 
sense, even more appropriate is its application to Ceylon's political 
system. All political parties are dedicated to the elimination of pover­
ty, the development of the economic sector, and increasing prestige for 
the country among the world's states. Yet, no party has allowed itself 
the luxury of flexibility in programs over the short run in order to gain 
a greater responsiveness to its cause over the long haul. The Ceylon 
governments have been unable to generate sufficient direction and drive 
for their programs in order to insure accommodation of the social, eco­
nomic, and political changes necessary for stability.
Political struggles in Ceylon have followed the pattern of dema­
gogues enmeshing themselves in slogans wMch incite communal antagonisms 
for the sole purpose of getting the vote. Once in power there is no al­
ternative other than to fulfill the obligations of carrying out promises 
made explicit by the slogans, thus furthering communalisms. Opposition 
forces in any number of governments usually offer a choice among conserva­
tism or progressivism, at least- some alternative in a program current at 
the time. This is not true in Ceylon. All of its political parties claim 
dedication to the philosophy of democratic socialism, including now even 
the United National Party, once a wellspring of conservatism. Therefore, 
the electorate has merely to choose which party will give the people more 
in welfare, more in subsidies, with the least amount of effort expended 
by the people.
State corporations and boards are created only secondarily for 
the need of administering an economic sector. These are, instead, bureau-
26?
cratic stepchildi'en whose primary purpose are white collar, well paying 
positions for friends and relatives. And the Opposition also takes every 
advantage of the restlessness of the people by dwelling upon the epithets 
of "sinister moves" and "dictatorship" by the Government —  words which 
fall gratingly upon the ears of the electorate, a people dedicated, as
are the people of Ceylon, to parliamentary democracy, And they are dedi­
cated to the parliamentary system. During the past 33 years, experience 
has taught them the importance of free elections and universal suffrage, 
and the importance of being able to freely choose their leaders.
As to whether or not the Parliamentary system has been a success 
in the past, a more pertinent question perhaps has to do with whether it 
can continue to function in Ceylon in the future. Here again no pat gen­
eralization can be made. Under currently existing circumstances, the 
future does not appear too bright. Again the uneoxapromising attitude of 
the political parties comes to the fore, and the inflexibility results in 
confused thinking among politicians. Two examples will perhaps suffice. 
There is hardly any question that the Sirimavo Bandaranaike Government 
died by its own hand. In this case it was the split in the SLFP ranks 
over coalition with the LSSP and the matter of the press. As to the coa­
lition, it may well be that the Government thought that' liy bringing the
United Left Front into the administration peace in the labor picture might 
be bought. The ULF does represent a huge voting strength of 1,05 million 
workers. But the voting strength is somewhat misleading as evidenced by 
the number of Marxist Parties members in the House at the time. The 
Trotskyists had 12, the Communist Party 4, and the MEP 3» a total of 19 
in the 157-member body. The SLFP held 73 seats. The possibility of peace
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on the labor front was indeed a high price for the sacrifice of party 
harmony. And, there was no guarantee that such peace would be a reality. 
The Marxist parties themselves were divided between Mosoow-liners and 
pro-Peking, Someirtiat recently the Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions had 
split into two because the President and the General Secretary were on 
opposite sides in the Moscow-Peking political dispute. This breach still 
existed at the time of the SLFP-ULF Coalition,
The SLFP was also split over the matter of control of the coun­
try's newspapers. The anti-Press legislation was introduced for the pur­
pose of stilling the criticism of the administration. The Government's 
argument as to monopoly of the Press was a nebulous one, “Qiere are multi­
ple groups operating the daily and weekly papers, and there is nothing in 
the statute books or elsewhere which prevents anyone from setting up a 
newspaper publishing business in Ceylon, It is worth noting also that a 
Press Council, if one was required, could well have been structured with 
a membership consisting solely of members of the Fourth Estate with one 
member of the Cabinet acting in an advisory capacity on press matters idiich 
might better serve the stability of a government. The Press in any demo­
cratic country is regarded as an extension of the freedom to disagree, 
even criticize. It was this freedom which was under threat with the Press 
Bills.
Elsewhere among political parties, the Federal Party continues 
to divide the island's people, Ceylon is of course guilty of Sinhalese 
communalism. But the Tamil party leaders make no effort to gain the good­
will of the majority. They have devotion to a cause to be sure, but the 
manifestation of this devotion is found in satyagraha and the rather out-
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rageons demand for a separate, autonomous Tamil state. Such actions can 
only intimidate the Sinhalese more, alienating still further the moral 
question of syn^athy and humanitarianism. Too many Tamil leaders are 
also confused in their thinking. Novdiere, at any time, have they carried 
their fight on a reasonable and constructive basis by which to convince 
the masses of their just cause,
Ceylon has reached a fork in that political road idiich will de­
termine its future. It can forget its petty social grievances through 
the sense of compromise, display an effort to make the Parliamentary sys­
tem a success, forget about slogans, and find a general cooperative atti­
tude in building the future state structure. Or, it can continue as in 
the past with its rigidity toward political ideologies, its preference 
with subsidies and welfare over and above economic survival, and remain 
socially divided because of mythology and historical events. The people 
themselves hold the political instrument for the nationalizing process in 
their hands. The use of politics will determine the result: nationalism 
or perhaps disaster.
CHAPTER VU 
THE POLITICS OF NATIONALIZING
The twentieth century is the Age of Asian Nationalism* It is a 
virus of pride in nation and heritage, vdiich has been sweeping across the 
East infecting all countries, large and small. It attacked the Western- 
imposed political and economic systems, then continued on to carry the 
ideologies of race and color to exaggerated heights. People have awakened 
from a long period of enforced social sleep to find new energy in the 
facts or fancies of their heritage, in their real or imagined histories. 
The nation-state was to become an end in itself. The combined activity 
and efforts of all its people were to find expression in a great unified 
outpouring in order to regain the sense of traditional values, customs, 
and institutions. In eighteenth century Europe, nationalism was the pro­
duct of the Age of Enlightenment; in twentieth century Asia, it was the 
spirit of political independence, economic development, and cultural pro­
motion.
The philosophy of nationalism is the unity of people with every 
organism of the nation-state. It decrees upon all the people conformity 
to the cultural and social patterns of the majority community, a standard­
ization of thought and behavior. It has the dichotomous properties of 
being personal and concrete, yet impersonal and abstract. Nationalism is
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authoritarian in its precept as it is a discipline which imposes upon the 
people a list of directives without regard to the individual* s will or 
need. It has no other purpose other than to override the communal factors 
of village, class, language, and race through the fostering of loyalty to 
the society of the state. Thereby, it increases the strength and impor­
tance of the state, gaining self-respect among other states of the world. 
Nationalism can generally be considered a power of good.
Conversely, it is also a power of bad. It can stir up national­
istic sentiments for selfish ends, thereby becoming a powerful mechmiism 
of destruction in the hands of chauvinistic leaders vho use it as a weapon 
of propaganda to sustain leadership. Nationalism can create suspicion and 
fear wherein separate communities isolate themselves into self-centered 
little worlds with inbred cultures. The society then frequently becomes 
convulsed by ethnic warfare prefering conflict to cooperation; the oppo­
nents are the uwH k-es of the different rqces and cultures.
The politics of nationalizing are the instruments for the unifi­
cation of a society.
To the present time, these instruments have proved unworkable in 
the hands of the people of Ceylon for the Ceylonese are a fragmented, dis­
turbed society. Their history since 1948 has been one of conflict between 
ideals and realities. It is the product of trials and attmpts, errors 
and failures. Perhaps the word "chaos” is most appropriate to the internal 
condition of Ceylon. Ghosts of the colonial past hold sway over the island, 
haunting the people with memories of humil' ation and bondage. The Ceylon­
ese have counteracted through an over-acce; tuated revival of indigenous 
cultural traits. This has pushed the peopl) into the present with hardly
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any motivation other than a display of disdain for a bygone epoch. This 
emotional shibboleth, joined with the disappointment of realities arising 
from the trials and errors of an independent emerging nation-state, finds 
a terminal in a deep sense of frustration and inadequacy.
A basic problem is Ceylon's avowed disassociation with the West­
ern era while, at the same time, adopting Western styles in the political 
and economic spheres. To clarify, successive governments have not adapted 
plans to local conditions. They have instead adopted either the doctrin­
aire or the pattern by lAich programs have been implemented in other states. 
The politico-economic system of C^lon is Democratic Socialism. The ide­
ology presupposes a society wherein poverty and ignorance are eliminated, 
wherein property and privilege in any form occupy a well-defined and lim­
ited place, wherein all citizens have an equal opportunity, and idierein 
ethical and spiritual values contribute to the enrichment of the individ­
ual and communal life. VQ.thin this fï»amework, an economy of abundance will 
materialize by virtue of the fullest and most effective utilization of 
human materials and resources. Democratic Socialism assures the well­
being of the individual through equal opportunity and a just share of the 
fruits of progress, because all disparities and exploitation are eliminated. 
All of this is brought about through constitutional means, and with the 
consent of the people.
The "social justice" revolution in Ceylon was the acceptance of 
the institutions through which democratic socialism functions. The con­
stitutional arrangements were s. matter of course, a routine approach in 
the political process. Tne economic phase was something quite different. 
Ceylon had approached economic development with a forceful determination
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to realize the harvest which had eluded the people in former years. But 
instead of adaptijig methods to suit parochial conditions; the leadership 
chose to adopt Western techniques. Here is where the engines of economic 
development and social harmony have been derailed. I t  has been a d o p t io n  
rather than adaptation which has interfered with the structuring of the 
economic and social systems based upon the problems indigenous to Ceylon.
Nearly all styles of democratic socialism have been tried with 
the exception of Æevlon Democratic Socialism. The Ceylonese live in an 
independent country, the government of which has gone to extremes in dis­
associating the island with anything foreign. Yet, the people have been 
forced to choose from among Western styles for their economic guidelines. 
In 1948, the United National Party embarked upon a capitalismrfree enter­
prise course, the prototype of which was the nineteenth century laissez- 
faire philosophy. To have chosen such a course was not unusual, since the 
lessons Ceylon had learned about économie history were firmly grounded in 
the doctrine which had built power and prestige for other peoples. Where 
the doctrine had proved workable elsewhere, such was not to be the case 
for Ceylon; the resources were different, the tools were different, the 
people were different.
The MEP coalition found it politically expedient to copy the rel­
atively recent model of the British welfare state. Given the political 
fortunes of the MEP, the iSri. Lanka Freedom Party had little trouble in 
expanding the welfare state philosophy. It was evident that the people 
wanted more of everything, and satisfying the people is the thing which 
keeps a political party in power. Meanwhile, the UNP, realizing its ear­
lier mistakes, have now altered its course to one of democratic socialism
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of the type now familiar in the United States: a type of free enterprise
but with rigid government control over a variety of sectors, and the hy­
pothesis of equality for all people. The three Marxists parties in Ceylon 
offer the people democratic socialism transplanted from the U.S.S.R. The 
Federal Party, preoccupied with other issues, has yet to decide which type 
is best.
There may be some sUght variations in Ceylon from these proto­
types, but the differences are so slight they make little impression upon 
the people. The Ceylonese have really very little choice as to the type 
of democratic socialism best for Ceylon, The alternatives are limited to 
parroting Great Britain, the United States, or the U,S,S,R. So far, none 
of these have done much to help in fulfilling the aspirations of the Cey­
lonese. Given the highly personal character of politics in Ceylon, no po­
litical party has found it convenient to put interests of the country above 
party interests. Although it is true that to be an actor in government 
one must be both politician and statesman, en̂ >hasis continues to be placed 
upon the former rather than the latter. The voter has been bribed with 
welfare programs and subsidies. On the rare occasion when an attesçt has 
been made to bring some rationale into these programs, opposition forces 
have antagonized groups against groups through obsessions of wealth dif­
ferences, alleged monopolies, and private enterprise. In practically 
every instance, parties have sought to extract purely political advantage 
from the issues. Preoccupied with maintaining status, political rewards 
have been substituted for statesmanship and patriotism. Preeminently im­
portant in the political process is finding local solutions to local prob­
lems. A requisite for the nationalizing operation is exploring new avenues
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whereby public debate can be staged without creating further disunity 
among the communities.
Another instrument for use in Ceylon's nationalizing process is 
Buddhism. Ceylon governments have dwelt upon the "return of Buddhism to 
its rightful place" while refuting the idea that Buddhism should become 
the state religion. The "rightful place" of Buddhism is hardlv possible 
without its, becoming a state religion. Historically, its place was its 
predominance as a guide to kings and peasants alike. The philosophy was 
the major unifier for centuries prior to the coming of the European. There 
is no reason to suppose that, as a national religion, it could not once 
again fulfill this function since the European's departure. National 
forms of religions and national churches are found in other parts of the 
world. Italy, Spain, Ireland are dedicated to Catholicism; Islam is the 
state religion of %wia, Iran, Egypt, and other Middle East countries; and 
the national church of England, Norway, Scotland, and Finland, enjoy spec­
ial privileges. There are more. In the connecting structure of political 
administration with Buddhism, perhaps Colon's pattern of democratic social­
ism would be a socialism based upon Buddhism. It would restore Buddhism to 
its rightful place, it would not be a patterning of an imported product, 
and it would be a socialism having purely local application for solving 
the local problems of Ceylon.
Is Ceylon susceptible to Marxism? The answer is a quite unsatis­
fying, "That depends!" In spite of the factionalism of Ceylon's political 
parties, it has been possible to maintain Cabinets idiose authority has not 
been seriously challenged except through the constitutional and parliamen­
tary process. Ceylon has an enviable record of orderly and peaceful
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elections. The voters show a high degree of maturity. Election authori­
ties have a creditable tradition of maintaining law and order. Eyery 
precaution has been taken to reduce the possibility of incident. In the 
vicinity of the polling places no flags may be displayed, no political 
party booths erected, meetings are banned immediately before polling, all 
of which is an atten^t to stage fair and peaceful elections. In the gen­
eral elections and in the numerous local elections, there has been hardly 
any violence. But, all of this does not obscure the fact that a change 
could come to the advantage of extremism from the Left.
Ceylon is the only country in the world with an organized Trot­
skyist party. It has the majority membership of the three Marxists par­
ties. The ideology of the three is the same; the difference is one of 
degree and personal disagreements between the leaders rather than doctrine. 
The Communist Party was formed in a split with the LSSP during World War II, 
after the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. The Trotskyist majority contin­
ued to denounce war as a struggle between is^erialists; the Communist mû^ 
ority favored support of Britain. This division continued after the war.
The third party is another minority wing of the LSSP, the Viplavakari Lanka 
Sama Samaja Party (VLSSP), more revolutionary than its parent organization.
An attitude is fairly general in Ceylon that if the LSSP should 
gain power, its approach to politics and economics would be more moderate 
than that of the Communist party. Its showing at the polls has been some- 
^at unimpressive. It has, up to now, largely a history of no-contest 
arrangements with the SLFP. As to the 1964 coalition, it would be indeed 
difficult to determine the weight of this merger affecting dissolution of 
the Bandaranaike Government in light of another issue, the Press Bills.
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As to the language issue and the Indian "stateless”  ̂the Marxists ao-gue 
for fairness to the Tamil people. They do not talk about parity in lan­
guage; but they propose settlement through implementation of administra­
tive regulations. Marxists assure the Tamils of a reversal of the process 
of humiliation, and preservation of cultural traits. Thus, economic and 
social changes could obviate changes in Ceylon's political structure.
Up to now, neither the UNP or SLFP have had to face the question 
of polemical attitudes of the younger people toward the present system.
The time is rapidly approachiî . Since I96O when the voting age was low­
ered from 21 to 18 years of age, roughly one million new voters have been 
added to the register. Given the discontentment, the younger generation 
may well express itself by giving preference to that political party which 
guarantees greater security, irrespective of the means. %.thin the narrow 
confines of the family and village relationships, fast fading into limbo 
is the authoritarianism which has been the traditional product of centuries 
of the family-caste-village complex. There was a rather humble acquies­
cence to the political power structure of the village and thus a strong 
sense of obligation. Where there is this deviation in the social habits 
of the younger generation, there is reason to suppose that deviation can 
also be reflected on the political spectrum. Elected politicians must 
still secure the support of the people. The masses who will count most 
toward future electoral support are those who are now frustrated by unemr 
ployment and lack of security today. There is nothing in the present po­
litical structure of Ceylon which negates the possibility of another 
revolution of social justice like that of 1956. Should another occur, it 
may prove to be even more extreme. Economic and social changes certainly
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do make a change in the political picture, but economic and social stag­
nation produce the same result.
One of the keys to a successful nationalizing process is the 
solution to the Tamil problem. Ceylon needs a national government idiich 
assures the Tamil population of representation in the Cabinet such as a 
Ministry of Tamil Affairs. In addition, at least two of the nominated 
mmbers of Parliament should be Tamil. The Ministry of Tamil Affairs 
could be a liaison between the government and the Tamil people. It would 
give the psychological assurance that the Tamils too have a voice in gov­
ernment. There is an immature approach to realities on both sides. Tamil 
grievances are based on the feeling of being second class citizens. The 
righting of wrongs perpetrated on minority races is always the precondi­
tion of national unity, the principal device for national progress. A 
solution to this critical problem in Ceylon cannot be found overnight.
But someidiere a start must be made, which will demonstrate the good intent 
tions of the government toward relieving the anxieties of the minority. 
Representation in government and encouragement of the Tamil cultural ac­
tivities would, at least, start the healing process of the deep sores 
lAich continue to afflict the Ceylon society.
The matter of languages is another case in point where the dis­
dain of the past has been linked with the inept use of a political instru­
ment, the "Sinhala Only" Act. No one would deny Ceylon the right to a 
national language. Every country in the world has a lingual identifica­
tion, and within this linguistic macrocosm are the nd.erocosms of dialects. 
In Ceylon, there is no reason to grant the Tamil language parity status 
with Sinhala. But, it is an injustice to deny a community its own language
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tie with identity. If the country decides upon one lang’.iage for admin­
istrative purposes, there is no reason why it should not be able to do 
so. This is particularly true when the preponderant majority of the 
people obviously desire it. This, however, does not give the government 
the right to withhold from its citizens the knowledge and use of a com­
munication media of any segment of the population.
The Tamil and English languages both have been the victims of 
political misadventures, launched through emotionalism. It is a ludicrous 
premise that a U  of Ceylon's current social ills would somehow disappear, 
if only all the people were coerced into speaking one tongue. It hardly 
needs be stated that all languages, whatsoever their origins, are store­
houses of knowledge. A language —  any language —  is a transmission belt 
for the dissemination of understanding. Language does not ask the color 
of a man's skin, his status in life, the country he belongs to, or the God 
he believes in. It is there for all to use; to accept concepts contained 
therein, or to reject them, or to modify them.
It is ironical that the C^lon government while propagating the 
philosophy of world peace —  and Ceylon is genuinely dedicated to world 
peace —  at the same time should attempt to narrow the channels of commu­
nications idiich, by so doing, might lessen the chances for peace. Of all 
the roads to mutual concord between nation-states, the most important is 
the clear understanding of another's language. If a language is not under­
stood, neither are the people understood, nor what they are thinking.
There is no other way to con^rehend what is going on in the minds of men 
without knowledgable communication. The rather interesting speculation 
arises as to how peace could be obtained if all countries would permit the
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use of its indigenous language to the exclusion of all others, including 
the prohibition in institutions of learning.
It is a false assunqption to claim that ty permitting the use of 
only one language, while prohibiting all others, the result will be uni­
fication of a people. Far more urgent is the permeation of a feeling of 
belonging, a comradeship with other citizens, and the charge of responsi­
bility for conq)leting an assigned task. In the worldwide steps of pro­
gression, perhaps the most notable feature has been the growing unity of 
mankind. If this trend is to continue, there is need for transmission of 
ideas and ideids which belong to different races and cultures.
Ko one people have a monopoly on wisdom, Ceylon has within its 
power to share with the world the great literature of the Sinhala language. 
It can assure itself an ease of transition into its national language for 
all communities hy adapting the Roman script, already familiar to Ceylon­
ese, to Sinhala. The psychological inhibition of the unfamiliar Sinhala 
script would thus be eliminated. Nothing here suggests that the latter 
be discarded; but there is hardly any logical reason to deny a Sinhala 
script-Roman script existence, side by side.
k change in outlook by the Tamils is also inoperative in their 
attitude toward the government. The Federal Party, which claims to rep­
resent the Tamil-speaking people, has done nothing to help relieve SLnhalese- 
Tamil conflicts. The demand for a separate state is nothing short of 
political suicide. The continued pursuit of this completely unrealistic 
goal is totally repugnant to majority sentiment. It takes two to feder­
ate, and the federal state idea can never win the support of the Sinhalese. 
Such demands will continue to alienate the majority toward the Tamils.
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The Federal Party refuses to recognize that a considerable portion of the 
Sinhalese realize as legitimate the grievances of the Tamil population, 
and are sympathetic to the Tamil cause. But as it now stands, the Tamils 
have achieved nothing except furthering Sinhalese antagonisms toward them 
by reason of the Tamil-led boycotts, civil disobedience caẑ aigns, and 
the demand for a separate Tamil state.
% e  Ceylonese are engaged in a conflict between traditional val­
ues and institutions on the one hand and on the other, with customs and 
attitudes acquired by contact with the Western world. The conflict comes 
from an attanq>t to salvage the best of both and amalgamate the two. It 
is a noble undertaking, but is bound to bring the different communities . 
into collision. Herein lies the root cause for the tardiness of economic 
development. It is not that the means of development are missing, but 
that the instruments chosen have been ineptly applied.
The adoption of a foreign species rather than adaption was men­
tioned above in connection with Ceylon's democratic socialism. The same 
holds true in the matters of resources and industrialization. The general 
discontent on the part of the people with the different Plans can be attri­
buted to nothing else other than planning has become devoid of meaning.
It is fine to talk about industrialization and "catching up" with other 
countries as long as the necessities of living are plentiful and at prices 
which purchasers can afford. Small gains in the supply of economic needs, 
coupled with minor decreases in the cost of living, represent to the peo­
ple some progress and will, in turn, generate enthusiasm and cooperation 
in the developmental process. But, if it requires increasingly greater 
individual output of time and energy to purchase the necessities, the
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question arises as to Aether or not it is worth it* If the workers would 
produce enough, the major economic problems would be solved. But increased 
production comes through incentives for the worker. Where the taxes con­
tinue to increase, and where the unit of currency buys less and less, it 
is hardly likely that the worker wiU voluntarily expend greater effort in 
producing. All countries must iMustrialize not only for present and fu­
ture production for domestic consumers, but for the state's protection as 
well. Western esQ>ires have disappeared, of course, from the Asian area. 
Nevertheless, the small states are still vulnerable to the facts of inter­
national politics under idiich trade boycott and similar methods can wreck 
an economy.
One of the pecularitiss of the general development program in 
Ceylon has been the lack of attention given the agricultural sector. Gen­
erally, there has been no incentive to increase production despite the 
island's ever-mountii^ requirements of food for the standing population.
In the case of Ceylon, there would be nothing wrong in the nationalization 
of paddy lands, providing of course the administering agency was made up of 
capable agziculturalists, A substantial reduction in taxes on tea, rubber, 
and coconuts would place these products in a more congietitive category on 
world markets. The loss of tax revenues would surely be replaced by great­
er income to the government through foreign exchange earnings. And it 
might be found profitable to institute a forced savings plan in lieu of the 
heavy tax burden. There is benefit in the psychological factor that the 
people are loaning money to the government for the general welfare and be 
assured of its return someday. But it makes little sense to erect a fac­
tory to manufacture machine tools or anything else for export where the
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product meets stiff coBç>etition iu the world market if, at the same time, 
the country is forced into using the earned foreign exchange for import­
ing necessary iteios which could be produced more cheaply at home. Food 
and cloth are but two examples of the inports.
The agricultural and industrial sectors must be given some suit­
able incentives through lower taxation, and other means which wiU make 
them want to produce more. At the same time, the consumer must reap bene­
fits through lower living costs. The worker is the consumer. If that 
worker is associated in even a small way in management, it gives him a 
sense of responsibility and participation in the maximizing of production 
whether increased harvests, more cloth, or more cement for better housing. 
There is much concern over tbs numerical increase of population, a matter 
which occupies the attention of many national and international agencies. 
Ceylon has also established Planned Parenthood clinics. The program has 
had same success, but it is only a partial answer. There will always be 
increasing numbers of people. It is for these that employment opportun­
ities must be found today and tomorrow. People are wealth in any country. 
Combined with the natural resources, agricultural and mineral, an indus­
trialized Ceylon is on the horizon, providing the social problem is first 
solved, followed by cooperative efforts between government and people to 
work together.
One of the dilemmas of small emerging states is finding an appro­
priate relationship to other states. These developing entities have been 
criticized by a variety of foreign sources for the policy of nonalignment, 
and for being critical of the actions of others lAile being powerless when 
disputes arise in their own backyards.
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The only defense ̂ bioh Ceylon has for its nonaligned posture is 
that it views nonalignment as a moral concept. Nonalignment can hardly 
be defined in any way other than in the broad terms of world peace and 
morality among nations. Nonaligned nations do assume moral postures. 
Ceylon is an in^artial critic and arbiter. It might well take the lead 
in chas^ioning the idea of a permanent organization for mediation and ar­
bitration for disputes among the neutralist countries. One thing which 
all of these have in common is the outlook toward peace. Individually, 
none can influence world affairs since their weight in international af­
fairs is in direct relation to country, size, populati.on, economic and 
military strength. But since the one thing which holds the nonaligned 
countries together now is the common outlook, collectively these coun­
tries could be a dynamic force in world affairs if a permanent organiza­
tion became a actuality.
It is hoped C^lon will not forego its current international 
policy. Alignment, economically md/ov militarily, with any powerful 
nation can only transfer the country to a satellite rank and therefore, 
in substance, return C^lon to dependent status. Its membership in the 
United Nations can have meaning for Ceylon only if it continues to judge 
each issue on individual merit and not from the view of the Cold War imr> 
pact.
In conclusion, no people can claim the ultimate in perfection 
for their governmental system. Whatever degree of perfection has been 
attained, it is due to the qualities of that system in the parochial se1> 
ting with attention given to the people's aspirations, wants, and needs. 
Governments are always in the experimental stage, augmenting and impro-
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vising according to altering circumstances within a country. The changes 
are made not according to some classic or doctrinaire philosophy but, izt- 
stead, according to the indigenous problrase Ceylon might adapt the words 
of Alexander Pope's An Essay On Man. "For forms of government let fools 
i contest; lAate'er is best administered is best." The administration of 
the government must satisfy the people with whom rest the politics —  the 
instruments —  of nationalizing.
Happiness and prosperity have continued to elude the Ceylonese. 
They have permitted the soars of indignities and humiliation, inflicted by 
the past to become a program of retribution for the present. The people 
and their government have not been able to bridge what is to them the Dark 
Ages of coloidaUsm, but feel themselves still the inferiors thus creating 
an emotional blockade toward cooperation. They cannot effectively perform 
the functions of the nationalizing process, no matter how much they would 
like to, as long as th^ fail to realize that the price of nationalism is 
courage, free inquiry, and a respect for individual rights.
The politics of nationalizing is the transcending of the barriers 
of nationality, race, creed, and class. It is breaking through the stric­
tures of community parochialisms.
Lanka —  The Island —  has an enviable history of an admired land, 
and its people have a noble heritage on tdiich to grow. When all the people 
will voluntarily consolidate to set about the task of reenforcing their 
identity as the proud People of Cevlon then Lanka's place in time and his­
tory will again be momentous.
*( PtHrû







N O R ++++++++++M ullaiitivt





/  N dV R ^T  H - / ^ E  N L /
K anta la
A n u ra d h a p u ra iwanwtum Tm*
G alkulam a
T̂ir.p.n
\  V I I I I V  V . T ' s ^ é k W w ,  
G a ig a in u w a tf  \K a la w « wPuttala
lonnaruwNOR W £ SÛE>R
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX I  
The National Flag of Ceylon
The Heraldic lion Flag (page 10) is said to have had its origin 
as a stone carving over a gateway to the Sanchi Stupa in India, built by 
Asoka in the third century B.C. It also appears on the walls of caves at 
Dambulla (see Fig. 6, page 56) in frescoes depicting the conflict between 
King Duttha Gamani and Elara in the second century B.C. The flag also 
flew over idiat is now Kotte during the coronation of King Parakrama Bahu VI.
Its more contemporary io^ortance rests in the fact that it was 
the royal standard of the last King of Kandy, Sri MLckrama Raja Sinha. It 
was this flag lAich was lowered on March 2, 1815» lAen the British assumed 
control of the kingdom, then taken to London to gather dust in the arch­
ives. The lion Flag was never used, or even mentioned, by the British 
government for I30 years.
The subject of a national flag became a topic of controversy among 
the Ceylonese as independence neared. An ad hoc committee was formed to 
consider the design for a national flag. Some very old drawings and crude 
color plates of the lion Flag were found among public and private posses­
sions. The Sinhalese desired adoption of the original pattem. Minority 
groups accepted the lion Flag with some modification; some Tamil leaders 
wanted a wholly new symbol. The ancient lion Flag of Lanka was finally 
agreed upon, but with two vertical strips, green and saffron, added in 
deference to the minority groups on the island. The bo-leaves in the 




The Kew Letters Written By 
The Prince of Orange to the Governors 
of Dutch possessions, February 7, 1?95
(Note: To my knowledge, the English translations of the following appear 
noi&ere else in American sources. The Eew Letters are known in Dutch 
history as the Eew Circulars. With relevance to Ceylon, the translation 
by Colvin de Silva (page 39) will be found in the Ceylon Literary Register. 
3rd series, vol. I, p. 110» The communications to the Governor and the 
Commanding Officer by Sea at the Cape of Good Hope were more elusive. The 
Public Record Office and the India Office of Commonwealth Relations, London, 
could shed no light on the whereabouts of the Letters» East India Compai^ 
papers in the Chatham Papers contain no relevant material for 1795» ^  
search led me to the public records of the Government of the Netherlands, 
and finally to the conç)aqy of Algemeen Rijksarchief, publishers, at the 
Hague. They proved most helpful in forwarding English translations from 
Dutch records contained in G. McCall Theal, Records of the Cane Colony. 
1791-1796 (London: 1697), p. 28, and jL_ Rodway. History of British Guiana. 
1782-1833. vol. II, (Georgetown, Demerara, 1893), p. 72. The translations 
from these sources follow.)
Order from the PRINCE OF ORANGE to the GOVERNOR OF THE CAPE OF 
GOOD HOPE.
Eew, February 7, 1795»
TO THE GOVERNOR OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.
We have thought it right to write to you by this opportunity, and 
to charge you to admit into the Fort under your command such Troops as may 
be sent thither on the Part of His Brit. Majesty, and to receive into Table 
and False Bays and other Harbours'and Places where Ships can remain with 
Safety all Ships of War, Frigates or Armed Vessels that may be sent from 
His said Brit. Majesty, and to look upon them as Troops & Ships of a Power 
in Friendship and Alliance with Their High Mightiness, & that come to pre­
vent the Colony from being invaded by the French.
(Signed) W.Pr. of ORANGE.
By Command of His Highness, In the Absence of the Private Secretary.
(S ig n e d )  J .W . BOEJSNE.
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Order from the PRINCE OF ORANGE to the COMMANDING OFFICER BY SEA 
AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.
Eew, February 7» 1795*
TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER BY SEA AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.
We have thought it necessary hereby to write to you and order you 
to admit into the Road of the Cape of Good Hope and into False Bay such 
Ships of War, Frigates or armed Vessels as may be sent thither on the part 
of ELs Britannic Majesty, as Ships or a Power who is in Friendship and 
Alliance with Their High Mightinesses, to prevent the Colony from being 
invaded by the French; and jou will put yourself under the Orders of the 
Commanding Officer of the said Ships if he is older or higher in rank than 
yourself, and not oppose him in case he should put azqr Troops on Shore for 
the Defense of the Forts.
(Signed) W.Pr. of ORANGE.
By His Higimess's Command in the Absence of the Private Secretary.
(Signed) J.W. BOEJENK.
At the same time a letter was delivered to the Governor from the 
Prince, dated Eew, February 7th 1795» ^&ich ran as follows :
"We have thought it necessary by these, to command you, in Demerara 
as well as Essequebo, to admit the forces which may be sent there by His 
Britannic Majesty; and, in the rivers, such men-of-war, frigates, or other 
armed vessels, as may be sent there by His Majesty of Great Britain, and to 
consider them as forces and vessels in friendship and alliance with their 
High Mightinesses the States General of the United Netherlands, coming 
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